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“Like the other immigrant groups, the day will come when we win the economic and political
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That day may not come this year. That day may not come this decade, but it will come someday.”
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vi

ABSTRACT
The Latino population has experienced significant growth in the last few decades, and as a
result of that growth, the Latino population is now the largest minority group in the U.S. Despite
this, our understanding of the attitudes, behavior, and representation of this group still lags relative
to others in American society. As a result of that growth, the Latino population is now the largest
minority group in the U.S. Amongst other things, which is why there is a need to explore how this
group is represented in government. Prior work – be it due to data limitations, the low number of
Latinos in office, or theoretical considerations – has been unable to provide an adequate picture of
the level of representation afforded to Latinos. This study is an attempt to add to our understanding
of Latino representation in the U.S. I do this through the presentation of three distinct but
interrelated papers. The first paper looks at the level of congruence between Latinos and their
legislators relative to non-Latino whites and their legislators. This paper finds that Latinos are at a
disadvantage, one that is exacerbated in contexts where they make up larger segments of the
population. In addition, I find that this disadvantage is rooted in both the attitudes and behavior of
both Anglos and Latinos. The second paper explores legislative communication on Twitter with
respect to the interests of the Latino population. I find that Latino and Democratic legislators are
more likely to post about issues important to Latinos. I also find that there is a difference in the
behavior of Latino and non-Latino legislators attributable to legislator ethnicity, with Latino
legislators more likely to post symbolic messages than their non-Latino colleagues. The third paper
explores the role of legislator ethnicity in policy framing on bilingual education. I find that shared
ethnicity, or rather the lack thereof, between legislators and respondents does influence support
for bilingual education in certain situations. Collectively, these papers provide a clearer picture of
the relationship between legislators and their constituents and of the role that legislator
characteristics and district demographics play in influencing legislative behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long been interested in the relationship between people and the individuals
that represent them in office. Only relatively recently has this focus moved toward understanding
representation as it relates to specific minority groups (see Smith 2004 for a general discussion of
work on race within the discipline).1 Latinos, because of their newfound status as the largest
minority group in the U.S., have recently become the focus of pundits, candidates, and scholars
alike.2 Given the potential of this group to influence American politics, there is a need to more
deeply understand what Latinos care about, how they behave, how they interact with the
government, and how government represents them; the last of which is the key focus here.
At its core, this dissertation is concerned with exploring how Latinos are represented and
accounting for the factors that produce variation in the representational process. This work – like
the concept of representation itself – touches on different ways in which this segment of the
population is represented.3 The first chapter explores the extent to which Latinos are substantively
represented in the U.S. House of Representatives and the underlying mechanisms structuring the
situations in which they are not. In doing so, it taps into the preferences of Latinos relative to nonLatino whites, and it provides a more complete look at the contexts in which Latinos are likely to
have their interests advanced by their legislators. The second chapter examines whether legislators
are talking about the issues that are important to the Latino population, which speaks to symbolic

1

The literature on Latinos (and, to a larger extent, Asians) is still underdeveloped when compared to that on
African-Americans and whites in American politics.
2
The terms Latino and Hispanic are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation, as is the norm in the literature
within the discipline.
3
Though this work speaks to different facets of Latino representation, no single project can adequately speak to the
different types of representation afforded to any given group, much less, the American people as a whole.
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representation, as what legislators say (or do not say) speaks volumes about how they view Latinos.
The third chapter is focused on indirect representation, which can potentially be gained through
the non-Latino Anglo population. This chapter asks: how effective can legislators be in garnering
support for issues important to the Latino population through shaping the opinions of the nonLatino population?

Types and Levels of Representation
There are various ways to explore the political representation of groups in society. Much
ink has been spilled in writing about the different types and levels of representation. It is the work
of Pitkin (1967), however, to which the literature within the discipline traces key theoretical
debates and conceptualizations regarding representation. The important types of representation for
this work are descriptive, substantive, and symbolic.4 Descriptive representation refers to whether
legislators reflect the individuals they represent with respect to demographic characteristics (e.g.,
a black legislator representing black constituents). Substantive representation refers to the extent
to which representatives advance the interests of the individuals they represent. Symbolic
representation, according to Pitkin (1967), speaks to how representatives “stand for” their
constituents5, and it should be noted that it does not require the presence of descriptive
representation nor the actual advancement of constituent interests. Though theoretically distinct,
in practice these different types are often interconnected, which means that a single legislator can
provide all three types of representation to a given constituent. This dissertation is aware of this

4

Pitkin (1967) also speaks of formalistic representation, which speaks to the institutional arrangements that dictate
who represents whom.
5
Sinclair-Chapman (2002) defines symbolic acts as those “aimed at giving voice to group interests, agenda-setting,
and offering alternative views or political possibilities [that] are integral to enhanced political deliberation [and] that
address the concerns of disadvantaged groups” (p. 8).

2

and takes advantage of those different intersections when looking at the representation afforded to
Latinos.
In addition to different types, the level at which representation is explored is another key
consideration in the study of representation. Substantive representation can be explored at the
individual level. This can be done by looking at the dyadic relationship between constituents and
their representatives (Miller and Stokes 1963), which is the level of analysis to which much work
in the discipline gravitates (see Griffin 2014). It can also be explored at the aggregate level, which
can be done by looking at the collective attitudes of a district (or group of people) to see how they
line up with the behavior of legislators (Weissberg 1978: Hurley 1982; Hero and Tolbert 1995) or
that of the government as a whole (Wlezien 1995; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Gilens
2012). The level at which representation is explored has both theoretical and methodological
consequences. It should also be noted that the finding of congruence at one level does not guarantee
that the same applies to other levels.6 Exploring the representation afforded to the people at
different levels allows for a more complete picture of the relationship between the people and
government.

Descriptive Representation
Descriptive representation, though not the central focus of any of these individual papers,
provides the underlying foundation that ultimately holds my work together. Like the broader
literature on minority representation, this work is aware of – and makes analytical use of – the
ethnic ties that bind legislators to their constituents and citizens. Scholarship in this vein of the
literature has long operated under the assumption – at least implicitly – that minority legislators

6

Indeed, individual-level preferences and voting behavior of legislators could be consistent with each other while
the collective outputs of the legislature may not be. The opposite could also be true.
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bring something different to the table, something that results in the enhanced representation of
their co-ethnic (or co-racial) constituents (see Mansbridge 1999; see also Griffin 2014).
Work in this area of study has explored various aspects of descriptive representation, from
differences in the behavior of minority legislators and non-minority legislators – and the effect this
has on the representation of their co-minority constituents – to the effect of descriptive
representation on the attitudes and behavior of constituents (see Griffin 2014 for an overview).
Indeed, a natural preoccupation in the aftermath of the passage of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of
1965 has been gauging the impact of the increased election of minorities in Congress; but there
are various ways to do this. Many scholars have looked at how the presence of minority legislators
affects the way in which minorities are substantively represented (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Swain
1995; Cameron et al. 1996; Overby and Cosgrove 1996; Canon 1999; Lublin 1999; Whitby 2000;
Tate 2003; Casellas 2007, 2011; Grose 2011; Rouse 2013). Other scholars have looked at how the
presence of minority legislators influences constituents. Some have looked at how descriptive
representation shapes how constituents feel towards and think about government (Gay 2002;
Pantoja and Segura 2003; Sanchez and Morin 2011), while others have focused on its effect on the
political behavior of minorities (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2001; Banducci et al. 2004; Barreto
et al. 2004; Rocha et al. 2010).
When considering the descriptive connection between legislators and constituents, the
questions of what makes minority individuals different and how that translates to the expectation
that they will better advance the interests of their co-ethnic (or co-racial) constituents inevitably
arise (Mansbridge 1999; but see Dovi 2002; Rocha and Wrinkle 2011). Indeed, though much of
the work in this vein assumes that minority legislators are in a better position to advance the
4

interests of her/his co-minority constituents than non-minority legislators are, it is a fairly strong
assumption that the color of an individual’s skin (or their membership in a given group) will
influence their behavior (see Dovi 2002). However, this nation has a long history, and legacy, of
societal and legal realities that have structured the relationships between individuals from different
groups based on race (and ethnicity).7 Therefore, minorities, because of shared history and life
experiences have – to varying levels – a sense of linked fate, whereby individuals that are part of
a racial (or ethnic) group believe that their own success is tied to that of their group more broadly,
and this is something that has a bearing on how individuals behave (Dawson 1994; Schildkraut
2013; Lavariega Monforti 2014). This is the connection that scholars believe to be driving the
behavior of minority legislators (Mansbridge 1999; Dovi 2002) and tying them to the segments of
the constituency that are like them. Having that commonality is theorized to put them in a better
position to advance the interests of those individuals that are like them (Mansbridge 1999).

Latino Representation
Scholars trying to understand the extent to which Latinos are represented have been
primarily preoccupied with the factors that lead to higher descriptive representation (see Casellas
2009) and the subsequent effects of descriptive representation (and its absence) on the substantive
representation of Latinos (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Kerr and Miller 1997;
Lublin 1997; Casellas 2007, 2011; Griffin and Newman 2007; Knoll 2009; Minta 2009; Wilson
2010). The focus on the descriptive-to-substantive representation connection is substantively
limited insofar as there are few Latino legislators in Congress and of the fact that many if not most

Mansbridge (1999) mentions “contexts of historical political subordination and low de facto legitimacy,” which
definitely play a part in shaping the worldviews of individuals generally, and of legislators too, as a result (p. 628).
7
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Latinos are not represented by co-ethnic legislators.8 Nonetheless, there is some support for the
notion that Latinos are better represented by co-ethnic legislators in both voting behavior and in
the broader legislative process. Latino legislators not only seem to demonstrate an awareness of
Latino interests, but also a willingness to advance those interests (relative to their non-Latino
colleagues) at various stages in the legislative process (i.e., agenda-setting (Wilson 2010; Rouse
2013), in committee work and oversight (Minta 2009), and when voting (Griffin and Newman
2007; Casellas 2011)).
How Latinos in the electorate fare on the substantive representational front in the absence
of descriptive representation is even more of a motivating factor in exploring the representation of
Latinos, especially in the short-term because this population is only expected to keep growing.9
Even if Latino legislators are more likely to advance the interests of Latinos in the legislative
process than non-Latino legislators, that is not in and of itself normatively concerning. Indeed, all
individuals, at least in theory, have the ability to adequately represent minorities. Further, if
Latinos merely heighten the already adequate level of representation afforded to Latinos in the
electorate by non-Latino legislators, then the absence of descriptive representation may not be
problematic from a substantive viewpoint.10 Nonetheless, the literature on the subject casts doubt
on whether this actually takes place, even in those districts where Latinos increasingly make up
larger shares of the total population (see Griffin and Newman 2007). Available scholarship on the

8

There are currently 38 Hispanics in Congress (NALEO Educational Fund 2019), which is the highest number in
the history of our nation, but much of the work on representation was done decades ago (see Welch and Hibbing
1984; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Kerr and Miller 1997), and the number of Latino legislators in Congress didn’t eclipse
the 20 member mark until the turn of the new millennium (Ornstein 2013).
9
Granted, this could mean a close in the descriptive-to-population gap (Latinos currently make up about 18% of the
total population and hold only about 7% of the seats in Congress (NALEO Education Fund 2019) that currently
exists, but it could also mean that this gap only further grows.
10
This is in no way meant to discount the other benefits that are commonly associated with descriptive
representation.
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subject suggests that Latinos are more ideologically liberal than their non-Latino co-citizens in the
electorate (Griffin and Newman 2007; Segura 2012; Barreto and Segura 2014) and that the voting
behavior of Latinos in Congress follows suit (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Kerr and Miller 1997;
Casellas 2007; Griffin and Newman 2007). The work of Griffin and Newman (2007) also suggests
that there is an ideological gap between Latinos and their legislators relative to whites and their
own legislators, a difference that is not lessened by larger Latino districts and even exacerbated in
those districts where Latinos get close to a majority. Not only is this finding in need of further
exploration, so are the other ways that Latinos are represented by their legislators, and this
dissertation is an attempt along these lines.
Though the literature on Latino representation provides a better understanding than what
was available just a couple of decades ago, there are still questions in need of exploration along
with some theoretical and methodological refinements that need to be made to the available work
on the subject. The Latino population has grown significantly in the last few decades (Barreto and
Segura 2014, p. 15; Brown 2014). This growth has led to an increased presence of Latinos in
various offices from city councils to state legislatures and Congress (Casellas 2011). Even though
those numbers still lag behind their numbers in the population, increased presence means that there
is more statistical leverage to explore how their presence influences the relative representation
afforded to Latinos by co-ethnic legislators when compared to that afforded to them by non-Latino
officeholders. Similarly, with growth has also come a dispersion in the population of Latinos
across the United States (Stepler and Lopez 2016; Milligan 2018).11 In light of those trends, there
is a renewed interest by pundits, campaigns, and researchers in this Latino “Sleeping Giant” as a

11

The Western region of the U.S. still holds the majority of the Latino population, but the South and Northeast have
experienced significant growth in their Latino populations since the turn of the millennium.
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potential force in American politics in the years that come (see Barreto and Segura 2014, p. 15).
That growth has not happened in a vacuum, however. Indeed, there are intergroup dynamics at
play that need to be considered alongside said growth. The status of Latinos as the largest minority
group in the U.S. (see Flores 2017) means that this segment of the population affects the
demographic hierarchy in the country (see Vespa et al. 2018); something that has the potential to
invoke anti-Latino attitudes and behavior (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). The different papers here
speak to these demographic changes and their consequences for the representation of Latinos. I
now turn to a brief discussion of each specific portion of the dissertation as well as outlining more
of the substantive questions that I endeavor to speak to.

Overview of Papers
Paper Number 1: Substantive Representation
My first paper is focused on the extent to which Latinos are dyadically represented by their
legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives relative to non-Latino whites. Prior work – be it
as a result of limitations in the data, a low number of Latino legislators in office, or theoretical
considerations – has failed to adequately explore the representation afforded to Latinos in the
legislature. The Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) provides not only a nationally
representative sample of Latinos and positions taken by them (and non-Latinos) on important
issues of the day, but also roll call votes taken by their respective legislators (see Ansolabehere
and Schaffner 2013). Clearly, dyadic representation is not the only way to explore representation
(see Weissberg 1978; Hero and Tolbert 1995), but it is one of the most direct ways to do so.
However, prior work, in its reliance on proxy measures for the interests of Latinos, has provided
an imperfect measure of Latino representation. I use actual positions taken by individual
respondents and explore how they line up with the voting behavior of their legislators.
8

In addition, and arguably more importantly, the paper explores the factors that account for
variation in the representation afforded to Latinos relative to whites. Recent scholarship finds what
appears to be a backlash effect, in which larger Latino populations lead to more ideological
distance between Latinos and their legislators when compared to whites and their legislators
(Griffin and Newman 2007). In essence, the explanation provided for such a deficit in the
representation afforded to Latinos in more Latino-populated districts is that those larger
populations lead to more anti-Latino sentiment. This is theoretically consistent with the in-group
versus out-group dynamics posited by scholars going back to V.O. Key’s (1949) seminal work on
the effect of the size of the African-American population on the attitudes and behavior of the white
population (see also Allport 1954; Blalock 1967; Quillian 1995; Hood and Morris 1997; Taylor
1998; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Rocha and Espino 2013; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). While
theoretically consistent with a racial backlash explanation, there is a need to explore the underlying
mechanisms driving this effect. Indeed, it could be that this “backlash” effect is actually (or
additionally) rooted in the attitudes and behavior of the Latino population. Latinos could be less
likely to participate as their share of the population grows, something that may come from a lack
of mobilization, a free rider effect, apathy, or from the fact that Latinos tend to be lower on the
socioeconomic spectrum than non-Latino whites. Irrespective of the determining factor(s), finding
that Latinos in more heavily Latino-populated districts participate at lower rates than those in
districts with lower Latino populations could add a fundamentally different perspective to the
equation. Similarly, it could be that the attitudes of Latinos become more distinct when we move
from districts with lower Latino populations to those with higher Latino populations, which could
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also explain a representational deficit, one that isn’t rooted in the attitudes (or behavior) of the
non-Latino white population. I explore those possibilities in the first paper.
Paper Number 2: Symbolic Representation
An important part of what legislators provide constituents is symbolic representation.
Through their presence in the legislature, their behavior, and communication, legislators work to
provide their constituents with psychological reassurance that they are aware of and working to
advance their constituents’ interests in office (see Sinclair-Chapman 2002). In my second paper, I
explore the communication of legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives with respect to the
interests of Latinos. More specifically, I look at both the substance (i.e., whether the tweets address
issues important to Latinos) and nature (i.e., whether the tweets are policy-oriented, symbolic in
nature, media, etc.) of legislative communication on Twitter. Since its introduction, Twitter has
been widely adopted and used by candidates and legislators alike (see Lassen and Bode 2017), and
it is currently used by millions worldwide, including many governments and heads of state. Unlike
other parts of the legislative process (i.e., agenda-setting, committee work, and roll call voting),
legislators do not face the same constraints on their behavior in how they communicate with their
constituents. Indeed, they are, at least theoretically, free to post whatever they want on Twitter,
which is why what they choose to post (or not to post) lets constituents know what their priorities
are and whether legislators are on their side.
Legislative communication, however, is undoubtedly connected to the behavior (and
success) of legislators in the broader legislative process. This means that legislators cannot post
about their success on the legislative front if they are not able to get policies through the legislative
process. At best, they can post opposition to the policies on the agenda or attempt to present issues
important to their constituents. Symbolic acts have long been considered a strategy for legislators
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to compensate for the lack of change in the status quo on the policy front (Henry 1971; Barnett
1975; Eulau and Karps 1977; Sinclair-Chapman 2002; Tate 2003; Dancey and Massand 2017;
Tillery 2017). In exploring legislative behavior on Twitter, this paper adds not only to our
understanding of how Latinos are represented in Congress, but also to that of minority legislative
behavior in comparison to non-minorities in the legislature.
Paper Number 3: Indirect Representation (and the Limits of Descriptive Representation)
My third, and last, paper explores the possibility of indirect representation of Latino
interests through the non-Latino population. A theoretical staple of the literature on minority
representation is the descriptive connection between the people and the individuals that represent
them in government. This flows naturally from the expectation that minority legislators are better
positioned to advance the interests of their co-minority constituents. That connection has been
tested in many ways, and at different stages in the legislative process, with the general conclusions
being that minority legislators do advance the interests of their co-ethnic and co-racial constituents.
This is important for the individuals being represented because, in addition to the psychological
and emotional benefits of descriptive representation, there are actors actively working on the issues
important to them as constituents. Nevertheless, legislators do not only represent their co-ethnic
(or co-racial) constituents, which means that there is a need to garner broader support for their
policies in office. Part of their job is representing all of their constituents. However, recent
literature on interactions between legislators and their constituents with whom they do not share a
racial or ethnic identity suggests that the communication between the two groups is strained, to
say the least (see Butler and Broockman 2011; Broockman 2014; Mendez and Grose 2018). Work
in this area shows that constituents are less likely to reach out to their representatives when there
is not a demographic connection between the two (Broockman 2014), and also that legislators are
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also less likely to respond to their constituents when they do not share the same racial or ethnic
identity (Butler and Broockman 2011; Broockman 2013; Mendez and Grose 2018). Both of these
realities may be rooted in the intergroup dynamics that scholars have been exploring for decades
(see Huddy 2001; Hogg et al. 2017).
Since an important part of legislative success is ensuring that constituents support (or at
the very least tolerate) the behavior of legislators in Washington, D.C., whether they can
successfully communicate with constituents and garner support for their favored policies is of
particular importance. Frames are at the heart of communication, individuals couch their
arguments in the most favorable light, and legislators are no different. Policy frames in political
communication have long been looked at as a means to gain support (or opposition) to issues on
the political agenda (see Chong and Druckman 2007). A long literature on the subject suggests
that frames are generally effective in doing so (Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Jacoby
2000; Chong and Druckman 2007; Merolla et al. 2013). More recent work has moved towards
exploring the situations in which they don’t (Brewer 2003; Hartman and Weber 2009). One such
factor that may affect how effective policy frames are is the source cue (Hartman and Weber 2009;
Nicholson 2012; Weber et al. 2012). While an oversight by earlier work on the subject, this is
something so fundamental that it needs to be considered when looking at communication between
two actors as this can influence how receptive individuals are to the message they are presenting.
Indeed, the best policy frame may not be effective if the source presenting it isn’t viewed as a
credible, legitimate, or trustworthy one (Hartman and Weber 2009).
In this third paper, I account for the relative success that legislators can have in framing a
political issue contingent on the shared (or not) ethnicity between them and their constituents. The
12

literature on elite-citizen communication suggests that the latter will sometimes adopt positions
taken by the former (Minozzi et al. 2015; Butler and Broockman 2017), but we do not know how
legislator ethnicity influences the propensity of constituents to do so. Based on the other literature
on communication patterns between constituents and legislators, and that on intergroup dynamics,
I theorize that policy frames will only be successful when there is a racial descriptive connection
between the two parties involved. I explore this by using a survey experiment where the key
manipulation is legislator ethnicity to see whether my theory is correct.

Broader Topics and Connections
One of the most important concepts in the study of American democracy is representation.
Indeed, our republican form of government leads to the reliance on intermediaries for the
advancement of the interests of the people. That dyadic relationship between individuals and their
representatives plays an important role in whether the outputs of government reflect the will of the
people – it is supposed to be, after all, a government by the people, for the people. The U.S. House
of Representatives was meant to be the closest to the people by design, and though other actors
(governmental and otherwise) can have a bearing on the policy outputs of the American political
system, there is an expectation that the behavior of those individual legislators will reflect the
preferences of those that they’re tasked with representing. Granted, though debates about the
proper role of representatives – with respect to how they represent constituents – in the American
context is one that has been ongoing since our nation’s infancy (see Burke 1774; Pitkin 1967:
Mansbridge 2003), there is an expectation that the behavior of legislators sometimes reflect the
preferences of the people that put them in office.12 The first paper speaks directly to this
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Though there is still debate about the delegate versus trustee models of representation, and even more nuanced
conceptions of the relationship between constituents and their representatives (see Rehfeld 2009), this work is built
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relationship and in doing so highlights the gap in the representation afforded to Latinos relative to
whites, which provides motivation for and informs the other papers here.
Communication is an important part of the relationship between citizens and their
representatives. It is a way for the people to let officeholders know what they want and for
officeholders to keep citizens informed. Legislators go to great lengths to let constituents know
about their behavior in and outside of the geographical districts they represent (Mayhew 1974;
Fenno 1978; Arnold 1990; Jacobson and Carson 2015). The second and third papers explore
legislative communication in two distinct ways. The Twitter paper looks at how legislators
communicate with constituents and what they choose to communicate with them, both of which
can provide us with a better understanding of how Latinos are represented. The last paper focuses
on legislative communication in a different way; it looks at how effective (or ineffective) Latino
and non-Latino legislators can be in communicating with constituents as influenced by shared
ethnicity or the lack thereof. This is important because it adds to our understanding of a still
growing literature on the strained relationship between constituents and legislators (see Mendez
and Grose 2018).
How legislators behave in office has consequences for their own electoral aspirations and
for the representation afforded to the individuals responsible for putting them in office. How
legislators choose to spend their time in office is indicative of their priorities. Scholars have looked
at legislative behavior in different parts of the legislative process in an attempt to get a better
understanding of what makes them tick. Though far removed from Fenno’s (1978) bird’s-eye view

on the notion that there should be some level of congruence between the preferences of the people and the
individuals that represent them. In addition, and more importantly, as the work that follows will show, there is a
disconnect between the preferences of Latinos and their legislators that is more pronounced than that between whites
and their legislators, and this is something that any view of representation would have issues reconciling.
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of legislative perceptions and behavior, the subsequent work on legislative behavior also gives us
an idea of what is driving the behavior of legislators. Indeed, aside from making decisions on
things like how much time is spent in the district versus at Capitol Hill or the amount of resources
allocated to staffing, legislators are also tasked with engaging in the legislative process. In that
formal process (e.g., committee work, roll call votes, etc.) legislators also have to make decisions
about how they can increase their likelihood of being re-elected. It is there that more substantive
differences in behavior amongst legislators can be gleaned.
An important argument normally made for increased descriptive representation is that it is
a way to increase the substantive representation of underrepresented groups in society.13 This work
deals with those differences in legislative behavior based both on the individual characteristics of
the legislators (e.g., race, ethnicity, partisan identification, age, etc.) and the composition of their
districts (e.g., district demographics). As a result, the dissertation as a whole speaks to the
differences in behavior and their bearing on the representation of Latinos. For example, the first
paper looks at how the aforementioned factors influence the representation afforded to Latinos
across different geographic contexts. The second chapter looks at how those same contexts
influence what legislators are talking about on Twitter and how they’re doing it, which highlights
differences in priorities and legislative strategies chosen in their communication, the latter of
which is of particular importance here. The last paper touches on the way in which demographic
characteristics can moderate the communication between legislators and their constituents and, in
doing so, provides some insight as to how legislators behave. A lack of receptivity on the part of
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In addition, there are also non-policy benefits believed to be associated with increased descriptive representation
such as increased feelings of efficacy (Merolla et al. 2013), decreased feelings of political alienation (Pantoja and
Segura 2003), and psychological reassurance rooted in symbolic acts on the part of minority legislators (SinclairChapman 2002).
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constituents could potentially lead legislators to change their outreach strategies and behavior more
broadly in pursuit of their re-election bids on their horizons.
These different papers complement each other, as each is able to speak to different aspects
of the political representation of Latinos. For example, the leading paper looks at whether or not
the roll call votes of legislators are consistent with the preferences of constituents, which is
important in its own right, but it is only one part of the legislative process and of the relationship
between constituents and their representatives. Indeed, the absence (or presence) of congruence in
that part of the legislative process does not mean that Latinos cannot be (or are not) represented in
other ways and in other parts of the process.14 The second paper looks at the representation of
Latinos through the communication of legislators, which provides insight into the issues that
legislators are discussing and how they are doing so. In addition, it also highlights differences in
communication amongst legislators and, in doing so, points toward differences in the symbolic
representation of Latinos. Therein lies the connection between those papers, as the realities of
navigating the legislative process – and success on the legislative front – can influence the behavior
of legislators and how they communicate with their constituents. Relatedly, the third paper is
concerned with looking for an alternative path to increased substantive representation and it also
deals with constituent communication. The former is a direct connection to the first paper as it is
also preoccupied with variation in substantive representation, albeit through the non-Latino
population. The latter is a connection to the second paper insofar that it adds to our understanding
of communication between legislators and constituents.

Nonetheless, that finding – and other literature on the subject – provide a basis for developing expectations for the
exploration of representation in other areas.
14
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Conclusion
This dissertation is an attempt to gain a better understanding of the representation afforded
to Latinos by legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives. However, as the discussion above
makes clear, there are different types of representation and various areas in the legislative process
that can be looked at to gauge the representation afforded to this group. The leading paper explores
representation on the back end of the legislative process: roll call voting. The paper that follows
looks at representation via communication on Twitter. The last paper explores the possibility of
indirect representation and a limitation of descriptive representation. The closing chapter discusses
avenues for further study, new questions, and my research agenda moving forward.
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CHAPTER 1: THE REPRESENTATIONAL DEFICIT OF LATINOS IN
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

30

Abstract
This paper explores the extent to which Latinos were substantively represented in the 112th
U.S. House of Representatives (2011-2013). I make use of a large national sample of Americans
to tap into the congruence of the attitudes of constituents with actual roll call votes taken by their
legislators in office. In doing so, I am able to make comparisons between constituent attitudes and
legislative behavior for Latino versus non-Latino constituents. Using a more refined measure than
previous studies of constituent-legislator dyads across congressional districts, I find that Latino
respondents face a representational deficit relative to non-Latino whites and explore the various
factors, individual- and contextual-level, that explain variation in that relationship. One such factor
is the size of the Latino population in a district. I find that larger Latino populations are associated
with decreased representation for Latino respondents and, further, that this deficit is largely rooted
in anti-Latino attitudes and behavior on the part of non-Latino whites in those districts. On the
whole, the findings here are consistent with the backlash hypothesis
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Introduction
Latinos are currently the largest minority group in the U.S. and make up about 18 percent
of the population (Alonzo 2018). The 116th Congress is the most racio-ethnically diverse in our
nation’s history, with the largest number of Latino legislators in our history. But there is still a
disconnect between the size of the Latino population and the number of Latino legislators in
office.1 One lingering question, that the available literature does not fully address is the extent to
which Latinos are substantively represented in Congress. Work on the subject within the discipline
is scarce, and that which is available does not provide an adequate picture of the aforementioned
relationship. Thanks to the availability of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES),
I am able to present a more refined measure of Latino preferences that takes into account actual
constituent and legislator positions taken on issues of the day, instead of relying on general
ideological measures or interest group scorecard ratings.
In addition, as a result of mixed findings on the expected effect of the size of the Latino
population on the representation of Latinos, and more recent work citing an anti-Latino
mobilization effect coming with larger Latino populations (see Griffin and Newman 2007), I also
explore the role of Latino population size on the attitudes (and behavior) of whites as well as the
underlying mechanisms responsible for any “backlash” effect on the representation afforded to
Latinos. Indeed, while Griffin and Newman (2007) find that there is an ideological gap between
Latinos and their representatives when compared to whites and theirs, a difference that is
exacerbated by districts where Latinos comprise a larger segment of the population in the district,

1

Latinos hold 38 seats in Congress, which is about 7 percent of the total membership in the 116 th Congress, a
number that lags behind their share of the population, which is currently above 18 percent of the total population
(NALEO Educational Fund 2019).
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they do not directly test for a backlash hypothesis. While this backlash explanation – rooted in
group dynamics (i.e., in-group versus out-group attitudes) – is a possibility, it could also be that
the behavior and/or opinions of the Latino population itself are fundamentally different in those
districts where they comprise a larger segment of the population. Whether this gap is rooted in the
behavior (and attitudes) of the Anglo and the Latino population has both practical and normative
implications for the study of Latino representation. In any case, there is a need to explore differing
explanations and flesh out the underlying mechanisms for that aforementioned gap – something
that the available work has failed to do.
My work is an attempt to explore not only how Latinos are represented relative to nonLatino whites, but also to uncover the factors that account for variation in that representation.
Amongst the factors explored are various individual-level respondent characteristics (i.e.,
partisanship, education, income, and participation) and contextual level factors (i.e., the size of the
Latino population in a respondent’s district, being in a district where a respondent is represented
by a Democratic (and/or Latino) lawmaker), along with their interactions. Descriptive
representation has long been lauded as a way to increase the substantive representation of minority
groups. But even now – with more seats held by Latinos than at any previous time in the history
of our nation – many Latinos are still not represented by co-ethnic legislators. This is but one
reason why it is essential to account for the variation in representation afforded to Latinos in
instances where they are not represented by co-ethnic legislators. I take up these – and other
considerations brought forth by the available literature – to explore Latino representation here.

33

Theoretical Foundations
Representation
Representation is at the heart of our democracy. The American populace relies on
officeholders at all levels of government to come up with (and pass) policy on their behalf.
Therefore, the extent to which the preferences of the people are advanced in government tells us
something about the health of our republic. One of the most explored facets of the relationship
between the people and the government is centered on that particular part (i.e., congruence between
the preferences of the people and the behavior of elected officials) of the policy process, and this
paper is too. Even though policy responsiveness (or roll call congruence) is not the only way to
conceptualize representation – as will be made clear below – it is one of the most direct ways to
explore the relationship between the people and the individuals that represent them in office.
Representation has many dimensions (e.g., descriptive, substantive, symbolic (see Pitkin
1967)) and levels at which it can be explored (i.e., dyadic versus collective (see Miller and Stokes
1963; Weissberg 1978)). In regard to the latter, representation can take place and be explored at
the dyadic level, which is that between individuals and their representatives and it can also be
examined from a macro perspective (i.e., collective), which is how an institution (e.g., Congress)
as a whole represents individuals or groups in society. On the former, representation can refer to
the extent to which legislators mirror constituents demographically (i.e., descriptive), to the extent
to which the behavior of legislators reflects the preferences of their constituents (i.e., substantive),
or to “public gestures of a sort that create a sense of trust and support in the relationship between
representative and the represented” (i.e., symbolic representation, Eulau and Karps 1977, p. 241;
see also Edelman 1964; Pitkin 1967; Sinclair-Chapman 2002). Though different theoretically,
these are intimately linked in practice – especially when we think about minority representation –
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because they all have a bearing on how individuals are represented.2 Here, the primary focus is on
the substantive representation of Latinos in the electorate. But the presence of Latino legislators in
Congress also allows for the exploration of how descriptive representation influences the
substantive representation afforded to that segment of the population.
Though there are various ways to explore representation, congruence – or lack thereof –
between the voting behavior of legislators and their constituents has long attracted the attention of
scholars in the discipline (Miller and Stokes 1963; Erikson 1978; Bartels 1991; Hill and Hurley
1999; Wlezien 2004; Clinton 2006). Recent work in this vein of the literature has explored
behavior in other areas of the legislative process such as agenda-setting (Bratton and Haynie 1999;
Sinclair-Chapman 2002; Bratton 2006; Wilson 2010), committee work (Gamble 2007; Rouse
2013), and oversight (Minta 2011; Rouse 2013)), but roll calls are arguably more visible, and easier
to access and evaluate. In general, the work that looks at this dyadic representation suggests that
the behavior of legislators reflects the preferences of constituents at least some of the time (Miller
and Stokes 1963; Hill and Hurley 1999; Wlezien 2004; Clinton 2006). We know less about how
the preferences of Latinos are mirrored by their legislators and about the factors that influence
variations in the behavior of legislators with respect to Latinos.
Minority Representation
The extent to which the behavior of minority and non-minority legislators is different has
consequences for the individuals that they represent. Indeed, if there is no substantive difference
in the way in which minority and non-minority legislators represent their constituents, then the
reality that there is a large segment of the minority population that is not represented by someone

2

The literature on minority has demonstrated that descriptive and other types of representation are linked, as race
and ethnicity have been found to influence the behavior of legislators in office (see Griffin 2014 for a review; see
also Hero 2017).
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that mirrors them racially or ethnically should not be concerning from a representational
standpoint, at least on the policy front.3 However, the literature on minority behavior – at both the
state and congressional level – suggests that there is something inherently different that minority
legislators bring to the table which is evident in their behavior, as alluded to above (see Griffin
2014 for a review). This does not provide a rationale for increasing descriptive representation,
however. But when coupled with the literature showing that there is often a disconnect between
the preferences of minority and non-minority constituents (Griffin and Newman 2008), and
between minority constituents and their representatives (Griffin and Newman 2007, 2008) 4, the
representational deficit raises some concerns and ultimately calls for more descriptive
representation.5 Here, I explore whether or not such a deficit exists for Latinos and its potential
causes, as those have a bearing on whether or not there should be more calls for descriptive
representation or any other course of action taken on this front.6 However, before moving on to
the discussion of why we should expect to see a deficit or its causes, there is a need to look at other
work on dyadic representation
Though the literature on the broader legislative process suggests that minorities behave
differently in various ways, what is of particular importance here is whether their roll call voting

3

This is not in any way meant to discount the symbolic or psychological benefits associated with descriptive
representation. However the paper is focused on substantive representation and that is the lens through which this
argument is being made.
4
In addition, some research also suggests that there is a disconnect in the two-way communication line between
constituents and legislators, where the former is less likely to reach out to their representatives when they don’t
share the same race (Broockman 2014) and the latter is less likely to respond to requests from constituents that
aren’t of their own racial group (Butler and Broockman 2011), neither of which bode well for the representation of
minorities.
5
Indeed, if Latinos aren’t being adequately represented by non-Latino legislators, then one tried solution is to
increase the number of Latino representatives in office.
6
That deficit could be rooted in the attitudes and behavior of non-Latinos, in that of Latinos, or a mixture of both,
though more on this below in the discussion of potential factors explaining differences in representation for Latinos
relative to non-Latino whites.

36

behavior is different and how this affects the representational prospects of the individual that put
them in office. The literature on the representation of African-Americans in Congress suggests that
black legislators not only display an awareness of the interests of their co-racial constituents – and
members of the African-American population more broadly (Grose 2011) – but also show it in
their voting patterns (Lublin 1997; Canon 1999; Lublin 1999; Whitby 2000; Tate 2003; Grose
2011). Similarly, work on the representation of women suggests that women display a higher
propensity than men to advance the interests of women more broadly (Vega and Firestone 1995;
Swers 1998, 2002; Dodson 2006; see also Reingold 2008). Though not the only factor that has a
bearing on the representation afforded to the individuals that comprise the American population,
descriptive representation is one that has to be considered here, especially in light of the deficit
found by recent work (i.e., Griffin and Newman 2007). In addition, though the noted differences
between minority and non-minority legislators remain after accounting for other factors (e.g., size
of the minority population, legislator age, etc.), it is difficult to ignore the role that partisanship
plays in the level of representation afforded to individuals. For example, Cameron and his
colleagues (1996) note that in the absence of descriptive representation, blacks were generally
better off when represented by Democratic legislators than by Republican ones.
Latino Interests
A prerequisite for variation in representation is variation in the preferences of the Latino
population relative to those of the non-Latino population. Indeed, if Latinos and non-Latinos see
eye-to-eye on political issues, then a discussion of differences in representation – at least with
respect to constituent preferences and legislator behavior – is unnecessary. Although the contours
of Latino public opinion are still being explored, there is enough work on the subject to indicate
that the preferences of Latinos and non-Latinos generally differ, and also that there is enough pan37

ethnic cohesion in the preferences of Latinos to consider them a group (Leal 2007; Segura 2012;
Barreto and Segura 2014). Latinos differ from their non-Latino counterparts in their preferences
and also in the relative importance they place on political issues.
Immigration is an issue that normally gets pegged as a Latino issue, but pigeonholing the
Latino population as a one-issue constituency is neither wise nor warranted, as there are other
issues that are of particular importance to the Latino population. Indeed, bilingual education, health
care, the economy, crime, and income inequality, amongst others, are issues on which Latinos
demonstrate distinct preferences from non-Latinos (Leal 2007; Segura 2012; Barreto and Segura
2014). These issues also regularly top the “most important problem” lists among Latinos (Sanchez
2016; Vargas 2016; Barreto et al. 2018; Barreto 2019). Thus, there is a basis for exploring variation
in representation afforded to Latinos and non-Latinos, one rooted in their diverging preferences on
various issues. Here, I explore this by looking at congruence between respondents and their
legislators on various issues ranging from tax cuts to ending “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” It should be
noted that some of the issues I examine here are not necessarily high on the Latino agenda, but
they are still worth exploring.7 I describe the data in more detail below, but before doing so, I
review the literature on representation with respect to the Latino population and the general
expectations that stem from that literature.
Latino Representation
At its core, this chapter is concerned with explaining the level of representation afforded
to Latinos, and in explaining variation in the representation afforded to this segment of the

7

Though exploring representation on issues that Latinos care about (or place a primacy on, priority-wise) would be
advantageous – insofar that it accounts for issues particularly important for this segment of the population – the data
currently available doesn’t allow for that. In addition, there is some value in exploring how Latinos are represented
on issues that are on the political agenda.
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population. The available literature on the subject is limited but does provide some guidance. In
their seminal work, Welch and Hibbing (1984) explore the effect of legislator ethnicity and district
composition (i.e., size of the Latino population) on legislator votes. Their work shows that in
general, Hispanic legislators display a more liberal voting record than their non-Latino
counterparts, and perhaps more importantly, that non-Latino legislators in districts with higher
Latino populations are also more liberal than those from districts with smaller Latino populations
(Welch and Hibbing 1984, p. 333). More recent work on the subject supports the general patterns
found by Welch and Hibbing (1984). Indeed Casellas’ (2007, 2011) work, which explores several
Congresses (i.e., the 87th through the 104th), finds that the roll call behavior of Latino legislators is
significantly more liberal than that of non-Latino legislators, even after accounting for various
other factors including party affiliation (see also Kerr and Miller 1997, Lublin 1997; but see Hero
and Tolbert 1995).8 While insightful, these works are limited in what they can say about how
Latinos are represented substantively.
For a variety of reasons, prior work has failed to provide an adequate picture of the extent
to which Latinos are represented by their legislators. Take Welch and Hibbing’s (1984) work as
an example; it uses Conservative Coalition Support (CCS) scores as the dependent variable, which
is a flawed measure of legislative action on Hispanic preferences. In addition, and arguably more
importantly, the 96th Congress – the most recent of those which they look at – had only six Latino
legislators, something that greatly limits the inferences that can be drawn from their analysis

8

Exploring the 100th U.S. House of Representatives, Hero and Tolbert (1995) find that there is no discernable
difference in the roll call voting behavior of Latino legislators when compared to their non-Latino colleagues.
Casellas (2007) confirms this but finds that in all of the other legislatures explored that this is not the case. In
addition, Kerr and Miller (1997) refute the findings of Hero and Tolbert (1995) on methodological grounds and
conclude that their assessments of the models were incorrect, instead suggesting that there is a statistically
significant difference in the behavior of legislators based on ethnicity.
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(Ornstein et al. 2013).9 Similarly, several works that were building on that of Welch and Hibbing’s
(1984), also suffer from some of those issues, though to a lesser extent (see Hero and Tolbert
(1995); Kerr and Miller (1997)). Hero and Tolbert (1995) explore the 100th Congress, which had
more Latino legislators and they also use the Southwest Voter Research Institute (SWVRI) scores
as the dependent variable. That measure, while still an imperfect measure for Latino interests, does
provide more votes to explore the relationship between legislator ethnicity and voting behavior.
However, even then, there were only 10 Latinos in the legislature (see also Kerr and Miller 1997).
Casellas’ (2011) work is a departure from those kinds of measures mentioned above; he uses Poole
and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores, which provide an assessment of legislator ideology
based on all roll call votes taken in a given session (see also Lublin 1997; Griffin and Newman
2007). Griffin and Newman (2007) use respondent self-placement on an ideological scale, which
while a closer measure of Latino interests, is problematic in its own right in light of what we know
about how imprecise ideological self-identification is with regard to issue preferences (see Ellis
and Stimson 2011).
While a definite improvement over earlier work (i.e., that of Welch and Hibbing 1984),
there is an important part of the equation left out by prior scholarship on the subject: the
preferences of actual constituents. Indeed, in using those aggregate (and proxy) measures for
Latino interests, scholars are in essence imposing views on Latinos that may not be appropriate
across different districts, which is theoretically inappropriate given the potential for variation in
preferences across contexts. Though not quite in the image of Miller and Stokes’ (1963) seminal
work – because I do not have direct measures of legislator preferences – data made available

9

The authors studied legislators in office between 1972 and 1980, but the 96 th Congress was the most recent one and
it had the highest number of Latino legislators during that period.
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relatively recently allows for the exploration of dyadic representation with a national sample of
Latinos (and non-Latinos). Accounting for positions taken by respondents on individual roll call
votes allows for a better picture of this dyadic relationship amongst respondents and legislators
across districts while accounting for a variety of variables at both the individual level and at the
contextual level, those of which I turn to next.
Reasons to Expect Variation in Latino Representation
Prior work shows that there is a difference in the behavior of legislators – one partly rooted
in ethnicity (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Kerr and Miller 1997; Lublin 1997; Casellas 2007, 2011)
– and that legislators tend to be more ideologically distant from Latinos when compared to their
white counterparts in the electorate (Griffin and Newman 2007).10 Legislator ethnicity is but one
factor that needs to be accounted for when trying to explain the level of representation afforded to
Latinos. The literature on the subject suggests that there are both individual-level and contextuallevel factors that need to be accounted for when exploring variation in the representation afforded
to this particular group.
Income is one factor that naturally comes to mind when thinking about variation in
representation because Latinos tend to be lower on the socioeconomic scale compared to nonLatinos (Amenta and Smith 2016), and there is some research to support the notion that the
preferences of the rich seem to be better reflected in the behavior of legislators than the preferences
of the poor (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2009, 2011, 2012; Gilens and Page 2014). Relatedly, Latinos
generally lag behind non-Latino whites and blacks in voter turnout (Shaw, De La Garza, and Lee
2000; De La Garza 2004; McDonald 2017), which, when we take work showing that voters are

The connection being made here is that ideological distance – as measured by the voting records of legislators –
means lower representation of the interests of a given group, here Latinos.
10
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more likely to have their preferences advanced by their legislators (i.e., Griffin and Newman 2005),
leads to the need to account for individual voting behavior when exploring variation in
representation.
As the scholarship on the subject has long acknowledged (see Welch and Hibbing 1984),
the size of the Latino population in a given district needs to be accounted for theoretically and
empirically. This decision stems from a majoritarian perspective, where Latinos in districts with
larger Latino populations are expected to have their preferences advanced by legislators more than
those with lower Latino populations their district. It also flows from the work on legislator
motivations, as the electoral connection is one that is ever-pressing and posited to influence the
behavior of legislators (Mayhew 1972; Fenno 1978; Arnold 1990). In addition, as other work on
representation shows, whether a given respondent is in a district where she is represented by a coethnic or co-partisan legislator is also likely to influence the relative representation afforded to
them. Some work also shows that both Latinos and Democrats are more likely to advance the
interests of Latinos when compared to non-Latino and Republican legislators, respectively
(Casellas 2007; Griffin and Newman 2007).
Backlash and Out-Group Threat
In addition to exploring congruence, this chapter is concerned with exploring variation in
the representation afforded to Latinos relative to non-Latinos in Congress because more recent
scholarship has touched on the presence of potential backlash associated with growth in the Latino
population (see Griffin and Newman 2007, 2008; see Abrajano and Hajnal 2015 for a review).
From a majoritarian perspective, an increase in the number of Latinos in a given district should
increase the representation afforded to that group. Indeed, in those districts where non-Latino
whites are an outright majority and Latinos make up a small segment of the population – to the
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extent that their preferences differ – there should not be the expectation that both groups are
afforded the same representation, as the former has more power over whether legislators keep their
jobs. However, in districts where Latinos make up a larger share of the population relative to nonLatinos, there should be a corresponding increase in the level of responsiveness to Latinos. Griffin
and Newman (2007) find that this is not the case, showing that larger Latino populations are
associated with lower representation as measured by ideological distance between respondents and
their legislators. Though Griffin and Newman (2008) find some suggestive evidence regarding a
“backlash” effect, missing is an exploration of the underlying mechanisms driving changes in
ideological distance between Latinos and their legislators.
The work on political backlash is largely rooted in the literature on racial threat theory (see
Key 1949; Allport 1954; Blalock 1967; Quillian 1995; Hood and Morris 1997, Taylor 1998;
Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Rocha and Espino 2013; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015) and the in-group
versus out-group dynamics posited by the social identity theory literature (see Tajfel and Turner
1979; McLeod 2008). At their core, both types of studies explain majority attitudes towards an
out-group (e.g., blacks, Latinos, etc.) as an artifact of a perceived threat posed to the majority’s
well-being (for a review see Berg 2015). Irrespective of the underlying mechanisms driving
backlash – whether rooted in out-group animus, a threat to material interests, or something else –
it can potentially explain why Latinos, in spite of growing numbers, do not see the expected
representational gains that their numbers would warrant. If this is the case, then we would expect
to see that the attitudes of non-Latino whites become more anti-Latino as we progress from districts
with low Latino populations to those with high Latino populations.
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Work in the discipline has explored – and found support for – a backlash effect in which
we see the preferences of whites change in response to demographic changes (see Abrajano and
Hajnal 2015). But I want to make the explicit connection here between backlash theory and the
political representation of Latinos. More specifically, I want to see how population differences
across districts influence the attitudes and behavior of non-Latinos (and Latinos themselves) in
order to better explain the mixed findings of prior work on the subject. The data used here gives
me more statistical leverage because it has large enough samples and contextual variation to
capture attitudinal and behavioral differences in each of the populations of focus here (i.e., Latinos
and non-Latino whites). Though the backlash theory has some teeth, it could also (or alternatively)
be the case that Latinos themselves are responsible for any representational deficits. This
possibility has different consequences and implications for the study of how Latinos are
represented, and it is one whose theoretical merits I look to now.
Latino Engagement and Attitudinal Distinctiveness
Scholars have long noted the connection between socioeconomic status and participation
(Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995), a relationship that has far-reaching
implications for the Latino population, which generally tends to be lower on the socioeconomic
status spectrum (see Barreto and Segura 2014). In turn, Latinos – because of their lower propensity
to participate in the political process (Shaw, De La Garza, and Lee 2000; De La Garza 2004;
Barreto and Segura 2014; see also Jones-Correa et al. 2018 for a review) – may experience lower
levels of representation, even when comprising a plurality or a majority in a given district.
However, this itself doesn’t directly explain the variation in the ideological distance between
Latinos and their legislators relative to whites, unless Latinos in districts with larger Latino
populations display a lower propensity to participate in the political process than those in districts
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with fewer Latinos. This is an interesting possibility because if Latinos in those districts with
higher Latino populations tend to participate less than others, then Latinos would be partially
negating any representational gains that their raw numbers would warrant. Prior work has noted
that Latino participation, at least in majority-minority Latino districts, increases, which – though
it doesn’t speak to those districts with less than a minority of Latinos – casts doubt on the notion
that Latinos will participate less in districts where they constitute a larger share of the population
(Segura and Woods 2004).
The backlash theory posits that there is a change in the attitudes and behavior of the
majority group (see Abrajano and Hajnal 2015) when minority groups become larger. But the
“backlash” found in prior work on representation (i.e., Griffin and Newman) could be attributable
to the Latino population itself. Theoretically, there is a possibility that Latinos in districts with
larger Latino populations have less homogeneous preferences, which in turn could make it harder
for legislators to adequately represent them (Clifford 2012). It could be that as we move from
districts where Latinos are a clear minority to those where they constitute a plurality (or close to a
majority) we see that Latino preferences become more similar to non-Latinos, in the sense that
Latino respondents in the latter districts support policies not supported by a majority of Latinos,
in the collective sense. Be it due to sub-ethnic diversity, a desire to become more mainstream, or
some other dynamic, the possibility that the preferences of Latinos change with growth in the
population is something that needs to be accounted for empirically, as it can potentially explain
the backlash effect that scholars have attributed to non-Latino whites; an effect that has
fundamentally different causes and consequences for the study of Latino representation.
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Hypotheses
Prior work suggests that the policy preferences of Latinos and non-Latino whites differ
(Sanchez 2006; Leal 2007; Segura 2012; Barreto and Segura 2014). Indeed, Latinos generally tend
to be more liberal than their non-Latino whites (Griffin and Newman 2008; Segura 2012). When
paired with the fact that whites have a majority status in the demographic composition of our
nation, the idea that Latinos will be afforded less representation than whites is not a controversial
one – at least from a majoritarian perspective, as, all things constant, the majority group’s
preferences should carry the most weight. Though prior work suggests that a representational
deficit exists for Latinos relative to non-Latino whites (Griffin and Newman 2007), there is a need
to see whether this applies to the more direct measure being used here. From previous work comes
the expectation that – all other things constant – legislators will be more responsive to the
preferences of non-Latino whites than to those of Latinos.
Hypothesis 1: The policy attitudes of Latinos are less congruent with those of their
representatives than are the policy attitudes of non-Latinos.
The size of the Latino population in a given district might also play a role in how Latinos
are represented relative to non-Latinos. Theoretically, a larger Latino population should lead to
increased representation. However, the literature on the subject is a bit mixed on this notion. For
example, whereas Welch and Hibbing (1984) find that larger Latino populations were associated
with more liberal voting records by legislators, subsequent works (i.e., Hero and Tolbert 1995;
Casellas 2007) find no such thing. Griffin and Newman (2007) – in exploring variation in
ideological distance between Latinos and their legislators relative to whites and theirs – find that
the size of the Latino population seems to only influence representation in districts where Latinos
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get close to a majority – in so-called “threat districts.” They attribute this effect to backlash coming
from the non-Latino white population – though they do not formally test for alternative
explanations or underlying mechanisms. As a result, there is a need to see how the size of the
Latino population influences the congruence between Latinos and their legislators and whites and
their own.11
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between the level of congruence between
the attitudes of Latinos and those of their representatives and the size of the Latino population
As discussed above, the backlash theory posits anti-minority group (here, Latinos)
sentiment rooted in an ethnic threat posed by the size of that minority population on the attitudes
and behavior of the white population (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; see hypotheses 3 and 4 below).
Hypothesis 3: White respondents will hold more anti-Latino positions as we move from
districts with low Latino populations to those with higher Latino populations.
Hypothesis 4: Latino respondents will hold attitudes less consistent with the broader Latino
population as we move from districts with low Latino populations to those with higher Latino
populations.
The threat explanation theoretically captures any representational deficit that may manifest itself,
but again, the finding alone doesn’t explain whether it really is a backlash effect or something else.
Indeed, that representational deficit may be rooted in the attitudes and (or) behavior of the Latino
population itself, in addition to or entirely separate from that of non-Latino whites. It could be that
larger Latino populations work to mobilize the white population and/or lead to more anti-Latino
policy preferences, both of which would be compatible with the backlash theory. It could also be

11

Though that discussion may suggest that there is a need to model the effect of the population as curvilinear, no
such relationship exists (see Appendix A). Therefore, I address it here instead of in the modeling section later.
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the case that the preferences and (or) behavior of the Latino population itself are different in
districts where Latinos have few co-ethnics in their geographical region as compared to those
where those individuals have many co-ethnics living around them. This latter possibility, though
logically not as appealing as the backlash theory, is possible, as Latinos in districts with larger
populations may “free ride” (or depend on their co-ethnic citizens to vote and participate, more
broadly) or they could grow more fractured as a result of intragroup attitudinal heterogeneity. 12
Hypothesis 5: White respondents will become more active as we move from districts with
a low number of Latinos to those districts with larger Latino populations.
Hypothesis 6: Latino respondents become less active as we move from districts with a low
number of Latinos to those with larger Latino populations.
Data and Methodology
Congruence
The 2012 iteration of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) survey – with
more than 5,000 Latino respondents across congressional districts – allows for the testing of my
hypotheses.13 Not only does the survey capture a nationally-representative sample of Latinos, but
it also provides their preferences, as well as the roll call votes of their respective legislators across
several policy issues, which makes it ideal for exploring the representation afforded to this segment

Sub-ethnic variation does – in some cases – lead to differences in the preferences of Latinos (e.g., Puerto Ricans
holding different positions than Cubans; see De La Garza and Jang 2011). In larger districts, this could be more
likely to come into play as sub-group competition could have a bearing on who gets what. Unfortunately, the data
doesn’t allow for the sub-ethnic exploration, but, if this is happening, then it should manifest itself at the aggregate
level and provide at least suggestive evidence for whether this is the case.
13
This data set is supplemented with the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) estimates and
information about individual legislators from their official house websites, personal websites, and other publications,
when necessary.
12
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of the population.14 In addition, the survey provides data on non-Latino respondents to allow for
comparison.
Individual respondents are nested within their districts, and I must account for this in my
modeling. Theoretically, there is reason to expect that the individual contexts in which respondents
are nested will influence the representation afforded to them. Multi-level modeling allows for the
exploration of individual-level characteristics (i.e., ethnicity, education, income, etc.), contextuallevel factors (i.e., size of the Latino population, co-partisan district, etc.), and their interaction.
Representation – the primary dependent variable here – is conceptualized as congruence
between constituents and their legislators. In order to capture this, a congruence index (see Ellis
2013) is created which sums the instances where legislators and constituents have the same
response (or do not) on a given policy area to create a variable that ranges from 0 to 1, with zero
being a situation in which the respondent and their legislator are never in agreement and one being
the opposite.15 For each respondent in the data set, I take their positions on the different individual
policy issues and match it up with the roll call votes of their legislators. A binary variable is created
for each of the individual issues where 1 represents congruence between respondents and
legislators and 0 means that the two take different positions. Those variables are then used to create
the abovementioned index.16 This congruence index has a mean of about 0.52, which indicates

The CCES is an amalgamation of the research efforts of various scholars – several different research teams across
the U.S. – with the purpose of studying how “Americans view Congress and hold their representatives accountable
during elections, how they voted and their electoral experiences, and how their behavior and experiences vary with
political geography and social context” (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2012, p. 7).
15
Other dependent variables are used for auxiliary analysis and they will be described in detail below.
16
The index accounts for how many times the roll call votes of legislators matched up with the positions taken by
their constituents. So, for an individual and a legislator that are on the same page on every issue, the main dependent
variable takes a value of 1.
14
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that, on average, the preferences of constituents and their legislators are congruent about half of
the time (see Table A1 in Appendix A).
The individual issues used to construct the index come from the survey item that asks
respondents the following: “Congress considered many important bills over the past two years.
For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle.” That
prompt was followed by issues including then-U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan’s budget bill aimed
at cutting spending in Medicare and Medicaid, immigration reform, the repeal of the Affordable
Care Act, and the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy in the military, amongst others (Ansolabehere and
Schaffner 2012, p. 63).17
Respondent ethnicity (Latino) is the key explanatory variable, and it is captured through
the use of a binary variable which takes the value of 1 when a given respondent self-identifies as
Hispanic, and 0 when they identify as white and state that they’re not of Hispanic origin. 18
Similarly, legislator ethnicity (Latino MC) is captured with a binary variable using information
from the Office of the Historian of the U.S. House of Representatives and it also takes the value 1
when a given legislator is identified as Hispanic (Wasniewski et al. 2013). Legislator partisanship
(Democrat MC) is captured by a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the legislator is a

The complete list of roll call votes available are: Paul Ryan’s 2011 House Budget Plan, which would cut Medicare
(and Medicaid) by 42%; the Simpson-Bowles Budget Plan, which would make cuts of about 15% “across the board
in Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Defense, as well as other programs. Eliminate many tax breaks…[and]
reduce debt by 21% by 2020”; the Middle Class Tax Cut Act, which would “extend Bush era tax cuts for incomes
below $200,000. Would increase the budget deficit by an estimated $250 billion”; the Tax Hike Prevention Act,
which would “extend Bush-era tax cuts for all individuals, regardless of income. Would increase the budget deficit
by an estimated $405 billion”; the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, which “would remove tariffs on imports and
exports between South Korea and the U.S.”; a repeal of the Affordable Care Act; a bill to approve the Keystone XL
Pipeline; a bill to end “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in the military (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2012, p. 63-65).
18
This variable is constructed using the question “Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?”
(Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2012, p. 29). Individuals that answered “Yes” were categorized as Hispanic and those
that no weren’t.
17

50

Democrat and 0 when that individual is Republican.19 The size of the Latino population in a given
district (% Latino) is operationalized as a variable that captures the percentage of Latinos in each
respondent’s district with data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2011 American Community Survey
(ACS) population estimates. This variable ranges from 0.6 to 81.9 percent, but on average, Latinos
take up about 15 percent of a given district (see Table A1 in Appendix A). Other individual-level
variables used here are respondent gender family income, intention to vote, and educational
attainment.20 At the contextual-level, variables capturing whether respondents are nested in
districts where they’re represented by co-ethnic legislators and Democratic legislators,
respectively are created as dummy variables. At that same level, a measure that captures the
percentage of Latinos in a district is also used.
In addition to holding the individual-level respondent characteristics constant in estimating
the effect of ethnicity on congruence, I also explore how intersections of Hispanic ethnicity affect
the representation afforded to members of this group. More recently, scholars have started to think
about the fact that individuals can be part of various disadvantaged groups, those based on race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual identity, and religion (amongst others) and that those different categories
overlap (McCall 2005; Hancock 2007). As a result, when thinking about marginalization, being in
multiple categories (i.e., minority female or a poor minority) may lead to further disadvantage than
simply being a part of a single group. Within the context of this paper, I explore how those different

19

There were no independents in the 112th U.S. House of Representatives.
Respondent gender is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for female respondents and 0 otherwise, family
income is an ordinal variable ranging from $0-10,000 to $500,000 and up, educational attainment ranges from no
education to completion of a graduate degree, and intention to vote in the 2012 election takes a value of 1 for yes
and 0 for no.
20
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categories interact with respondent ethnicity. That is, how do Latinas, poor Latinos, and Latino
non-voters fare on the representational front. 21
To explore the level of congruence afforded to Latinos relative to non-Latino whites, I
make use of multi-level modeling because it allows me to account for the fact that individual
respondents are nested in their congressional districts. This is important because it allows for the
exploration of how geographic (and congressional) context (i.e., district population and being in a
district in which a respondent is represented by a Latino legislator) influence the effect of
respondent ethnicity and other respondent characteristics. In order to allow for that possibility in
the models, I use a district-specific intercept and allow the effect (the slope-estimate) of respondent
ethnicity to vary across districts. 22 23
Results
Constituent Preference-Legislator Vote Congruence
Before exploring potential backlash mechanisms, there is a need to confirm whether
Latinos do face a representational deficit relative to non-Latino whites. A starting point for this
analysis is the exploration of whether Latinos face a deficit when compared to whites in all of the
individual issue areas that make up the congruence index. I run a separate model exploring the
effect of respondent ethnicity on congruence for each of the issue areas available. That is, 8
different regression models with the dependent variable being congruence between respondent
preference and legislator roll call vote (see Appendix A). On 5 of the 8 issues available there is a

21

Non-voters would not typically fit in an intersectionality framework, but the focus here is on
the existence of multiple characteristics connected to representational disadvantage, so considering
non-voting alongside the traditional focus on women and class-based disadvantage seems appropriate.
22
This means that the models used here are random slope, random coefficient models, which are estimated using
Stata 14’s mixed command.
23
All of the models computed here include only Latino and non-Latino white respondents in an attempt to stop
comparisons from being additionally complicated by race; this is the same thing that Griffin and Newman (2007) do
in their analysis.
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difference in the level of congruence between Latinos and their legislators and their non-Latino
counterparts in the electorate. On the repeal of the Affordable Care Act and preferences towards
the Keystone XL Pipeline, we see that Latinos face the largest representational deficit when
compared to whites (see Figure 1.1). However, on the proposal to repeal the “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” policy in the military, which would allow gays to openly serve in the U.S. armed forces,
Latino respondents tended to have higher congruence than their non-Latino counterparts. With
this, I move on to the exploration of deficit (or lack thereof) when all issues are accounted for.
In order to capture the representation of Latinos, I explore respondent characteristics,
contextual factors, and interactions of those measures to see whether Latinos face a
representational deficit with a more refined measure (see Table 1.1 for all core models). A
consistent finding across different specifications is that Latinos do in fact face a representational
deficit relative to non-Latino whites, something evident in the negative and statistically significant
coefficient for respondent ethnicity (see the first row in Table 1.1). In essence, that estimate
suggests that the difference between Latinos and non-Latinos (and their respective legislators) is
about 1 percent, which naturally seems small at first glance. However, when we take into account
that members of the U.S. House of Representatives vote on hundreds of pieces of legislation every
year, even a 1 percent difference is likely to be consequential for Latinos. This provides support
for the first hypothesis.
The second column in Table 1.1 shows several interactions between respondent ethnicity
and other respondent characteristics, which are there to explore how intersections of ethnicity and
categories of disadvantage affect Latino respondents. To best visualize those interactions, I rely
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Figure 1.1: The Effect of Latino Ethnicity on Representation by Issue
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Table 1.1: Models of Constituent Preference-Legislator Roll Call Congruence
Individual
Characteristics
Latino
Female
Family Income
Education
Voted

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

-0.005%
(0.003)

-0.025**
(0.009)

-0.011***
(0.003)

-0.016***
(0.004)

-0.012***
(0.003)

-0.008
(0.005)

-0.009**
(0.003)

-0.013***
(0.002)
0.002***
(0.000)
-0.002*
(0.001)
0.003
(0.002)

Individual
Interactions
Latino x Female

0.011
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.004
(0.002)
0.005
(0.006)

Latino x Income
Latino x Education
Latino x
Voted
Contextual
Characteristics
Democrat MC
Latino MC
% Latino

-0.013***
(0.002)
0.002***
(0.000)
-0.002*
(0.001)
0.003
(0.002)

0.073***
(0.003)

0.073***
(0.003)

0.067***
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.009)
0.000
(0.000)

0.067***
(0.003)

0.068***
(0.003)

0.071***
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.009)
0.000
(0.000)
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Table 1.1 Continued.
1
Contextual
Interactions
Latino x Democrat
MC
Latino x
Latino MC
Latino x
% Latino
Constant

2

3

4

5

6

7

0.505***
(0.005)
38680

0.013*
(0.006)
0.018%
(0.009)

0.535***
(0.005)
39060

0.495***
(0.004)
39060

0.491***
(0.002)
44091

0.494***
(0.002)
44516

0.494***
(0.002)
44091

-0.001
(0.000)
0.512***
(0.003)
44516

431

431

425

431

425

431

425

0.0019

0.0376

0.0314

0.0316

0.0313

0.0026

0.0372

-0.0064
0.5181
0.5141
0.5108
0.5125
0.0361
Note: The dependent variable here is an index constructed using congruence (or lack thereof) between
respondents and their legislators on all available issues in the 2012 CCES. This measure ranges from 0 to 1, with
one being perfect congruence between the two actors (see Appendix A for descriptive statistics).
Standard errors in parentheses
% p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
# Snijders and Bosker R-Squared estimate

0.5206

Individuals
Districts
#Level 1 R

2

#Level 2 R

2
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on charts that show the marginal effects (or predicted outcomes) as the values of the interacting
variables change. First, I look at the interaction between ethnicity and a respondent’s income (see
Figure 1.2). The interaction, though not statistically significant on the whole, shows that in general,
as income increases, the effect of ethnicity on congruence seems to become more negative, a
finding that wouldn’t necessarily be expected, as income is generally associated with increased
representation (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2009, 2011, 2012; Gilens and Page 2014). Moving to the
effect of gender (see Figure 1.3), it appears as if Latino men face a larger representational deficit
relative to non-Latino men than do Latinas when compared to non-Latino women. In this particular
case, it appears that women, in general, are at such a representational disadvantage that ethnicity
doesn’t further disadvantage Latinas compared to non-Latinas. Next, in Figure 1.4, I chart the
effect of ethnicity on congruence as contingent on education. At the lower levels of education,
congruence for Latinos is lower than that of non-Latinos. However, moving from the lower levels
of education towards the higher levels, the negative effect gets closer to zero and the difference
between the two groups becomes statistically insignificant, which speaks to the power of
education. In essence, education allows Latinos to catch up to non-Latinos with respect to their
level of representation.38 The last of the individual-level interactions explored is that between
ethnicity and voting. Figure 1.5 suggests that like education, participation essentially erases any
representational differences between Latinos and whites, a finding that fits the work on
participation and representation (see Griffin and Newman 2005).
Moving to the contextual level, the first effect that stands out is that of being nested in a

38

Whether this is due to Latinos being better educated (and the representational benefits that normally come along
with that) or to Latinos changing their preferences – in a way that reflects those of non-Latinos – is not something
that I am suited to address here. However, irrespective of the underlying mechanism, the end result is that Latinos
are represented at higher rates holding all else constant.
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Figure 1.2: Latino Effect on Congruence as Family Income Increases

58

Figure 1.3: Latino Effect on Congruence for Men and Women
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Figure 1.4: Latino Effect on Congruence as Education Increases
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Figure 1.5: Latino Effect on Congruence for Voters and Non-Voters
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district where a given respondent is represented by a Democratic legislator greatly improves
congruence, irrespective of ethnicity (see Column 3 in Table 1.1). However, the main
preoccupation here is how these contextual realities affect the representation afforded to Latinos.
Sticking with partisan representation with respect to ethnicity briefly, it is clear that Latino
respondents represented by Republicans are at a representational disadvantage when compared to
non-Latino whites in districts where they’re represented by Republicans (see Figure 1.6). On the
flipside of that, there isn’t a statistically significant difference in the representation afforded to
Latinos relative to whites when they’re both represented by Democratic legislators. Looking at
descriptive representation, it is apparent that Latino respondents don’t seem to be at a
representational surplus relative to whites when represented by Latino legislators, but having a
Latino MC does erase the deficit noted above (see Figure 1.7). However, in the absence of
descriptive representation for Latinos, that representational deficit is there, with whites being better
represented by non-Latino legislators.
The last of the contextual interactions – and one of the most pressing here – is that between
respondent ethnicity and the size of the Latino population in a given individual respondent’s
district on representation. Figure 1.8 shows the level of congruence afforded to Latinos when
moving from districts with the lowest to the highest Latino populations. Similar to the “backlash”
effect found by Griffin and Newman (2007), districts with larger Latino populations were
associated with lower levels of representation. This is definitely inconsistent with a majoritarian
perspective because instead of their (Latinos) representation increasing with their numbers –
except in the highest levels of Latino populations in districts (i.e., around 80% in a district) – we
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Figure 1.6: Partisan Representation Effect on Substantive Representation
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Figure 1.7: Descriptive Representation Effect on Substantive Representation
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Figure 1.8: Latino Representation as Latino Population Size Increases
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see Latinos are further disadvantaged moving from one extreme to the other.39 This lends support
to the second hypothesis; larger Latino populations don’t lead to increased representation here.
Backlash Mechanisms
Now that I have confirmed an effect that has been construed as attitudinal “backlash” in
other work (i.e., Griffin and Newman 2007), there is a need to explore whether this change in the
representation afforded to Latinos in those district with higher Latino populations is in-fact rooted
in anti-Latino-motivated behavior and (or) attitudinal change on the part of non-Latino Anglos or
in the Latino population itself. As alluded to earlier, the “backlash” effect could be rooted in
participatory and attitudinal differences by Latinos in those more Latino-heavy districts. To
explore these possibilities, I create a new dependent variable. To do so, I first look at the way in
which the preferences of Latinos and non-Latinos change across districts when we move from
those with lower Latino population to those with higher Latino populations. To capture this
change, I create an index designed to measure pro-Latino attitudes – one similar to the congruence
index discussed before. This is done by determining the relative position of Latinos and nonLatinos for each of the individual roll calls, then recoding each one so that the position more
favored by Latinos relative to non-Latinos was positive, and finally summing them into an index
where higher values indicate that respondent attitudes are more consistent with the preferences of
Latinos relative to non-Latino whites. This variable ranges from 0 to 1 and has a mean of about
0.49 (see Table A1 in Appendix A). As before, the key explanatory variable here is respondent
ethnicity, though the size of the Latino population in a given respondent’s district and control

39

This suggests that Latinos need to have an overwhelming majority for their respective legislators to mirror their
preferences (in roll call voting behavior) at a rate similar to that afforded to non-Latino whites.
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variables are included in the model aimed at exploring changes in individual attitudes across
different districts.
This exploration of attitudinal change across districts is plotted in Figure 1.9. This figure
shows how pro-Latino attitudes change amongst non-Latinos (and Latinos) moving from the low
to the high end of the percentage Latino estimate across districts. The figure shows that while the
attitudes of non-Latino whites do seem to become slightly more anti-Latino as a function of the
size of the Latino population, the preferences of Latinos also shift when moving from districts with
low Latino populations to those with higher Latino populations. The attitudes of Latino
respondents in districts with larger Latino populations become more pro-Latino. Thus, there is
some support for the backlash theory posited by Griffin and Newman (2007) – and for the 3rd
hypothesis – and none for the notion that the attitudes of Latinos become more anti-Latino – at
least in this cross section – in larger Latino districts (i.e., hypothesis 4).40
Another potential manifestation of the so-called “backlash hypothesis” is a change in the
participation of non-Latinos, though I also explore the potential change in the participation on the
part of Latinos. As it relates to the former, the expectation would be that whites become mobilized
by larger Latino populations as they pose a threat to their status on the social hierarchy. A more
active Anglo population would definitely fit into this backlash explanation and could indirectly
explain the representational deficit experienced by Latinos.41 However, it could also (or
alternatively) be the case that Latinos don’t participate at the same rate when there are more

40

However, even then, the more pro-Latino preferences could still be negatively affecting the level of representation
afforded to Latinos, as the more pro-Latino that attitudes become, the more distinctive they are, and thus further
away from the mainstream.
41
The implicit, and thus untested, relationship here is that between political behavior and heightened representation.
However, Griffin and Newman’s (2005) work finds some support for the notion that voters are better represented
than non-voters.
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Figure 1.9: Attitudinal Change Across Districts
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Latinos, a free riding effect of sorts, which could also explain the abovementioned gap in
representation. Sorting out which (or what mixture) of the two is taking place has practical,
strategic, and normative implications. If it is the case that this “backlash” is rooted entirely in the
behavior of the non-Latino population, then that’s different from it being rooted in the fact that
Latinos in those more heavily Latino-populated districts are less likely to take part in the political
process. Each of those entails different strategies to alleviate the representational gap for Latinos.
To explore this possibility, I create a political participation index to use as the dependent
variable.42 This participation index ranges from 0 to 1 and has a mean of about .20 (see Table A1
in Appendix A). Figure 1.10 shows changes in the political participation of Latinos and whites
across districts to see whether either group displays a higher (or lower) propensity to participate in
the political process as Latinos comprise larger segments of their district’s population. In-line with
a backlash explanation, non-Latinos do in-fact seem to be more likely to participate in those
districts with higher Latino populations. On the other side of that, Latinos display the opposite and
instead become less likely to participate in the political process in those districts with higher Latino
populations, which doesn’t bode well for the Latinos when paired with the suggested mobilizing
effect of larger Latino populations of whites. Together, those two findings provide support for the
5th and 6th hypotheses, respectively.

Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I explore several hypotheses related to the level of substantive representation
afforded to Latinos and non-Latino whites by their members in the U.S. House of Representatives.

42

This index is created using a principal components analysis of political attendance meetings, political sign
displays, having worked for a candidate, and monetary donations to candidates and political organizations in the last
12-months leading up to the survey.

69

Figure 1.10: Political Participation Across Districts
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The results provide support for the notion that Latinos are at a representational deficit and
for the idea that this deficit seems to be exacerbated in districts where Latinos make up a larger
share of the population. Prior work has relied on imperfect measures of Latino interests, and of
legislator voting behavior, that don’t directly tap the preferences of constituents. My work, because
I use the CCES data with actual positions taken by respondents and subsequent votes taken by
their legislators, is able to get more empirical and theoretical leverage on explaining how Latinos
are substantively represented.
On the substantive front, I find, as mentioned above, that Latinos face a representational
deficit when compared to whites. I also find, however, that descriptive and partisan representation
provide contexts that can close that gap in representation. Relatedly, there are also individual-level
factors that the findings suggest can work to decrease that deficit. More specifically, educational
attainment and political participation both seem to place Latinos and their non-Latino coconstituents on a more even playing field with respect to representation, all else equal. On the
whole, I show that Latinos do experience a representational deficit when compared to non-Latino
whites, which doesn’t on its own raise any flags because they are a minority group in American
society. However, this deficit is increased across districts where they constitute a larger share of
the population, which is concerning from a majoritarian perspective. This work provides a
preliminary exploration of the factors contributing to the representational deficit, which hasn’t
been directly accounted for in other work.
This chapter, in its exploration of the potential mechanisms driving the representational
deficit for Latinos, contributes to our understanding of the level of representation afforded to
Latinos and the role of the non-Latino population in that representation. Indeed, the additional
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analysis on the attitudes of non-Latinos lends some support to the backlash hypothesis as we can
see that whites become more politically active as we move from districts with low Latino
populations to those with higher Latino populations, and that their attitudes become more antiLatino across districts because of increased Latino populations. However, that exploration also
shows that Latinos tend to participate less in districts where they make up a larger segment of the
population, which further contributes to their disadvantage.
The results here have the potential to inform those interested in studying Latino
representation and those interested in closing the representational gap between the two groups
explored here. On the former, this work suggests that while legislators play an important role in
the representation afforded to Latinos, there is a need to consider how intergroup dynamics
structure the level of congruence between Latinos and their legislators. Indeed, while other work
on the relationship between constituents and their legislators suggests that there is a disconnect
(and distortion) in the representation afforded to minorities as a result of variation in the propensity
of minorities to contact non-minority representatives (Broockman 2014) and of legislators to
contact constituents when they’re minorities (Butler and Broockman 2011; Mendez and Grose
2018), at least some of this deficit seems to be rooted in a backlash effect on the part of non-Latino
whites. On the latter, this work suggests that Latinos, activists, reformers, and candidates can take
action to lessen (or close) that representational gap. Efforts to do so could be in the form of Latino
mobilization, reform to encourage more educational attainment, and the election of Democratic
and Latino legislators all have a bearing on the representation afforded to Latinos outside of the
behavior of Anglos.
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While this work does show that at the dyadic level Latinos face a representational deficit,
it doesn’t speak to the possibility that Latinos can be substantively represented at the collective
level (see Weissberg 1978; Hero and Tolbert 1995). Indeed, these roll call-based dyads don’t
account for the aggregate level outputs. Nonetheless, at either level – because Latinos are in the
minority – there are things that may not make it to the agenda, which means that a representational
deficit would still exist, irrespective of the things being voted on by legislators and being passed
through the legislature. Relatedly, while it would be interesting to explore this dyadic relationship
on bills that are atop the Latino agenda, at this point – because of data limitations – isn’t possible,
at least not in the same fashion as it was explored here. This is an important consideration because
it could be the case that the analysis here underestimates the representational deficit face by Latinos
relative to whites. Future work needs to address this possibility.43 In addition, this work doesn’t
provide a picture of how the sub-groups that make up the Latino population are represented, which
is important because although there is enough homogeneity in the preferences of Latinos as a
group, there are still notable differences at the sub-ethnic level (e.g., differences between Latinos
from Mexico when compared to those from Cuba or Puerto Rico), which need to be accounted for.
However, in the absence of comparable and fine data that allow for that, the current analysis will
have to suffice. In the same vein, unlike the data used by Griffin and Newman (2007), the survey
here (the CCES) only explores the attitudes of English-speaking Latinos, which can also muddy
up the results captured here, likely overstating congruence between Latinos and their
representatives. In addition, this work can benefit from an exploration of Latino interests (and

43

This may not necessarily be possible in the near future because Latinos still constitute a numerical minority in the
legislature and surveying Latinos is costly and difficult to do, especially at the national level. Indeed, the CCES is
distinctive insofar that it captures a national sample of Latinos along with the geographic variation and thus allowing
for the exploration done here; it, however (and unfortunately) is an outlier in the available data.
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representation) across time, as the findings here could be strengthened (or attenuated) by such
exploration.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics and Additional Models
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics Table
Variable
Minimum
Mean
Dependent
Variables
0
.519
Congruence
Index
Participation
0
.202
Index
Latino
0
.472
Preference Index
Independent
Variables
0
.108
Respondent Level
Latino
Female
Education
Family Income
Voted
Contextual Level

Median

Maximum

St. Dev.

Skewness

Kurtosis

N

.5

1

.191

-.039

2.72

53742

0

1

.277

1.302

3.799

44534

.5

1

.189

-.182

2.695

53862

0

1

.31

2.525

7.376

51190

0

.531

1

1

.499

-.124

1.015

54535

1

3.621

3

6

1.462

.218

1.776

53949

1

6.094

6

16

3.24

.424

2.392

47384

0

.728

1

1

.445

-1.022

2.045

53949

0

.409

0

1

.492

.369

1.136

53949

0

.049

0

1

.216

4.184

18.504

53382

.6

14.927

9.6

81.9

15.631

2.129

7.767

53840

Democrat MC
Latino MC
% Latino
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Table A2: Individual Issue Congruence Models
SimpsonRyan
Bowles
Tax Cut
Budget
Budget

Tax Hike
Prevention

Korea Free
Trade

Repeal ACA

Keystone
XL

Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell

Latino

-0.010
(0.007)

-0.022**
(0.008)

-0.024**
(0.008)

-0.007
(0.008)

0.007
(0.008)

-0.028**
(0.009)

-0.039***
(0.008)

0.029***
(0.007)

Democrat
MC

0.612***
(0.008)

-0.004
(0.006)

0.099***
(0.010)

0.407***
(0.012)

-0.016*
(0.007)

0.083***
(0.008)

-0.335***
(0.014)

-0.334***
(0.011)

0.215***
(0.005)
42714
423
0.3647

0.513***
(0.004)
42605
416
0.0002

0.535***
(0.007)
41605
422
0.0091

0.302***
(0.008)
42085
426
0.1644

0.514***
(0.004)
42138
425
0.0003

0.518***
(0.005)
42483
430
0.0078

0.770***
(0.009)
38669
422
0.1211

0.608***
(0.007)
42731
417
0.1076

0.1625

0.7471

0.0129

0.2255

0.5707

0.6921

Constant

Obs.
Districts
#Level 1 R2
Level 2
0.9284
0.0036
R2
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
# Snijders and Bosker R-Squared estimates
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Table A3: Testing for Curvilinear Relationship
Model
Latino
-0.012***
(0.003)
% Latino
0.001
(0.000)
2
% Latino
0.001
(0.000)
Democrat 0.068***
MC
(0.003)
Constant
0.491***
(0.003)
Individuals 44516
Districts
431
#Level 1
0.0318
R2
Level 2 R2 0.5146
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
# Snijders and Bosker R-Squared estimate
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CHAPTER 2: TWEETING TO LATINOS? LEGISLATIVE
COMMUNICATION IN THE 115TH U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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Abstract
This paper explores the extent to which legislators in the House of Representatives talk
about the issues important to Latinos on Twitter. In addition, it explores differences in the behavior
of legislators rooted in individual-level and geographic characteristics. This work is concerned
with both the substance and nature of legislative behavior on Twitter, as the literature on minority
legislative behavior leads to the expectation that Latinos will not only post about different issues
than their non-Latino colleagues will, but will also do so in a different fashion (i.e., Latinos being
more likely to post symbolic messages than white legislators). To explore the behavior of
legislators, I use data collected from the official accounts of members of the 115th U.S. House of
Representatives. I find some preliminary support for the notion there are differences in the
behavior of legislators attributable to legislator ethnicity.
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Introduction
Since its introduction, Twitter has become an integral form of communication for
candidates and legislators alike (Williams and Gulati 2010; Lassen and Brown 2011; Gainous and
Wagner 2014; Lassen and Bode 2017). However, usage alone tells us little about how legislators
communicate with and representing their constituents. This paper is concerned with the nature and
substance of the communication between legislators and their constituents on this platform. How
legislators interact with constituents on this new platform may have electoral consequences, but
also, and arguably more importantly, representational consequences. Legislative communication
is a means to keep constituents informed, but it also serves other purposes. One such purpose, and
the focus of this chapter, is signaling to constituents that legislators are working to advance their
interests. Whether this signaling manifests itself in legislators informing constituents about events
in their districts, telling constituents about how they voted on a given piece of legislation, or
something else, it is a way for representatives to establish and develop trust and rapport with
constituents (see Fenno 1978). In addition, and important for the ongoing discussion, it is part of
how legislators represent constituents. Communication is central to the constituent-legislator
relationship; MCs need to know what their constituents want in order to have the opportunity to
act on those demands and constituents need to know whether or not their legislators are doing so.
Here, I explore how legislators represent the interests of the Latino population on Twitter and how
they do so.
Latinos currently constitute about 18% of the total population in the U.S. – making them
the largest minority group in American politics – which is why understanding this group’s
attitudes, behavior, and representation in (and by) government is important. The focus here is on
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representation because there is a need to understand government responsiveness to the interest of
the group that is poised to change American politics in the decades to come. We now know, thanks
to advancements in the study of Latino public opinion, a great deal about what Latinos care about
policy-wise, though our understanding of how Latinos are represented in government is still
underdeveloped.1 This work is an attempt to address this gap and gain a better understanding of
how legislators speak to the interests of Latinos on Twitter. In what follows, I explore what and
how legislators are posting on Twitter. That is, I look at both the substance (i.e., symbolic versus
policy) and the issues that MCs discuss (i.e., what policy areas they focus on) on Twitter.2 I do this
using data collected from the Twitter profiles of members in the 115th U.S. House of
Representatives. Given the linkage between descriptive representation and the interests of
minorities in the broader population, I also explore whether there is a difference in the legislative
behavior of Latino legislators when compared to non-Latino legislators. I explore this both with
respect to what legislators are posting, and the way they post because the literature suggests that
legislator ethnicity should influence both.

Theoretical Foundations
Communication and Symbolic Representation
Communication is central to the relationship between citizens and the people that represent
them. How legislators choose to communicate with, and what they choose to communicate to,
constituents can impact their electoral prospects (see Fenno 1978). It is how legislators keep
constituents informed and part of what can influence whether representatives keep their jobs

1

That is in comparison to the study of whites and blacks in the study of American politics.
Though the question of what legislators are posting with respect to the Latino population is important in its own
right, exploring differences in how Latino and non-Latino legislators are communicating on Twitter adds to our
broader understanding of the different ways in which individuals of each group have to navigate the legislative
process.
2
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(Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Yiannakis 1982; Arnold 1990). Legislators – and politicians more
broadly – are motivated to present themselves in a favorable light. Politicians go to great lengths
to make themselves look good to constituents, whether by showing them that they frequent the
same hole-in-the-wall restaurants, that they are like them, or that they are fighting for them in
office. Indeed, there are various examples of politicians trying to connect with their constituents.
Whether it is President Ford’s infamous tamale faux pas3 highlighted by Popkin (1991, p. 1-2), or
former Wisconsin governor Scott Walker’s brown-bag lunch theme (Cramer 2012, p. 30), it is easy
to see that elected officials feel a need to make a good impression on constituents and potential
voters. Acts like those and countless others demonstrate how legislators work to develop and
nurture the trust of constituents; something important to their own reelection efforts and other
aspirations in office (Fenno 1978).
What legislators choose to share with constituents is important, not only for their electoral
fortunes but also for the perceptions that constituents have of them and the government more
broadly.4 That communication conveys a certain level of awareness of the interests of the people
they represent, and it is part of what scholars describe as symbolic representation. Symbolic
representation refers to how legislators “stand for” a group and it hinges on the belief that
representatives share the interests of minority constituents. Hansel and Truel (2015) describe it as
“any gesture that symbolizes a commitment to the group or symbolizes the ideal that the group
espouses” (p. 957; see also Edelman 1964; Eulau and Karps 1978; Stokke and Selboe 2009).5 In
President Ford bit into a tamale without removing the husk, which serves solely as a wrapper and isn’t meant to be
eaten.
4
Whether constituents think their legislators are advancing their interests have the potential to impact their own
feelings of trust and efficacy (Miller et al. 1980).
5
Similarly, Sinclair-Chapman (2002) refers to symbolic acts as those “aimed at giving voice to group interests,
agenda-setting, and offering alternative views or political possibilities [that] are integral to enhanced political
deliberation [and] that address the concerns of disadvantaged groups” (p. 8). Eulau and Karps (1978) describe
3
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their communication, legislators have the opportunity to demonstrate an awareness of the group
interests within their constituencies. They can show constituents that they care about the issues
that are important to them even if the aggregate outputs of government do not reflect what
constituents want. This is important because individual legislators, due to majoritarian dynamics
(and other institutional realities), may not always be able to show constituents they are fighting for
their interests in their voting behavior or the laws being passed.
In addition to being important for the communication strategies chosen by legislators (see
Edelman 1964; Eulau and Karps 1977, 1978; Tate 2001; Sinclair-Chapman 2002; Nteta and
Schaffner 2013; Hansen and Treul 2015; Dietrich et al. 2017; Tillery 2017), symbolic
representation is important for the potential effects it can have on constituents (Lawless 2004;
Hansen and Treul 2015; Hayes and Hibbing 2017). Scholars often cite the psychological benefits
of symbolic representation, whereby being symbolically represented gives “psychological
reassurance to group members that representatives are working in their interests and responsive to
their needs” (Sinclair-Chapman 2002, p. ii; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003). That is what is believed
to be driving other attitudes and behavior. Symbolic representation has the potential to influence
constituents’ perceptions of the individuals that represent them (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003;
Tate 2003; Lawless 2004; Dietrich et al. 2017) and of government more broadly (Pantoja and
Segura 2003). There is also evidence to suggest that symbolic representation, broadly construed,
can influence the behavior of minorities in the electorate (Stokes-Brown and Dolan 2010).6

symbolic representation as manifesting itself in the “public gestures of a sort that create a sense of trust and support
in the relationship between the representative and represented” (p. 63).
6
Some scholars speak of symbolic representation and descriptive representation in tandem (see Hayes and Hibbing
2017), but they are distinct concepts (Pitkin 1967) and though descriptive representation itself can be symbolic, it is
not a prerequisite, as any legislator can behave in such a manner that communicates an awareness to the interests of
minority groups. In this work, I focus on symbolic acts in communication, not mere presence.
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Minority Behavior and Symbolic Representation
Prior scholarship has demonstrated the distinctiveness of minority legislative behavior in
various areas of the legislative process (see Griffin 2014). While it may not be surprising that
minority and non-minority legislators tend to vote differently on policy questions (Griffin and
Newman 2007; Casellas 2011), scholars have also found divergence at other parts in the legislative
process (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Sinclair-Chapman 2002; Bratton 2006; Gamble 2007; Wilson
2010; Minta 2011; Rouse 2013). For example, Rouse’s (2013) work demonstrates that Latino
legislators work to advance the interests of Latinos in the agenda-setting phase of the legislative
process. Elsewhere, Minta’s (2011) work shows that African American and Latino legislators are
more likely to advance minority interests in committees and through oversight (see also Rouse
2013). Minorities generally display not only an awareness of the interests of the communities they
represent but a willingness to work to try to bring about change that reflects those interests in the
legislative process.
Though all legislators face the collective action problem, there is reason to expect minority
legislators to be more likely than non-minority legislators to rely on symbolic communication
because of it. Even if they are a part of one of the partisan coalitions in Congress, they are still a
minority in the racial (or ethnic) sense, which means that they are less likely to get things important
to their co-racial (or co-ethnic) constituents to the floor, much less passed by government. It is
because minority legislators are less likely to have “policy wins” (Griffin and Newman 2008) that
there is reason to expect that they will be more likely than their non-minority colleagues to resort
to posting symbolic messages to gain and develop the trust of their co-ethnic (or co-racial)
constituents to compensate for the lack of change in the status quo, at least with respect to that
subgroup’s interests. The literature on legislative behavior in other areas of the legislative process
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suggests that the differences attributable to race (or ethnicity) may manifest themselves in the
communication of legislators.
There is no shortage of examples of symbolic acts by legislators, something which applies
to minority legislators to a larger extent (see Sinclair-Chapman 2002). Indeed, there are plenty of
examples of legislators proposing (or supporting) resolutions that, even if passed, do not
fundamentally change anything on the policy front, or in the status quo for that matter (Edelman
1964; Sinclair-Chapman 2002). Even a casual look at the legislative communication of legislators
seems to suggest that Latinos in office do indeed post symbolic messages.7 A recent example of
this is a resolution introduced to the Senate judiciary committee by Congresswoman Catherine
Cortez Masto, a Latina senator from Nevada, titled “A resolution recognizing the heritage, culture,
and contributions of Latinas in the United States” (S.Res. 111, 2019).8 Representative Adriano
Espaillat (NY-13th) introduced a resolution before the House to rename “Hamilton Heights,
Washington Heights, and Inwood, New York…‘Quisqueya Heights’,” a nod to the Hispanic
population with Dominican roots (H.Res. 63, 2019).9 Congressman Espaillat also stated that the
purpose of that resolution was to “fight against the gentrification of [the] neighborhood” and to
honor “the long-standing history and rich contributions of Dominican-American elected officials,
artists, small-business and bodega owners, writers, and trailblazers” (H.Res. 63, 2019. In a press
release celebrating Hispanic Heritage Month, Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard (CA-40th),
stated:

7

Though all legislators engage in symbolic representation, I focus on examples of Latino legislators given the focus
of the paper. Nonetheless, it should be noted that there are plenty of examples of non-Latino legislators that could be
used here (see Tate 2001; Sinclair-Chapman 2002).
8
Congressman Luis Correa introduced the same resolution in the House of Representatives on the same day (H.Res.
234, 2019).
9
Quisqueya is a municipality in the Dominican Republic.
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While this is a wonderful time to celebrate these contributions [referring to the history and
accomplishments of Latinos], it is also a time to remember we must continue to work to
ensure all our Latino communities get a fair chance at the American dream, including a
good-paying job, a first-class education, and quality and affordable health care.
This demonstrates an awareness of the issues important to the Latino community (Roybal-Allard
2018; NALEO/Latino Decisions 2019).
Similarly, on April 30th, Representative Nydia Velazquez (NY-7th) posted the following on
Twitter: “FACT: Latinos are more likely to suffer from: Diabetes, Liver disease, High blood
pressure, Obesity, Asthma, Cancer. This #MinorityHealthMonth, let’s pledge to reduce racial and
ethnic inequities in the Hispanic Community” (@NydiaVelazquez). These examples, and plenty
of others, highlight a commitment to the interests of the Latino population. Nonetheless, not one
of them specifically references any actual policy or votes taken to bring about change and the
resolutions – though technically part of the legislative process and can be voted on – do not change
anything substantively on the policy front. However, as noted by Tate (2001), “200 or more such
symbolic resolutions are generally passed in each Congress, [which suggests that] there must be
political rewards and tactical advantages associated with them” (p. 626).
Twitter and Communication
Twitter, as evidenced by numerous political events (e.g., the Black Lives Matter protests
and movement, the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the Arab Spring), can be a valuable
political tool for the people. Politicians have seemingly come to understand its importance and
reach, as suggested in their adoption and usage over time (see Lassen and Bode 2017). Though
seemingly just another platform to some, Twitter has fundamentally changed the way that
legislators communicate with their constituents and supporters. Unlike franking, newsletters, or
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press conferences, Twitter allows individuals to instantly communicate with millions of users at
the touch of a cell phone, tablet, or computer.10 Though distinctive in its reach, Twitter falls in line
with the other mediums that legislators have, and continue to use, for communicating with
constituents in the sense that it allows them to discuss what they are doing for them, so as to not
fall out of favor with them.
It did not take long for Twitter to gain traction with legislators and officeholder hopefuls.11
Twitter is now a key communication platform for politicians on the campaign trail (Evans et al.
2014) and once in office (Golbeck et al. 2010; Evans et al. 2013; Straus et al. 2013; Straus et al.
2014; Lassen and Bode 2017). Twitter is part of American politics and a platform that is used not
only by members of Congress but by the president and other prominent actors (Gainous and
Wagner 2014). It is not uncommon today for a tweet to make national news, something that speaks
to how impactful and important to our politics this relatively new medium has become. In addition,
it is a platform that allows politicians to do various things from sharing their current meal to talking
about policies and pieces of legislation on the agenda. And these messages – unlike a newsletter,
C-SPAN showing, or floor speech – have the potential to have an immediate impact because they
are posted on a social networking site that many adults in the U.S. rely on for news (Shearer and
Gottfried 2017).
Much of the research on congressional Twitter use has focused on explaining variation in
the adoption (Williams and Gulati 2010; Lassen and Brown 2011; Straus et al. 2013; Evans et al.

10

This work is built on the assumption that legislators are followed by at least some of their constituents. However,
as the work of Barbera et al. (2014) shows, it is not too strong an assumption because there is a non-trivial
percentage of constituents that follow at least one member of Congress. Nonetheless, even in the absence of a large
constituent following, I think it is safe to assume that legislators behave as if their constituents are watching,
otherwise it would be difficult to explain the activity that we do see on the platform.
11
Twitter was introduced in 2006 and it didn’t take long for large segments of the citizenry and legislators to adopt
the platform (see Gainous and Wagner 2014).
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2014) and general usage of the platform by officeholders (Ardoin 2013; see also Bode et al. 2011;
Hemphill et al. 2013; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Lassen and Bode 2017; Wagner et al. 2017).
However, we are now at a point where Twitter has experienced widespread adoption by individuals
in both legislative chambers, so there needs to be more of a focus on what legislators are posting
and why they are doing so.12 More recent work has started to move in this direction (see Dancey
and Massand 2017; Stout et al. 2017; Tillery 2017).
Still, the available work leaves something to be desired on the “why” front and on the
question of whether Latino interests are reflected in that communication. On the former, there is a
need to better understand the driving factors behind what legislators are posting on Twitter. We
have the motivation (i.e., re-election), and an idea of what factors account for adoption and a
propensity to post, but our understanding of what causes certain legislators to post certain things
(e.g., a picture of their pet or meal as opposed to a roll call vote or something else) is lacking (but
see Hemphill et al. 2013). Part of this is rooted in the fact that the available work was done at a
time where few legislators were actively using Twitter (e.g., Golbeck et al. 2010; Mergel 2012;
Hemphill et al. 2013), it specifically focused on a subset of legislators (e.g., Tillery 201713) or
issue area (e.g, Dancey and Massand 2017; Stout et al. 201714), or is concerned with more
particular behavior that does not speak to Latino behavior (e.g., Wagner et al. 201715). Relatedly,
we know that certain legislators are more likely to advance the interests of Latinos in the broader
legislative process, but we do not know if their behavior on Twitter reflects that or the contributing
factors of such behavior. Indeed, at least theoretically, there is the possibility that legislators can

12

All members of the 115th U.S. House of Representatives had a Twitter account.
Tillery (2017) only looks at members of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC).
14
Both of these works are concerned with legislative behavior with respect to the black lives matter movement.
15
This work looks at gender differences in Twitter behavior.
13
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use communication as a means to demonstrate that they are aware of the things important to the
Latino community, even if their behavior in other areas of the legislative process doesn’t.16 This
work contributes to both of those areas by exploring differences in the behavior of legislators based
on individual characteristics (e.g., legislator ethnicity, partisanship, or age), district demographics
(e.g., the number of Latinos in a legislator’s district), or both. Since Latinos constitute a minority
in the populace and in the legislature, knowing if there is a difference in the behavior of Latino
legislators relative to non-Latino legislators can affect the discourse on Latino representation in
Congress.
Minority Legislators on Twitter
The descriptive-substantive connection is at the heart of work on minority representation
because there is the assumption that minority legislators are in a better position to advance the
interests of their co-racial (or co-ethnic) constituents.17 The work cited above suggests that this
does indeed appear to be the case in various areas of the legislative process, and some work on the
behavior of minority legislators on Twitter suggests that it extends to this area too. 18 Though
sparse, the available literature on minority communication on Twitter gives weight to the idea that
minority legislators post about issues important to the co-racial (Stout et al. 2017; Tillery 2017)
and co-gender19 (Evans and Clark 2016) populations that they represent. For example, Tillery
(2017) shows that members of the Congressional Black Caucus in the 113th Congress were more

16

This could be either legislators that try to establish and build trust through communication in the absence of being
able to accomplish things in other areas of the legislative process, or it could be those legislators that may pander to
Latinos on social media in order to get support without the intent of advancing their interests in other areas (e.g.,
voting, committee work, agenda-setting).
17
This expectation stems from shared life experiences, a sense of linked fate or identity, and interactions between
those individuals and their co-racial/co-ethnic populations (see Dawson 1994; Mansbridge 1999; Grose 2011).
18
Granted, the literature exploring minority representation on Twitter almost exclusively focuses on blacks (but see
Gervais and Wilson 2017).
19
Women aren’t a minority in the racial or ethnic sense, but they are a minority in the legislature, which is why I
include this work here.
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likely to talk about racial issues than their non-black colleagues in the legislature. Similarly, Stout
and his colleagues (2017) find that black legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives were
more likely to display support for “black-centered social movements” than their white counterparts
in Congress were (p. 493; see also Dancey and Massand 2017). Women legislators (and
candidates), according to the work of Evans and Clark (2016), are more likely to speak to women’s
issues on Twitter than males are. All of this fits the broader literature on minorities in Congress
well, as minorities generally display an awareness of the interests of the individuals they
descriptively represent (see Griffin 2014).
Latino Interests
To the extent that the interests of Latinos are different from those of their non-Latino
counterparts – and there is reason to believe that they are – there is a need to explore how legislators
speak to the interests of this population. Indeed, as Segura’s (2012) work shows, there are various
issues on which the Latino and non-Latino Anglo population differ (see also Sanchez 2006; Leal
2007; Baretto and Segura 2014). Furthermore, public opinion polls (Baretto et al. 2018; Barreto
2019) and Latino interest group reports (Sanchez 2016; Vargas 2016) consistently show that there
are certain issues atop the Latino political agenda.20 Not surprisingly, immigration reform is one
such issue, and one that often gets slotted as a “Latino issue.” But there are others such as bilingual
education, health care, the economy, crime, and income inequality, that have been identified as
those important to Latinos (de la Garza et al. 1992; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Barreto et al. 2002;
Pantoja and Segura 2003; Leal et al. 2008; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014; Lopez et al. 2016; Barreto
et al. 2018; Barreto 2019). None of those issues are of concern only to Latinos, but they are

20

Both Latino Decisions polls and Latino interest groups (i.e., the National Association of Latino Elected Officials
and the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda) demonstrate that certain issues (e.g., immigration, education, etc.)
are important to Latinos.
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amongst those that this segment of the population would like to see addressed and, as alluded to
above, in many instances the positions taken by Latinos – relative to Anglos – are fundamentally
different. Here I explore the factors influencing the propensity of legislators to tweet about
immigration, education, and health care because these are issues important to Latinos and also
those on which we see diverging preferences held by Latinos relative to non-Latinos (de la Garza
et al. 1992; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Barreto et al. 2002; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Leal et al.
2008; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014; Lopez et al. 2016; Barreto et al. 2018; Barreto 2019).
In addition, Latinos, as a result of the size of the immigrant population and their ties to the
U.S.-born Latino population, have a vested interest in the advancement of these issues even if they
are not issues only important to them. On immigration, for example, undocumented immigrants of
Latino origins constitute the largest segment of the unauthorized population (Migration Policy
Institute 2019), which means that they have plenty of reasons to want to see this issue addressed
by the government. 21 Education is another issue important to Latinos – and higher on the Latino
agenda relative to that of non-Latino whites – because they are more likely to have English as a
second language than their non-Latino Anglo counterparts. As for health care, Latinos tend to be
lower on the socioeconomic spectrum than non-Latino whites (Fontenot et al. 2018), and are also
dealing with an aging undocumented population (Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Trevelyan et al.
2016), which helps explain their prioritization of the issue relative to whites. All this is to say that
there may be something inherently Latino to these issues which could potentially explain the
salience of these issues for Latinos.

21

Undocumented immigrants from Mexico and Central America alone constitute about 67% of that population
(Migration Policy Institute 2019).
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Types of Tweets and Issue Areas
There are various ways to explore the behavior of legislators on Twitter. Here, my focus is
on understanding what issues individuals talk about and how they talk about them. Since the key
preoccupation here is trying to understand whether the behavior of legislators on Twitter reflects
the interests of Latinos, I look at the issue areas that legislators are discussing on Twitter with
respect to Latino interests. Legislators are free to post about whatever they wish on this platform,
but we know from prior work that a significant amount of what they do is policy-focused (Golbeck
et al. 2010; see also Lassen and Bode 2017), which means that they are making decisions about
what to focus on and, as a result, are speaking about certain issues while ignoring others.
There is also a need to explore how legislators use the platform. In other words, we need
to know what form tweets take (i.e., are they policy-oriented, announcing district events, etc.). As
discussed above, minority legislators – because of their numerical minority status – may be less
likely to focus on policy than non-Latino white legislators will, and this is a way to capture that.
Looking at these differences across legislators (and contexts) can add to our understanding of
legislative behavior and has the potential to highlight different experiences faced by minority and
non-minority legislators in Congress.
Determinants of Behavior on Twitter
Whether the focus is on explaining variation in the type of tweets (i.e., policy, appeal to
action, etc.) or issue areas (i.e., immigration, education, etc.) that legislators are posting about on
Twitter, there is a need to account for both the ethnicity of a given legislator and the size of the
Latino population. Latino legislators – because of their own backgrounds, interactions with, and
shared experiences with the Latino constituents they represent – may be more likely to speak about
the issues pertinent to the broader Latino population. Similarly, for the reasons mentioned above,
102

Latino legislators should be more likely to resort to symbolic representation than their non-Latino
white colleagues in the legislature. Nevertheless, speaking to the issues of the Latino population,
or even working to give psychological reassurance to Latino constituents via symbolic
representation, does not require shared ethnicity. Indeed, at least theoretically, Latino and nonLatino legislators should be able to advance the interests of Latinos. Relatedly, the size of the
Latino population might influence responsiveness to the interests of the Latino population, a
potential effect independent of legislator ethnicity, as more Latinos in a given legislator’s district
may increase the incentive to talk about issues important to Latinos because of the electoral
connection.22 Prior work has also noted that there are other legislator characteristics (e.g., gender
and partisan identification; Tillery 2017; see also Ardoin 2013; Evans et al. 2014; Stout et al. 2017)
and district-level factors (e.g., size of minority population; Ardoin 2013; Stout et al. 2017; Tillery
2017) that affect legislative behavior on Twitter.

Hypotheses
Based on the literature on minority legislative behavior (see Griffin 2014 for a review)
comes the expectation that Latino legislators will be more attuned, and vocal about the issues
important to Latinos than non-Latino white legislators.
Hypothesis 1: Latino legislators are more likely than non-Latino white legislators to tweet about
issues important to Latinos (i.e., immigration, education, and health care).

It could also be that larger Latino populations give legislators the flexibility to talk about issues that aren’t a
priority to their non-Latino constituents.
22
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Though some legislators may (or may not) be predisposed to be sensitive to the issues
important to Latinos due to shared ethnicity, given the electoral connection (see Mayhew 1974),
the expectation is that a larger Latino population in a given member’s district will increase the
likelihood that they post about issues important to Latinos.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between the size of the Latino population in a
legislator’s district and the legislator’s propensity to tweet about issues important to Latinos (i.e.,
immigration, education, and health care).
Latino legislators, because of their minority status – in both the ethnic and numerical sense
– are likely to engage in the political process differently. Though the literature on the subject leads
to the expectation that their policy-related behavior (i.e., positions taken, bills presented, etc.)
might be different, it is their behavior more generally that might be influenced. In the absence of
having the required majorities to push policy through Congress, the expectation is that Latino
legislators are less likely to have policy victories to flaunt and will subsequently be forced to use
other types of messages to keep their positions in office (see hypothesis 3). From this line of
thinking – and the literatures on minority legislative behavior and on symbolic representation cited
above – comes the expectation that Latino legislators are more likely than their non-Latino white
counterparts to engage in symbolic messaging on Twitter to signal to their constituents that their
interests are important even if they (as legislators) are unable to act on them in a way that the status
quo is changed. Relatedly, (non-)Latino legislators in districts with high Latino populations may
also be in the same situation and thus resort to symbolic messaging.
Hypothesis 3: Latino legislators are less likely than non-Latino white legislators to post policyoriented tweets.
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Hypothesis 4: Latino legislators are more likely than non-Latino white legislators to post symbolic
tweets.
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive association between the size of the Latino population in a
legislator’s district and the legislator’s propensity to post symbolic tweets.

Research Design and Methodology
Data
To explore legislative behavior on Twitter, I collected almost two years’ worth of tweets for each
member of the 115th U.S. House of Representatives using Python and the Twitter application
programming interface (API). I scraped tweets from the official profiles (i.e., those linked to the
websites of legislators) from the start of the legislative session until the first week of November in
2018.23 24 That span of almost two years yielded over 493,000 tweets, which is an average of over
1,100 per legislator in that time span (see Table 2.1).25 This is to be expected, as legislators vary
in their propensity to post on the platform (see Lassen and Bode 2017); some did not post at all
and others posted thousands of tweets.26 Tweets are not as long as press releases or newsletters,
but coding almost half a million tweets is no easy feat. Instead of coding each and every one of
those tweets by hand, I chose to rely on a method that is increasingly used by scholars in the field:
supervised machine learning (see Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Grimmer 2016; Lassen and Bode
2017). This method, though computationally intensive, is useful for large-scale projects

23

Tweets were collected until the week of the U.S. national elections in 2018.
I supplement this data with legislator characteristics from legislator profiles (and online sources) and the U.S.
Census Bureau’s 2017, 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates.
25
Tables 1 and 2 have summary statistics for both the entire chamber and for the Latino and white members. This is
because only the latter is used for the core analysis. The difference I am concerned with is that between Latinos and
non-Latino whites in the legislature.
26
Five members (Clay Higgins (LA-3rd), Jim Bridenstine (OK-1st), Pat Meehan (PA-7th), Rob Bishop (UT-1st), and
Evan Jenkins (WV-3rd)) were excluded because they did not meet the minimum threshold of fifty tweets to be
included in the analysis.
24

105

Table 2.1: Number of Tweets
Total # of Tweets
for Each MC
Full Chamber

Total # of Tweets
for Each MC
Whites and Latinos

Minimum

48

48

Mean

1148.037

1084.732

Maximum

6755

6401

Standard Deviation

941.1811

882.6737

Skewness

2.17794

2.1884

Kurtosis

10.42675

10.62242

Sum

493,656

401,351
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(like those being tackled by researchers in this new era of big data) and also fairly intuitive. The
method relies on researchers to train algorithms on a subset of the data, which then allows the
software to code the rest of the data using the different trained algorithms. Using this technique, I
hand-coded a random sample of over 5,000 tweets, which I then used to train three algorithms (i.e.,
maximum entropy, support vector machine, and glmnet; see Jurka et al. 2013, 2015).27 Those
algorithms were then used to code the rest of the tweets using an R program called RTextTools,
which was created by Timothy Jurka and his colleagues (see Jurka et al. 2013), and is used to take
on projects similar to this one (see Hemphill et al. 2013; Lassen and Bode 2017). However, getting
to that point took some time and effort, as there are several things that needed to be done in the
processing stage to ensure data quality for analyses.
The algorithms used here classify the tweets using a “bag of words” technique, which does
away with word order and relies on the roots of the words in the tweets (see Grimmer and Stewart
2013 for a more nuanced discussion; see also Lassen and Bode 2017).

28

In practice, this means

that I had to stem the words in the tweets (e.g., changing running to run). In addition to stemming,
I removed unnecessary information (i.e., getting rid of numbers, punctuation, usernames,
hyperlinks, and very (un-)common words in the data) that does not help the algorithms (see
Grimmer and Stewart 2013; see also Jurka et al. 2013 and Welbers et al. 2017).29 These procedures

27

I chose these three algorithms because they are those which not only have already been used for a similar purpose
by other scholars (i.e., coding tweets; see Lassen and Bode 2017; see also Jurka et al. 2015), but they are ones that
have been identified as low-memory algorithms. The latter is of particular importance, especially when one
considers the sheer size of the data being explored here.
28
See also Welbers et al. 2017 for more information on preprocessing data and techniques used.
29
Once the algorithms were trained, a fivefold cross-validation method was used to test the algorithms. This means
that the trained data was tested by partitioning it into five random sub-sets and those different configurations were
tested for accuracy with the hand-coded data (see Lassen and Bode 2017). Individually, no algorithm performed
better than 62%, but when at least two were in agreement, they coded about 99% of the data.
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are standard for this kind of analysis and they help reduce the size of the tweets used for coding,
which aids in the use of resources needed for coding. 30 31
The procedures outlined above allowed me to code each tweet based on whether it was
policy-oriented, event-related, or otherwise, a categorization scheme I will discuss below.
However, I am not only concerned with the nature of the tweets posted by legislators, I also want
to know what they are tweeting about. To explore whether legislators are tweeting about issues
important to Latinos, I take a different approach to the one described above.32 Specifically, I go
back to the unprocessed master list of tweets and make use of keywords to identify tweets for each
of the three issue areas. On immigration, for example, I use the following keywords to find tweets
regarding this topic: “immig,” “daca,” “undoc,” “dreamer,” and “green card,” amongst others.33
Here, I am solely concerned with what legislators are talking about, which is why such a crude
categorization scheme is useful. Granted, this technique ignores the valence of text about these
issues, but there is value in knowing whether they are talking about the issues at all; indeed,
whether issues are being discussed at all has a bearing on how the interests of the Latino population
are being advanced.34

30

I also translated the tweets not posted in English. While some of those were tweets where the legislator was
simply posting something they had already posted in English in a different language, the majority of tweets were
those in which they weren’t.
31
Though there is naturally a concern of losing valuable information, as Grimmer and Stewart (2013) note, that
scholars have “consistently across applications…shown that this simple representation of text is sufficient to infer
substantively interest properties of texts” (p. 273).
32
Though going the machine learning route here would give me more leverage in regards to exploring what MCs are
talking about relative to other topics, not just those identified as important to Latinos, that is not necessary for what
I’m interested in exploring here.
33
The same is done for education and health care.
34
There are issues that never get addressed in the formal legislative process, which likely speaks to the majoritarian
and partisan processes that take place in the institution. However, on Twitter (and in their communicative strategies
more broadly) legislators have the ability to address any issues they want. A failure to do so can be viewed as a
strong signal to constituents that those issues aren’t important or relevant.
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Variables
The categorization scheme used here for the dependent variables is adapted from Lassen
and Bode’s (2017) work (see also Golbeck et al. 2010; Tillery 2017). The symbolic category
captures tweets where MCs demonstrate an awareness of the issues important to minorities without
an explicit reference to policy or a roll call vote (see Tillery 2017; see also Sinclair-Chapman
2002). The policy category captures explicit mentions of roll call votes and/or pieces of legislation.
The partisan category captures tweets that use of partisan language and (or) the explicit reference
to either of the political parties. The appeal to action category captures tweets where legislators
attempt to get viewers to do something, be it repost a tweet, read a newsletter, or call a hotline.
The events category has tweets that explicitly mention an upcoming event, campaign-related or
otherwise. The media category houses tweets where legislators are sharing general information
and media (e.g., pictures, articles, videos, and links) and messages that don’t fall into any of the
other categories (see Table 2.2 for a distribution of the tweets for the 115th U.S. House).35
With the tweets identified and categorized, I use the raw number of tweets to compute the
proportion of tweets in a given category (or issue area) for each legislator, and these proportions
serve as the dependent variables for this study (see Table 2.3 for descriptive statistics).36 For the
issue areas, I compute the proportion of tweets in each of the policy areas described above.37 The
key explanatory variables are legislator ethnicity and size of the Latino population in a given

35

Though the key category here is symbolic, the other categories provide a more holistic view of how legislators are
using Twitter to communicate with constituents.
36
About 62 percent of the data was unanimously coded by all three algorithms and about 37 percent of the tweets
were coded by at least two of the algorithms. On one percent of the data, none of the algorithms were in agreement.
Ideally, I would like the unanimously coded percentage to be higher but relying on two algorithms should still
provide us with a general idea of the different types of tweets.
37
Each of those dependent variables, for immigration, education, and health care, are calculated by identifying how
many tweets of the total count fall into those individual areas. These issue area dependent variables were constructed
independent of those by tweet type (i.e., policy, symbolic, etc.).
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Table 2.2: Average Proportion by Category
Type of Tweet
Average Proportion
Average Proportion
Full Chamber
Whites and Latinos
Media
.786584
.7863112
Policy
.1251629
.1295553
Symbolic
.0027964
.0024182
Partisan
.0403114
.0360725
Appeal for Action
.0278641
.0283785
Event
.0053884
.0055587
No Code*
.0118928
.0117057
*These are tweets where none of the three algorithms were in agreement with one another. These
tweets will be coded by hand in the future.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Latino and Non-Latino White Legislators in 115th U.S.
House
Minimum
Mean
Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
N
Proportion
Variables:

Policy
Symbolic
Immigration
Education
Health Care
Legislator
Characteristics:

.010989
0
0
0
0

.1295553
.0024182
.0326319
.0470207
.0369691

.3103448
.0214395
.3316551
.157931
.184466

.0472527
.0036952
.0413321
.022193
.0302068

.3573358
2.303299
2.930808
1.080273
1.820873

3.41606
9.329297
14.97024
5.996295
7.413398

370
370
370
370
370

Latino
Age

0
33

.1
58.0973

1
88

.3004062
10.56154

8.111111
2.782222

370
370

Female
Democrat
District
Characteristics:

0
0

.1621622
.3783784

1
1

.3690986
.4856394

2.666667
.0925915
1.833089
.5015504

4.360215
1.251553

370
370

%
Latino

.8

17.96

88.1

18.62167

1.769903

5.612799

370
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legislator’s district. The former is a binary variable (Latino) that takes a value of one when the
legislator is Latino, and the latter is the percentage of the Latino population (% Latino) in each
district (see Table 2.3).38 39 In addition to ethnicity, other legislator characteristics included in the
models as controls are age, gender (female), and partisan identification (Democrat).40 At the
district level, the size of the foreign-born population is also included in the models, as it can
potentially help explain variance in legislative behavior, especially for issues such as immigration
and education.
Modeling
Legislators vary in their propensity to post on Twitter (Golbeck et al. 2010; Lassen and Brown
2011; Straus et al. 2014; Lassen and Bode 2017), which is why using a simple count model isn’t
appropriate here.41 Using the proportion of each MC’s tweets in each category (or issue area)
allows me to account for that variance, but that decision comes with its own methodological
considerations. Proportions, especially those with distributions skewed towards the extremes (i.e.,
0 and 1), make ordinary least squares regression problematic (see Ferrari and Cribari-Nieto
2004).42 In addition, because certain legislators have zeros for some of the dependent variables,
there is a need to adequately model those zeros and not lose them to data transformation (see

38

Legislator characteristics (i.e., ethnicity, age, party identification) were taken from a data set composed by
Stephen Wolf (2017).
39
I ran the models comparing Latinos to non-Latinos in general (i.e., all other non-Latino groups) and comparing
Latinos only to non-Latino whites, and the results do not change substantively. In fact, comparing Latinos to only
non-Latino white legislators seems to strengthen the results captured here. The results as presented here are arguably
stronger tests because they also include other minorities in the non-Latino category.
40
Party identification is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the MC is a Democrat and 0 when the MC
is a Republican. Unlike the U.S. Senate, there are no members in the 115th House that don’t fall into one of those
two camps (see Wolf 2017).
41
The variance in tweets amongst legislators for the period studied here also suggests that a count model isn’t
appropriate.
42
These types of distributions violate ordinary least square normality assumptions. Nonetheless, the substantive
results stay intact when these relationships are modeled using ordinary least squares regression. The post-estimation
tests suggest heteroscedasticity is present, which is what is expected based on the nature of the dependent variables.

112

Williams 2018). Though a zero-one inflated beta (ZOIB) distribution model (Buis 2010) might
seem appropriate, it rests on the assumption that there are different processes – and as a result,
different independent variables – influencing legislators that have no tweets in a given category
(or issue area) when compared to those with some tweets in those same variables (Buis 2010;
Williams 2018). However, this work is operating under the assumption that all legislators have the
same capability (or freedom) to post whatever they want on the platform. As a result, the zeros
that are present in the data come from the lack of desire or motivation to post about issues important
to Latinos. In this case, using a fractional response generalized linear model, seems more
appropriate because it allows for the modeling of proportions (including zeros) without the same
assumptions that come with Buis’ (2010) ZOIB model (Williams 2018; see also Papke and
Wooldridge 1996; Wooldridge 2011).43
While all of the dependent variables are proportional, there are two different groups of
models that are computed here. One set of models explores the issue areas (e.g., what explains the
likelihood that legislators post about immigration?), and the other set of models focuses on the
types of tweets (i.e., policy and symbolic). The former is centered around trying to answer the
extent to which legislators speak to the interests of the Latino population and the latter to the nature
of their communication.

Results
The purpose of this paper, as mentioned above, is two-fold: finding out what legislators are
posting on Twitter and how they’re doing it; I will address the former first and then switch my
focus to discussing the latter. What issues legislators are discussing on Twitter provides

43

This is done using the fracglm command in Stata 14 from Williams’ (2018) user-written package.
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constituents with an idea of the priorities of the individuals that represent them. Though exploring
all of the different policy issues that legislators are discussing would help better contextualize the
behavior of legislators on Twitter, I chose to look only a few issues that consistently sit atop the
priority list for Latinos in the electorate. This does not capture whether legislators are speaking in
support (or opposition) of these issues, but it does provide us with a basic idea of what’s being
brought to the discussion of ideas, which is generally a precursor to more substantive action in the
legislative process.
Before explaining the results, there is a need to explain what the tables and figures actually
show. Unlike ordinary least squares estimation, the coefficients from the fractional response
generalized linear models are not readily interpretable (see Williams 2018). As a result, the table
shows the marginal effects of the independent variables on the proportional dependent variables
and the figures display the predicted proportion of tweets in a given category at different levels of
the independent variables. In addition, and more importantly, it should be noted that it is not easy
to contextualize the results because the dependent variables – in order to account for variance in
the propensity to vote from one legislator to the next – capture the proportion of tweets from each
legislators total. That means that it is difficult to say how many more tweets legislators post in a
given issue area (or category) because there is a variance in the total number of tweets posted by
legislators on the whole.44 Therefore, the focus here is explaining the effects of the independent
variables on the dependent variables by looking at the direction and size of those effects and not
the number of tweets when moving from one level to another of a given independent variable.

44

In the data set, this ranges from about 50 to well over 6,000 in the two-year span (see Table 1, column 2).
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Issues
Immigration is one issue that is inextricably tied to the Latino population, and it is also one
that many Latinos have a vested interest in given their own transnational ties (and those of their
constituents). As would be expected, the descriptive connection between Latino legislators and
their co-ethnic members of the American public increases the likelihood that Latino MCs will post
about immigration on Twitter (see Table 2.4 and Figure 2.1). The predicted proportion of
immigration related tweets for Latino is almost twice as much as it is for non-Latino whites (see
Figure 2.1). This is a finding that lends some support for the first hypothesis that there is a
difference in behavior rooted in legislator ethnicity, at least with respect to immigration. The size
of the Latino (see Figure 2.2) and that of the foreign-born (see Figure 2.3) populations both
influence the likelihood that a given legislator will post about immigration on Twitter, irrespective
of their own ethnicity. This is consistent with the second hypothesis, whereby legislators with
larger Latino populations are more likely than those with lower Latino populations to post about
immigration. For the former, a move from a district with a one percent of Latino population to one
with a Latino population of eighty-one percent in the district leads to almost a three-fold increase
in the proportion of immigration tweets, all else constant (Figure 2.1). A move from a district with
a foreign-born population of one percent to one with a foreign-born population of forty-nine
percent leads to an almost twofold increase in the proportion of immigration tweets posted by a
given legislator (see Figure 2.2). These results are not surprising, as those legislators with larger
Latino, and foreign-born populations more generally are those most likely to be face pressure from
those communities to take action on this particular issue. In addition to those results, it is evident
that Democratic legislators are more likely than their Republican colleagues to post about
immigration (see Figure 2.4). This result is also not surprising, as Democrats are usually more
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responsive to the interests of the Latino population than Republicans are (see Griffin and Newman
2007).
Unlike immigration, legislator ethnicity does not appear to be a driving factor when looking
at legislator propensity to post about education or health care; this a finding that is at odds with the
first hypothesis. Even though the issues are those that Latinos place atop their priority list for
governmental action, they are not issues that only Latinos care about or have a vested interest in.
That aside, and though not part of the core hypotheses being tested here, there are some notable
findings when looking at other legislator characteristics. More specifically, legislator gender and
partisan identification were statistically significant in most of the models here, both in regard to
the issues and on substance (see Table 2.4). Female and Democratic legislators were both more
likely than their male and Republican colleagues, respectively, to post about education and health
care on Twitter (see Figure 2.5).
Substance
As discussed above, keeping constituents in the loop on the policy front is an important part of
legislative communication, and the data allow for the exploration of what accounts for variance in
that type of message. I look at this by using the policy proportion of each legislator’s total tweets
(see Table 2.4, column 4). This finding fails to provide support for the third hypothesis, as there
isn’t a statistically significant difference in legislators’ propensity to post policy-related tweets.
Even if Latinos are not as likely to have as many policy “wins” as their non-Latino white
colleagues, they may still choose to talk about legislation in other ways. Indeed, they could be
communicating that they voted against something or about bills that they have presented or
sponsored which could – in their minds – be just as good. Though the analysis here cannot speak
to either of those possibilities, it does clearly go against the expectation that Latinos are less likely
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Table 2.4: Fractional Regression Models
Independent
Proportional Dependent Variables
Variables
Immigration
Education
Health Care
Policy
Symbolic
Latino#
.0189617***
.0015814
-.0012516
.0025998
.0012375**
(.0073979)
(.0045175)
(.0073662)
(.0136569)
(.0007137)
Age
.0002021*
.0000575
.0001549
.0002014
.0000237**
(.0001192)
(.0001024)
(.0001174)
(.0002268)
(.0000116)
Female#
-.0020528
.0114665***
.0032117**
.0183889** .0015741***
(.0031674)
(.0035962)
(.0031127)
(.0069009)
(.0003655)
Democrat#
.0045936*
.0348757***
-.0098139 .0037627***
.0221418***
(.0024647)
(.0034186)
(.0059863)
(.0003479)
(.00288)
% Latino
.000411***
.0000392
-.0000837
.0001526
-.0000119
(.0000924)
(.0001063)
(.0001443)
(.000274)
(.0000127)
% Foreign
.0003861***
-.0002007
-.0001752
-.0001526
.0000222
Born
(.000159)
(.000162)
(.0001518)
(.0003852)
(.0000183)
N
370
370
370
370
370
Pseudo R2
.0780
.0014
.0235
.0009
.0686
#Estimate denotes a discrete change of binary variable from zero to one.
The estimates shown are marginal effects and the standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Figure 2.1: Predicted Proportion of Immigration Tweets Based on Legislator Ethnicity
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Figure 2.2: Predicted Proportion of Immigration Tweets Based on Latino Population
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Figure 2.3: Predicted Proportion of Immigration Tweets Based on Foreign Born Population
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Figure 2.4: Predicted Proportion of Immigration Tweets Based on Legislator Party Identification
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(a) PID and Education

(c) PID and Health Care

(b) Gender and Education

(d) Gender and Health Care

Figure 2.5: Predicted Proportions of Education and Health Care Tweet Based on PID and Gender
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to talk about votes or legislation on Twitter than are non-Latino white. Like ethnicity, most of the
coefficients in the model were statistically insignificant. The sole exception in that model was
legislator gender. The results show that female legislators were significantly more likely to post
policy-oriented tweets than their male colleagues in the House (see Figure 2.6). This is an
interesting finding, though not unexpected, as literature on female legislators in Congress shows
that women are more likely than men to speak on the floor on political issues of the day (Pearson
and Dancey 2011). Congresswomen may – because of gendered norms – feel like they have to
devote more of their efforts to highlighting policy-oriented activities as a way to demonstrate that
they are supposed to be there.1
The next, and final model that I discuss here, is that exploring the propensity of legislators
to post symbolic messages. Though symbolic tweets seem to have been published sparingly by
legislators in the 115th U.S. House of Representation (see column 2 in Table 2.2), the results
provide some support for the idea that Latino legislators are more likely than their non-Latino
white colleagues to post symbolic-type tweets. This provides support for the fourth hypothesis (see
Figure 2.7).2 In addition to legislator ethnicity, gender and partisan identification were also
statistically significant.3 More specifically, women and Democratic legislators were more likely
than their respective counterparts to post symbolic tweets (see Figure 2.8). Whereas women are
historical minorities in the legislature, in the 115th Congress, a majority of them – by being part of

Though primarily focused on the intersection of partisanship and gender, Pearson’s (2015) work demonstrates that
women go to great lengths to prove their credentials. Amongst other things, this is evident in their floor speeches.
2
Given the prevalence of symbolic acts in other facets of the legislative process (e.g., symbolic resolutions
(Sinclair-Chapman 2002), in floor speeches (Hill and Hurley 2002)), it is surprising that this type of tweets aren’t
more prevalent here. However, this can potentially be attributed to the fact that the method of exploration chosen
can’t pick up symbolic tweets that come by way of photographs, links to other media (e.g., videos, articles, press
releases, etc.), or other non-text presentations.
3
This means that hypothesis five is not supported in this study.
1

123

Figure 2.6: Predicted Proportion of Policy Tweets Based on Legislator Gender
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Figure 2.7: Predicted Proportion of Symbolic Tweets Based on Legislator Ethnicity
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Figure 2.8: Predicted Proportion of Symbolic Tweets Based on Legislator Gender
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to post symbolic messages. Though symbolic tweets seem to have been published sparingly by
legislators in the 115th U.S. House of Representation (see column 2 in Table 2.2), the results
provide some support for the idea that Latino legislators are more likely than their non-Latino
white colleagues to post symbolic-type tweets. This provides support for the fourth hypothesis (see
Figure 2.7).4 In addition to legislator ethnicity, gender and partisan identification were also
statistically significant.5 More specifically, women and Democratic legislators were more likely
than their respective counterparts to post symbolic tweets (see Figure 2.8). Whereas women are
historical minorities in the legislature, in the 115th Congress, a majority of them – by being part of
the Democratic party – were also a minority in the partisan sense since Republicans controlled the
House during that span (Congressional Research Service 2018).6 Those two realities may have
compounded to a heavier reliance on symbolic communication by female legislators in this time
period. By similar logic, Democratic legislators in the minority party may have felt more pressure
to reassure constituents that they were aware and fighting for their interests especially because of
fewer victories to lay claim on the policy front (see Figure 2.9).7

Conclusion and Discussion
The issues important to Latinos in the electorate do appear to be reflected in the messages
posted on Twitter by legislators. Though the raw proportions of tweets here do not account for
whether the messages posted are in line with the positions preferred by Latinos, they do show that

4

Given the prevalence of symbolic acts in other facets of the legislative process (e.g., symbolic resolutions
(Sinclair-Chapman 2002), in floor speeches (Hill and Hurley 2002)), it is surprising that this type of tweets aren’t
more prevalent here. However, this can potentially be attributed to the fact that the method of exploration chosen
can’t pick up symbolic tweets that come by way of photographs, links to other media (e.g., videos, articles, press
releases, etc.), or other non-text presentations.
5
This means that hypothesis five is not supported in this study.
6
Women held 92 seats in the House, and 67 of those were held by Democratic women.
7
Age also increases the likelihood that MCs post symbolic tweets (see Figure 2.10)
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Figure 2.9: Predicted Proportion of Symbolic Tweets Based on Legislator PID
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Figure 2.10: Predicted Proportion of Symbolic Tweets Based on Legislator Age
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some of the issues important to this segment of the population are being discussed by legislators,
which is important on its own. Only for immigration does ethnicity exert an effect on messages
posted, which likely speaks to the salience and prioritization of the issue for Latino legislators. The
same applies to the size of the Latino population in a given legislator’s district, which makes sense,
as it is an issue arguably more directly linked to the Latino population than the others explored.
In line with expectations, Latino legislators during the period covered were more likely to
post symbolic tweets than their white colleagues were. Unexpected, however, was the paucity of
symbolic tweets in relation to the total number of messages posted on the platform. One potential
explanation could be that legislators, in general, do not feel the need to post these kinds of tweets
because they engage with their co-ethnic (or co-racial) constituents in person or through other
mediums. It could also be that they believe that speaking to policy, irrespective of aggregate
outcomes, is more beneficial to their reelection efforts than reassuring their constituents that they
are aware of their interests. As mentioned above, policy, as defined here, speaks to roll call votes
and direct mentions of pieces of legislation, which are more concrete things that legislators can
hang their hats on. However, even policy seemed to be less of a focus relative to general media
posts, which constituted the vast majority of tweets during the period studied. Legislators may
view the platform as more useful for general informational purposes than I expected. Indeed, many
of those media tweets provided readers with information ranging from what legislators were
having for lunch to information about their non-voting legislative affairs and links to outside
content.
One limitation of this work is that it only focuses on one Congress, which does not allow
me to see how differences in party control affect communication. That is, we do not know how
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members behave on this platform based on whether they are in the majority or minority party. In
addition, and arguably more importantly, this work does not allow me to pick up on subtle cues
across messages, some of which are made possible by pictures. The software used for coding the
tweets here cannot rightfully pick up what a legislator was trying to portray by posting a picture
of her dining at a hole-in-the-wall restaurant in her district or that of wearing a LGBTQ+ pride pin,
and though the case can be made that they are symbolic in nature, the algorithms can only
categorize it as media. Nonetheless, this study is valuable insofar that it provides us with a snapshot
of legislative communication and an idea of what legislators are posting about on Twitter.
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CHAPTER 3: FRAMING SUPPORT FOR LATINO INTERESTS AND THE
LIMITS OF DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION
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Abstract
How does shared race (or ethnicity) influence the effectiveness of policy frames presented
by legislators to constituents? Recent scholarship highlights the role of race in the strained
communication between legislators and constituents (Butler and Broockman 2011; Broockman
2014; Mendez and Grose 2018). Work on intergroup relations provides the basis for the
expectation that shared racial (or ethnic) identity may influence how receptive constituents are to
communication from legislators (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Scholars have long viewed policy
frames as a way to change public opinion (see Busby et al. 2018 for a review), and it is a way that
legislators can garner support for the policies they champion or are forced to take up as a result of
partisan and majoritarian dynamics. However, scholarship on the subject has failed to take into
account the role of race as a source cue in framing and its potential effect on the effectiveness of
frames. Shared identity (or lack thereof) between legislators and constituents may provide some
insight into the distorted communication between the two and can also inform our understanding
regarding the advancement of Latino interests through the non-Latino population. Here, I explore
how ethnicity as a source cue influences the effectiveness of legislator policy framing on bilingual
education through a survey experiment. The results suggest that, in general, getting respondents to
think about the issue decreases support for bilingual education. In addition, and more importantly,
the results show that white respondents presented with an anti-bilingual education frame by a
Latino legislator display significantly less support for bilingual education than those in the baseline
condition.
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Introduction
The communication between legislators and constituents has a direct impact on the
representation afforded to citizens. While all legislative-constituent communication is important,
that between minority constituents and non-minority representatives is particularly important
given work that shows representational disadvantages for those individuals who are not
descriptively represented (Mendez and Grose 2018). Here, however, the focus is on the
communication between minority legislators and their non-minority constituents. We know that
there is an apparent disconnect in communication in the absence of the descriptive connection
(Butler and Broockman 2011; Broockman 2014). This disconnect has implications for the way in
which constituents are represented, but also for the way in which legislators go about doing their
jobs.
Legislators are tasked with representing all constituents in their districts. Therefore, even
if, as is normally expected, minority legislators are willing to vote in a manner that reflects the
interests of their co-racial (or co-ethnic) constituents, they need to be aware of, and sensitive to,
the interests of their non-minority constituents. Relatedly, the legislative process and the
institutional realities faced by legislators lead to situations in which legislators are forced to vote
on or take positions that may go against what their constituents want (Aldrich and Rohde 2000;
Cox and McCubbins 2005; Lebo et al. 2007). As a result, there is a need to better understand how
effective legislators can be in getting constituents to support the policies they are advancing or
forced to take because of pressure from other actors in the broader process.
Though this is a dilemma faced by all legislators, minority officeholders are in a distinct
position relative to their non-minority colleagues. Not only are they a minority in the racial (or
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ethnic) sense, they are also numerical minorities, and, depending on partisan control of
governmental institutions, partisan minorities. This means that these individuals are more likely to
have to take positions that may be out of favor with their constituents, which means that they are
also more likely to need to convince constituents to tolerate or get on board with the choices made
(or those that have to be made).
How information is presented can affect its effectiveness. Placing a spin on a message to
increase how receptive individuals are to it is something that is fundamental in communication. In
politics, this is normally described as framing (Druckman 2011), and it is a way to get individuals
to be more receptive to an issue stance as a result of how the issue is presented. Here, I explore the
effectiveness of framing on constituents in the absence of shared ethnicity. The literature on elitecitizen communication demonstrates that constituents will sometimes adopt the positions of their
representatives (Butler and Broockman 2017), but this does not account for the role of shared race
or ethnicity between legislators and constituents. This is an oversight that the nascent literature on
how source cues influence framing has acknowledged (see Hartman and Weber 2009). While the
message itself is important, the source that the message is coming from can also be impactful, and
it is something that needs to be accounted for in the study of framing. This paper is an attempt to
add to our understanding on this front, and it does so within the context of Latino representation.
Latinos are one of the fastest growing groups in American society (Brown 2014) and
currently hold more seats in Congress than they have at any other time in our nation’s history
(NALEO Educational Fund 2019).1 As a result of this, Latinos have become a group whose

1

Though the election of Latino legislators is definitely tied to the size of the Latino population, Latinos are not the
only group responsible for electing Latino legislators, nor are they the only individuals that those individuals
represent while in office.
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behavior has attracted the attention of academics and non-academics alike (see Barreto and Segura
2014). The election of more Latinos has been viewed as a way to increase the substantive
representation of Latinos in the electorate (see Casellas 2011), but absent from that discussion has
been information about how those legislators represent and interact with their non-Latino
constituents. In addition to the connection between legislators and constituents that come along
with the office, legislators also need to establish connections with their non-Latino constituents
because there are electoral consequences that are associated with doing so or failing to do so
(Fenno 1978). I explore how successful Latino legislators can be in trying to influence the attitudes
of non-Latino whites relative to the success of their Anglo colleagues through the use of a survey
experiment. The expectation, coming largely from the literature on intergroup relations, is that
Latino legislators will be less effective in garnering support via framing than their Anglo
colleagues.

Theoretical Foundations
Descriptive Representation
The literature on minority representation often focuses on how the descriptive connection
can be used to advance the substantive interests of the co-racial (or co-ethnic) constituents that
those individuals represent (see Griffin 2014). On that front, the literature shows some support for
the idea that minorities in office reflect the preferences of their co-minority constituents in their
voting behavior (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Swain 1995; Cameron et al. 1996; Overby and Cosgrove
1996; Canon 1999; Lublin 1999; Whitby 2000; Tate 2003; Casellas 2007, 2011; Grose 2011;
Rouse 2013) – and outside of it (e.g., agenda-setting (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Sinclair-Chapman
2002; Bratton 2006; Wilson 2010), committee work (Gamble 2007; Rouse 2013), and oversight
(Minta 2011; Rouse 2013)). However, minority legislators do not only represent their co-racial or
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co-ethnics in office; they are tasked with representing their entire district. As such, there are
electoral consequences that come along with the demographic diversity in any given district and
legislators need to figure out how to balance the interests of their different constituents (Fenno
1978; Grose 2011; Hansel and Treul 2015).
The absence of descriptive representation is something that is normally discussed in the
context of how it increases or decreases the substantive representation afforded to minorities; that
is, scholars are normally preoccupied with how minority constituents fare in situations when they
are not represented by a co-racial (or co-ethnic) legislator (see Cameron et al. 1996). An important
part of descriptive representation that is oftentimes left out of the discussion is the relationship
between minority legislators and their non-minority constituents. Indeed, descriptive
representation is presented as a means to increase the substantive representation of their cominority constituents, but what about those that are not part of a given minority legislator’s
demographic group? The relationship between those citizens that aren’t descriptively represented
and their legislators is one that needs to be further explored, as it can have democratic,
representational, and electoral consequences.
Legislator-Constituent Communication
Legislator-constituent communication is at the heart of our representative democracy.
There is an interdependent relationship between the two that hinges on whether or not constituents
provide legislators with information about their preferences and the legislators keeping
constituents in the loop (Miller and Stokes 1963; Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978). Much work
concerns itself with communication from constituents to legislators, but communication from
legislators to constituents is also important. Communication is itself a means to establish and
develop trust with constituents; it’s something that is important, especially when the demands of
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the job pull legislators away from their home districts, geographically and in terms of partisan (and
other) pressures (see Fenno 1978). Plenty of work demonstrates the lengths that legislators go to
in an attempt to ensure that their constituents view them in a favorable light (Mayhew 1974; Fenno
1978; Arnold 1990; Jacobson 2015). Communication is used not only to let constituents know
about their doings in Washington, D.C., and at home, but also as a way to garner support for their
own policies and choices.
In part then, legislators are in the business of trying to get constituents to support policies
they care about or are trying to pass. Though the focus in the literature is normally on whether the
behavior of legislators mirrors the preferences of the electorate, whether MCs can influence the
preferences of constituents has a bearing on whether they advance policies important to them while
in office. 2 After all, legislators have their own preferences and pressure from other political actors
that are not their constituents, which means that they have a need to be able to get support for their
policies in and outside of the halls of Congress. One such place they may look for support is their
constituents.3 Brockman and Butler’s (2017) work finds that citizens will sometimes adopt the
positions held by their legislators (see also Minozzi et al. 2015). Though the authors explore
various political issues and different variations in the intensity of the message, their work does not
examine legislator ethnicity. We know from other work that citizens are less likely to communicate
with their representatives in office when the two are not of the same ethnicity, something that
applies to both minority and Anglo respondents (Broockman 2014; Mendez and Grose 2018).

2

Relatedly, it could also be policies that are imposed on them as a result of partisan and institutional realities (i.e.,
the need to logroll or form other coalitions for success) they face in office.
3
While legislators can technically support (or try to advance) any policies they want, they are constrained by various
factors in practice (e.g., parties, the president, interest groups, constituents, etc.), which can lead them to turn to the
people that put them in office.
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Whether individuals are receptive to legislators that are not of their same racial or ethnic
groups has practical consequences. Principally, as related to this work, white constituents not
receptive to communication efforts from non-white legislators means that the prospects of indirect
representation via Anglos diminishes as the need arises to rely on white legislators to advance the
interests of Latinos in this sense. That is if only non-Latino Anglo legislators can successfully
communicate with their co-racial constituents, then the prospects of garnering support for Latinofavored policies through the Anglo population diminishes because then there is a need to get white
legislators to support those policies. However, even thinking outside of that possibility for a
second, if constituents – generally speaking, not just whites – are not receptive to communication
from legislators that are not like them, then this leaves a large segment of the population that isn’t
part of the legislative process in this sense. From that vantage point, this work has the potential to
speak to not only the limits but also the potentially undesirable side-effects of descriptive
representation.
Latino Interests and Bilingual Education
The extent to which the policy interests of the Latino population differ from those of the
non-Latino population has representational consequences for this segment of the population. This
work would not be necessary (or possible) if there were not differences between the two groups.
On this front, the available research suggests that Latinos and non-Latino whites differ not only in
regard to their policy preferences (Leal 2007; Griffin and Newman 2008; Segura 2012; Barreto
and Segura 2014) but also in the way in which they prioritize those issues (Sanchez 2016; Vargas
2016; Barreto et al. 2018; Barreto 2019). There are several issues where an overwhelming majority
of Latinos and whites sit on diametrically opposed sides (Leal 2007; Griffin and Newman 2008;
Segura 2012). Immigration, health care, the economy, crime, income inequality, and bilingual
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education are amongst those issues, and they are those that consistently come up in polls and
surveys of Latinos (de la Garza et al. 1992; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Barreto et al. 2002; Pantoja
and Segura 2003; Leal et al. 2008; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014; Lopez et al. 2016; Barreto et al.
2018; Barreto 2019). Though there are several issues that can be explored to see how shared
ethnicity affects receptiveness to policy frames, I focus on bilingual education because it is one
that meets the criteria that I will discuss now.
In order for framing to be a viable route, the issue needs to be one: that is salient to Latinos;
where there is a difference between Latinos and non-Latino whites; and where there is a
theoretically-plausible common ground to bridge the gap in support between the two sides.
Bilingual education meets these criteria. Bilingual education is an issue that is important to Latinos
in the U.S. (Sanchez 2006; Leal 2007; Baretto et al. 2018). It is also one where we see a divergence
in support for it when comparing Latinos and non-Latino whites (Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991;
Huddy and Sears 1995; Houvouras 2001; Sanchez 2006; Leal 2007). Even if the two populations
differ in their support for bilingual education, there are large segments of both groups that are for
immigrants (and citizens) learning English (Jones 2013). Indeed, Sanchez (2006) notes that “over
90 percent of Latinos in the [Latino National Political Survey] agreed that all citizens and residents
of the U.S. should learn English” (p. 436). If bilingual education can be presented in a way that
emphasizes the acquisition of the English language and not the retention (or development) of a
non-English language, then it can potentially elicit more support than it would otherwise.
However, prior work on the determinants of Anglo attitudes toward bilingual education policies
suggests that this may be easier in theory than in practice because those attitudes are in part rooted
in prejudice towards Latinos (Huddy and Sears 1995; Houvouras 2001; Shin et al. 2015). This is
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where the ethnicity of the legislator comes into place as it can provide respondents with a cue that
links the policy to Latinos (and/or immigrants) and thus potentially stunts any effect that the frame
may have.
Indirect Representation via Framing
The Latino population has experienced tremendous growth in the last handful of decades
and is now the largest minority group in the U.S. (Flores 2017). Even with the strides made in the
election of more Latinos in Congress (Bialik 2019), there are still many Latinos that are represented
by non-Latino legislators. The absence of descriptive representation and that population growth
can compound and lead to representational deficits faced by the Latino population (see Griffin and
Newman 2007), something that highlights the need to look for alternative paths to decrease said
deficits. One potential path that doesn’t require overwhelming Latino majorities or more Latino
officeholders – an admittedly longer-term strategy – is by gaining support for Latino policies
outside of the Latino population. Though cross-ethnic minority coalitions (e.g., blacks and Latinos)
provide one viable route, the Anglo population is still the numerical majority, and thus holds a
significant amount of influence in the political process as a result.4
This work clearly speaks to descriptive representation in general – as the discussion above
makes clear – but it also has a bearing on how the interests of the Latino population can (or cannot)
be advanced through the non-Latino white population. Substantive representation (i.e., how
legislators advance the interests of the individuals they represent) is at the heart of the study of
political representation, as there is a need to see to what extent the government is responsive to the
interests of the people (Pitkin 1967). As it relates to the representation of minorities, the concern

4

Whites are more likely to participate in the political process (Schlozman et al. 2012) and more likely to have their
preferences reflected in government as a result (Griffin and Newman 2005).
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is usually with exploring how descriptive representation (i.e., whether legislators mirror
constituents demographically) affects substantive representation (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Hero
and Tolbert 1995; Kerr and Miller 1997; Casellas 2007). The literature suggests that there is a
representational deficit for Latinos on the substantive front (Griffin and Newman 2007; see also
Chapter 1 in this dissertation). The number of Latino legislators relative to their size in the
electorate suggests that there is also a deficiency on the descriptive front, which means that there
are plenty of Latinos in the electorate not represented by someone like them (Congressional
Research Service 2018). Aside from the psychological and symbolic effects that the presence of
having legislators mirror them may have on constituents, research on the subject shows that
minority legislators are in a better position and more willing to advance the interests of their coracial (or co-ethnic) constituents (Sinclair-Chapman 2002; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003; Tate
2003). However, the aforementioned disconnect in the population and descriptive representation
suggests that there is a need to look outside of the Latino descriptive dyad for the advancement of
Latino interests. An alternative way to advance the interests of Latinos can come through the
support of the non-Latino population. Anglos, because of their sheer size and potential influence
on the political process, provide for an indirect route to the representation of Latinos. If non-Latino
whites can be presented with information that changes how they view a given issue, then there is
the possibility that the policies important to Latinos (and other minorities) may be advanced in
government.
Framing
Framing is built on the assumption that there are different ways to view any given issue on
the political agenda. For example, poverty can be presented as an issue that is caused by structural
factors or individual decisions (or behavior), and while both may be adequate, viewing said issue
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from one perspective as opposed to another can lead to different considerations. Take the work of
Nelson and his colleagues (1997) as an example (see also Nelson and Oxley 1999; Jacoby 2000;
Chong and Druckman 2007; Merolla et al. 2013). There they present a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) rally
in two distinct lights: as free speech, and as a public order disruption. As a result, the authors find
that individuals presented with the free speech frame were more tolerant of KKK rallies than those
that were presented with the public order frame (Nelson et al. 1997, p. 572). In this work, a frame
refers to “alternative conceptualizations of an issue or event” (Druckman et al. 2013, p. 58) and a
framing effect takes place “when in the course of describing an issue or event, a speaker’s emphasis
on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these
considerations when constructing their opinions” (Druckman and Nelson 2003, p. 730; see also
Jacoby 2000 and Busby et al. 2018).
The notion that frames can be used to gain support for policies is not a new one; it is one
that scholars have long viewed as a vehicle for doing so (see Busby et al. 2018).5 Scholarship on
the subject has demonstrated that how an issue is presented can influence the preferences of
respondents (see Chong and Druckman 2007). At its core, this work is concerned with whether or
not issues important to Latinos can be framed in a manner to elicit support from non-Latinos.
However, the study has broader implications for the study of framing, as it can potentially show
situations in which frames are not effective. This can add to the on-going debate about how
effective frames are and the situations in which they don’t work (Brewer 2003; Chong and
Druckman 2007). One thing largely ignored by scholars – until relatively recently – in the
exploration of the effectiveness of policy frames has been the role of the source presenting the

This doesn’t say anything about the normative implications of framing; only that scholarship has demonstrated that
it can be effective.
5
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frame. This is an important oversight because a source has the potential to communicate a plethora
of information, and it needs to be explicitly accounted for theoretically and empirically. More
recent work has moved in this direction and has explored the effect that partisan and ideological
cues on the effectiveness of frames (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2006; Hartman and Weber 2009;
Weber et al. 2012). Race (or ethnicity), as a result of its centrality in our politics, and its ability to
demarcate different groups in society is another factor that needs to be accounted for directly, and
this is what I do here.
Source Cues in Framing
As alluded to above, more recent work has moved away from exploring the effectiveness
of frames and towards exploring the circumstances under which frames do not work and factors
that can moderate them (see Busby et al. 2018 for a review; see also Brewer 2003). Source cues
have been identified by scholars as one of the factors that can influence the effectiveness of a given
frame (Brewer 2003; Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2006; Hartman and Weber 2009; Nicholson 2012;
Weber et al. 2012). Fundamentally, the idea is that there is a need to account for the source in
charge of transmitting a given policy frame because it can potentially influence how receptive
individuals are in general. While the substance of a given message is important, the source that is
presenting the information should also be considered, as there are few times in the political arena
that a message (or information) is presented without a source (see Hartman and Weber 2009 for a
discussion). Also, while a source cue is more likely to be impactful in certain situations than others,
here, the central preoccupation is with how shared identity influences how receptive individuals
are to policy frames.
A source has the potential to provide plenty of information to the receiver, some of which
can influence how receptive the latter is to the former. In general, there are various dimensions on
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which source information can be categorized. Amongst them are credibility, power, and
identification attributed to the source (Hartman and Weber 2009). Source credibility has been
found to influence how receptive a respondent is to information, with higher credibility generally
being associated with more receptivity to information (Zaller 1992; Eagly and Chaiken 1993;
Druckman 2001; but see Weber et al. 2012). Similarly, as the work of Hartman and Weber (2009)
suggest, identification with the source can also influence how receptive individuals are to
information. Indeed, though their work looks at the ideological match, or lack thereof, between
respondents and the information source, there are various other identities that can be called on
when looking at source-respondent congruence.
Ethnicity – like race – plays an important part in our politics as a result of its historical
legacy and thus has the potential to structure intergroup relations in American society, which
makes it one such factor where a match (or mismatch) can influence how receptive individuals are
to messages.6 This is important when we consider social identity theory and the theoretical
expectations derived from it. Research on social identity theory has long posited that identification
with a given group (even those arbitrarily ascribed) can lead individuals to hold more hostile views
towards an out-group (see Tajfel and Turner 1979; see also Hogg et al. 2017). Racial and ethnic
identities are those that – whether self- or externally-imposed – have the potential to draw the “us
versus them” dynamics in individuals. In turn, if individuals hold more favorable views towards
those in their own group, then there is the possibility that they may be more receptive to individuals
who are a part of their own group and the opposite for those who are not. Relatedly, this match (or
mismatch) can provide individual respondents a basis through which they can make political

Here – because of the focus on Anglo attitudes – the focus is on the racial match (ethnic mismatch) between the
fictional legislator and the white respondent.
6
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judgements. Alternatively, it could be that bilingual education, like other issues in American
politics, has become racialized and would make any frame, irrespective of source race or ethnicity,
ineffective. While this is definitely a possibility, the work of Merolla and her colleagues (2013)
suggests that this may not be the case, as their paper shows that even on a salient (and racialized)
issue like immigration (see Levy, Wright, and Citrin 2015), we can still see a shift in opinion based
on how an issue is framed.7
These potential underlying causes (i.e., identity match and out-group hostility) are not
necessarily incompatible, and though fleshing these out is beyond the scope of this work,
explaining what might be expected if one is likely the cause versus the other is something I can
briefly discuss now. If the identity match theory is correct, then we would expect the respondents
to be more likely to support (oppose) bilingual education when presented with the pro-frame (con
frame) when the legislator is white and oppose it irrespective of the pro or con frame when the
legislator is Latino. If the source cue allows respondents to link (or not link) bilingual education
to Latinos, then we would expect to see respondents in both the pro and con frame to be less
supportive when the legislator presenting the frame is Latino. At least in the conditions where the
respondents and the legislators don’t share the same racio-ethnic identity, we would expect the
results to be the same across the board, irrespective if it’s a lack of identity match or anti-Latino
prejudice manifesting itself.

Hypotheses
Though the literature on framing suggests that policy frames can be effective in influencing
respondent positions on issues, newer work on source cues and the literature on intergroup

7

Merolla et al. (2013) find a 17 percent shift in public opinion on support for a path for legalization, a change that
they attribute to a change in framing from “amnesty” to “opportunity to eventually become citizens” (p. 799).
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dynamics suggests that the frames alone are not the only parts of the equation influencing how
effective those frames are. The descriptive connection between legislators and respondents is one
that leads to the expectation that respondents will be responsive to the bilingual education frames.
Shared race between the two (i.e., legislator and constituent) leads to the expectation that
respondents will be more likely to support bilingual education in the pro-bilingual education frame
and the opposite in the anti-bilingual education frame when compared to the baseline condition.
Indeed, the literature on framing suggests that the frame, irrespective on what side of the issue it
is on, should be effective in shifting public opinion on the issue (see Chong and Druckman 2007
for a review). We know from prior work on public opinion that Anglos are more likely to show
opposition to bilingual education than Latinos are, all else constant (Huddy and Sears 1995;
Houvouras 2001; Leal 2007). Therefore, there is the expectation that the respondents not exposed
to any frames (i.e., the baseline condition) will be less supportive of bilingual education on the
whole. Since the respondents here are expected to be less supportive of bilingual education in
general, the expected effect between the baseline and the pro condition should be higher than that
between the baseline and the con condition. Nonetheless, the pro and con frame conditions should
be able to demonstrate any significant movement in opinion induced by the frame.
H1: Respondents in the pro-bilingual education frame condition with a white legislator (shared
race) are more likely to support bilingual education than respondents in the baseline category are.
H2: Respondents in the anti-bilingual education frame condition with a white legislator (shared
race) are less likely to support bilingual education than respondents in the baseline category are.
Unlike the conditions in which respondents share the same race as their legislators, those in which
respondents are exposed to a policy frame by Latino legislators, the expectation is that the frames
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will not be as effective. Respondents in the pro-bilingual education condition with a Latino
legislator should be less likely to support than those in the baseline condition. Whether it is because
Latino legislators are not of their own demographic background, or that Latino legislators allow
respondents to link the issue to the broader Latino population – and thus draw a backlash response
– the expectation is the same: less support for bilingual education (than the baseline condition).
H3: Respondents in the pro-bilingual education frame condition with a Latino legislator are less
likely to support bilingual education than respondents in the baseline condition are.
The last condition is where the legislator is Latino and there is an anti-bilingual education frame
being presented to respondents. Since respondents – based on the review of the literature – are
already expected to be more likely to oppose bilingual education and the frame is being presented
by a Latino legislator – which means less receptivity because of a lack of shared identity – the
expectation is that there will not be a statistically significant difference in the preferences of
respondents when compared to the baseline.
H4: Respondents in the anti-bilingual education frame condition with a Latino legislator should
not exhibit any distinguishable deviation from the baseline condition.

Research Design
Design
I use a survey experiment to explore whether ethnicity as a source cue influences the
effectiveness of a policy frame (see Appendix B for the survey).8 To see whether or not ethnicity
plays a role in how receptive white respondents are to the framing of bilingual education, I
manipulate the ethnicity of a fictional legislator by changing the surname across treatment

8

The survey experiment was fielded online through the Qualtrics research firm between June 14 th - 17th, 2019.
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conditions. The fictional Latino legislator in this study is named David Hernandez and his Anglo
analog is named David Miller. Here, the only thing that changes between the different conditions
– aside from whether the frame is for or against the issue, of course – is the last name of the
individual.9 Though there are various ways to present the policy frame, I chose to do so in the form
of a press release, as this is one of the most common forms of communication for legislators (see
Grimmer 2013). In addition, unlike a newspaper article – or other forms of communication that
rely on a middle person or entity – these messages are coming straight from the source.10
Individual respondents in the study are randomly assigned to one of the following
conditions: a pro-bilingual education frame with a Latino legislator, a pro-bilingual education
frame with a non-Latino white legislator, a con bilingual education frame with a Latino legislator,
a con bilingual education frame with a non-Latino white legislator, and a control condition where
respondents are not exposed to any frame or legislator. Though there are different ways to explore
framing effects (for a discussion see Chong and Druckman 2007, p. 109), given the nature of the
study, I have chosen to use a no frame/no cue condition as a baseline (see Joslyn and HaiderMarkel 2006; Weber et al. 2012).11 While there is disagreement amongst scholars on whether to
include a baseline (and the nature of said baseline), in this particular situation, having the chosen

9

Legislators almost always include their picture in press releases, so in order to make the press release look
authentic, I use a picture of former Congressman David Valadao. I chose his picture because he is an individual that:
is Hispanic, served in Congress, and looks like he could be non-Latino white legislator; that last one is important
because it avoids any additional complications that may come with differences in skin tone between the fictional
legislators in the different conditions.
10
While staffers and speech writers can play a part in this, at least as it’s presented here, the information is a straight
quote from the legislator’s floor speech on a fictional vote.
11
It’s difficult to present the frame on its own because it would have to be different from a press release, which
could bring other complications into the mix.
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control condition allows for the directional comparisons (i.e., pro-frame eliciting more support
than the baseline, con-frame eliciting less support than the baseline, etc.).12
As mentioned above, there are various ways to frame political issues (e.g., from an
economic or moral perspective), and here, the angle is English proficiency. Though we generally
see that whites are opposed to bilingual education (Huddy and Sears 1995; Houvouras 2001; Shin
et al. 2015), there is also a large segment of this population that is in favor of English-only laws
(Frendreis and Tatalovich 1997; Schildkraut 2003), which means that if bilingual education can
be framed as a means to help non-English language learners (ELLs) to achieve English proficiency,
then that may elicit support from whites. The pro frame places an emphasis on the ability of ELLs
to achieve proficiency and excel in other subjects (see Gandara and Escamilla 2016; see also
Bialstoyk 2018).13 The con frame highlights the fact that ELLs in bilingual programs take longer
to become proficient than those in English-immersion programs (Jepsen 2009; see also Umansky
and Reardon 2014). The press release includes information about the ELL population and the fact
that there’s variation in instruction across the U.S. It also highlights a key objective of bilingual
education: English proficiency, and then communicates the benefits of bilingual education (pro
frame) or problems with it (con frame) with respect to that objective (see Appendix B for visual
of treatments14).

The canon, which comes from Nelson et al. (1997), is not using any baseline, but I don’t think that’s appropriate
for the reason just mentioned.
13
Umansky and Reardon (2014) find that ELL students in bilingual education programs take longer to achieve
English proficiency than ELLs in English-immersion programs, but they also find that those students generally
perform better in other areas (e.g., mathematics and standardized testing), something confirmed by Bialstoyk 2016;
see also Valentino and Reardon 2014; Gandara and Escamilla 2016). Similarly, Jepsen (2009) shows that this gap in
reaching proficiency is present for grades one and two, but nonexistent in grades three through five.
14
The appendix shows one of each side of the issue (i.e., pro and con) and one of each of the two legislators (i.e.,
Anglo and Latino). However, the only difference between those shown in the appendix and those omitted is the
surname; irrespective of the side of the issue, the only difference between the two pro or two anti-bilingual
education newsletters is the surname of the legislator (i.e., Miller versus Hernandez).
12
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Data
To measure respondent attitudes on bilingual education, I use a question borrowed (and
modified) from the General Social Survey (GSS), which asks: “‘How do you feel about bilingual
education [in public schools]? Are you strongly in favor of it, somewhat in favor of it, somewhat
opposed to it, or strongly opposed to it?’” (Houvouras 2001, p. 142).15 In addition to the responses
presented there, I include a middle-of-the-road response (i.e., “[n]either in favor nor opposed to
it”).16 Prior work on the determinants of bilingual education attitudes amongst whites has identified
anti-Latino sentiment as a factor (Huddy and Sears 1995; Houvouras 2001; Shin et al. 2015). In
general, respondents who hold more hostile views towards Latinos are more likely to oppose
bilingual education. There are different ways of accounting for this potential disposition for
Latinos. One is through direct measures of warmth towards the group (i.e., a feeling thermometer)
and another less direct way is through measures that tap the so-called “new racism [or prejudice]”
(see Huddy and Sears 1995 for a discussion). With the latter, the purpose is to try and gauge how
Latinos are viewed more generally through attributions of failure and/or stereotypes. In other
words, we attempt to find out if respondents generally think Latinos are lazy and to what do they
attribute any perceived disadvantages (e.g., Latinos lack the same opportunities as non-Latinos,
there aren’t enough jobs to go around for this group, etc.). To capture these concepts, I use a feeling
thermometer for respondent attitudes toward Latinos and a Latino prejudice scale.17 For the latter,
I use three questions to construct a scale; individuals are asked whether they agree or disagree with

15

The variable is coded as support for bilingual education, where strongly opposed to it at the low end and strongly
in favor of it at the opposite end.
16
I do this in order to allow respondents that don’t have a preference on the issue to state such. The original wording
of the question would essentially force respondents to take a position on the issue that would be inconsistent with
their own preferences.
17
This measure asks individuals to describe how warm or cold they feel about Latinos on a scale from 0 to 100, with
0 being cold, 50 being neither cold nor warm, and 100 interpreted as holding this group in very high regards.
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the following statements: “Hispanics can get ahead if they work hard enough,” “A lot of Hispanics
are not well off because there aren’t enough jobs to go around,” and “The financial situation of
Hispanics would improve if they had a chance to get a good education” (see Huddy and Sears
1995).18 In addition, I include a feeling thermometer towards Anglos, as more affinity for one’s
group may increase the likelihood that respondents oppose bilingual education because it can
undermine their own group status (Valentino et al. 2013).19
In addition to those aforementioned attitudes, researchers have found that individual
context and threat perceptions can also have a bearing on support for bilingual education (Huddy
and Sears 1995; Shin et al. 2015). Though there are different ways to tap into respondent context,
I use the size of the Latino population in a respondent’s zip code and that individual’s own
perceptions of the size of the Latino population in the U.S. and in their community.20 The idea is
that the more Latinos respondents have in their district – and the larger they perceive this particular
group – the more opposition to bilingual education should manifest itself as a result of some threat
posed by Latinos (Huddy and Sears 1995; Shin et al. 2015). Population size (or perceived
population size) is not the only threats that need to be accounted for as scholars have noted, there
are others such as educational and linguistic that may influence attitudes on bilingual education
(see Huddy and Sear 1995; Shin et al. 2015). On the educational front, the questions that can be
asked are whether respondents have children in school, whether those children are in schools with
large Latino populations, and/or whether they’re in bilingual programs (see Huddy and Sears

18

The scale ranges from 0 to 1, and a higher score on the scale means more anti-Latino perceptions.
The feeling thermometers range from 0 to 100, with zero indicating coldness to the group, 100 indicating warmth
towards the group, and 50 being neither cold nor warm towards that group.
20
Though imperfect, this measure is good enough to get a sense for the general disconnect between the perceptions
that respondents have in relation to reality (Wong 2007 does something similar).
19
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1995). Huddy and Sears (1995) tap into educational threat by using various measures, but only
having a child (or children) under 18 was statistically significant. However, not all adults in the
U.S. have children, which is why there is a need to use a separate measure that will tap into
educational threat without excluding a large segment of the population. To tap linguistic threat, I
use the following two questions to construct an openness to non-English languages: the first asks
whether respondents are fluent in any non-English language and the second asks about their level
of proficiency.21 The idea is that those with self-exposure to a non-English language might be more
supportive of bilingual education and vice versa.
Aside from the aforementioned attitudinal and standard demographic controls (i.e.,
respondent gender, family income, educational attainment, age, ideology, and partisanship), I also
include a political knowledge scale.22 This scale is composed of several items that tap whether
respondents know the names of prominent political actors and rules of the political system.23
Though there are different schools of thought on how political knowledge should influence
framing (for a discussion see Chong and Druckman 2007), I include the measure here to see
whether it influences how receptive individuals are to the frames.24

21

This is an ordinal measure ranging from not fluent to fluent in a non-English language (see Shin et al. 2015). Zero
means that respondent doesn’t know any non-English language, 1 includes respondents that know a non-English
language at a basic level (i.e., “Hardly at all” or “Not Well”), are those that know a non-English language “Very
well,” and 3 houses those that know a non-English language “Well.”
22
The ideology variable ranges from “Very liberal” to “Very conservative” with moderates at the midpoint.
23
In specific, I use the following questions to create an index: what proportion of Congress is needed to override a
presidential veto?; who is the current speaker of the U.S. House of representatives?; what amendment to the
Constitution protects free speech?; and how many justices serve on the United States Supreme Court?
24
There is disagreement amongst scholars as to whether political sophistication should even be considered when
exploring framing (for a discussion see Chong and Druckman 2007). For example, Nelson and his colleagues (1997)
posit that political sophistication shouldn’t matter because framing isn’t contingent on an individual accepting a
given frame because no new information is being presented when framing, only a specific perspective on an issue
(but see Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001).
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A total of 751 non-Latino Caucasian adults participated in the survey experiment. From
this total, the breakdown across conditions was about 150. Of those respondents, about a third
identified as Republican (33.7 percent), close to the same as Democrats (28.2 percent), about 25
percent as Independents, and the remaining either stated “Other” (10.4 percent) or no partisan
affiliation (2.7 percent). The breakdown for self-ideological identification was as follows: 8.4
percent “Very Liberal,” 16.6 percent “Liberal,” 32.4 percent “Moderate,” 20.2 percent
“Conservative,” 9.3 percent “Very Conservative,” and 13.1 percent “Not sure.” The sample was
made up of about 80 percent of women. About 45 percent of the respondents had at least a 2-year
college degree, and the average age was about 41 years of age (see Appendix B for descriptive
statistics table).

Results
A cursory look at the initial breakdown of bilingual education support across experimental
conditions suggests that this sample of the non-Latino white population seems to be generally
supportive of bilingual education in public schools (see Table 3.1).25 In addition, and arguably
more importantly, when looking at the different experimental conditions relative to the baseline
condition (i.e., no frame and no source cue), it is apparent that the results do not seem to be
fundamentally different on the whole. It seems, at first glance, that getting respondents to think
about bilingual education generally decreases support, all else equal. Indeed, the baseline condition
has the most respondents in the favor side of the response scale (see the last two rows in the third
column of Table 3.1). One thing that does stand out in the table is the difference in support between
the baseline and the Latino legislator group in opposition framing conditions. Having a Latino

25

Respondents were screened in an attempt to ensure that there were only non-Latino white adults in the study (see
Appendix B for survey instrument).
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Bilingual Education Preferences by Experimental Condition
MC White
Baseline
MC Latino
in Support
in Opposition
in Support
in Opposition
Strongly
opposed to it

8.11

8.22

5.10

9.52

7.84

Somewhat
opposed to it

13.51

11.64

10.19

9.52

15.03

Neither in
favor nor
opposed to it

33.11

28.09

30.57

24.49

35.96

Somewhat in
favor of it

27.03

32.19

29.30

28.57

31.37

Strongly in
favor of it

18.24

19.86

24.84

27.90

9.80

Total

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

Note: Column percentages shown
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legislator present an argument in opposition of bilingual education seems to significantly decrease
respondent support for bilingual education in public schools. That opposition frame coming from
a Latino legislator decreases support in the “Strongly in favor of it” category by more than half of
that in the baseline. Relatedly, though not as pronounced, respondents in the white legislator in
support of bilingual education frame condition also display a difference in support for bilingual
education when compared to the baseline condition, though not in the expected direction. Contrary
to expectations, the stimulus actually seems to depress support for bilingual education relative to
the baseline group (see Table 3.1). Nevertheless, there is a need to more rigorously examine the
underlying processes that this casual browsing is unable to provide.
To see whether or not the differences between the different conditions are statistically
distinguishable, I conduct a series of independent samples t-tests (see Table 3.2). In essence, these
tests show whether the differences in means between the two populations are statistically
significant or not. The dependent variable starts at “Strongly opposed to it” and ends at “Strongly
in favor of it,” which means that a higher mean is indicative of more support for bilingual education
in public schools. The first test in column 1 suggests that there is generally less support for
bilingual education when the white legislator presents an argument in support of bilingual
education and this is a difference that is statistically significant (p=0.058). The second and third
columns for the white legislator in opposition and that for the Latino legislator in support,
respectively, show no statistically discernable difference in support for bilingual education in
comparison to the control condition (see Table 3.2). The last column in Table 3.2 shows the
difference in support for bilingual education between respondents in the control condition and
those in the condition where the Latino legislator presents an argument against bilingual education.
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Table 3.2: T-Test Statistics for Different Treatment Conditions Compared to Baseline Condition
MC White
MC Latino
Condition
in Support
in Opposition
in Support
in Opposition
Treatment

3.34
(0.10)

3.44
(0.10)

3.56
(0.10)

3.20
(0.09)

Baseline

3.59
(0.09)

3.59
(0.09)

3.59
(0.09)

3.59
(0.09)

Difference

-0.25*
(0.13)

-0.15
(0.13)

-0.03
(0.14)

-0.39***
(0.06)

Note: The dependent variable is support for bilingual education, and it starts at 1 (strongly opposed
to it) and ends at 5 (strongly in favor of it) with a midpoint of 3 (neither in favor nor in opposition).
The number for observations for the MC White in Support condition is 148, 146 for the MC White
Opposition condition, 147 for the MC Latino in Support condition,153 for the MC Latino in
Opposition condition, and 157 for the baseline condition. The results here show two-tailed t-tests.
The estimates shown are means with the standard errors are in parentheses.
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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Here – as can be seen above in the breakdown of support for bilingual education across
experimental conditions – the treatment group displays more opposition to bilingual education
than the control group (see Table 3.2). That difference is statistically significant at the 99%
confidence level (p=0.002).
In addition to comparing the conditions to the baseline, there is a need to compare the
conditions to each other to see whether ethnicity has an impact on support for bilingual education.
Though the comparisons above allow for grounded comparisons as a result of using the baseline
condition, the effect of ethnicity on support for bilingual education can also be explored by looking
at how the opposition and support conditions differ in support based on legislator ethnicity. The ttest statistic of the two pro-bilingual education framing conditions shows that the difference in
support for bilingual education is not statistically significant, which suggests that the ethnicity was
not a determining factor amongst those two conditions (see the first column in Table 3.3). The
comparison of the opposition frames suggests that the lack of shared ethnicity decreases support
for bilingual education; a difference that is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence
level (p=0.009).26 These preliminary tests suggest that legislator ethnicity can influence support
for bilingual education, if only in the anti-bilingual education framing conditions. Though
collectively, the results fail to provide any convincing support for the hypotheses as laid out above,
this does not mean that the source cue was not an important factor influencing support for bilingual
education. 27

26

See the appendix for a multivariate model comparing the effect of the two opposition conditions on support for
bilingual education. The results there also confirm this statistically significant difference attributable to legislator
ethnicity. There it is clear that the Latino opposition condition decreases support for bilingual education relative to
the non-Latino Anglo legislator in opposition condition.
27
None of the comparisons of the treatments to the baseline were in the expected direction.
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Table 3.3: T-Test Statistic for Differences in Support Based on Ethnicity
Support
Frame

Opposition
Frame

White
Legislator

3.56
(0.10)

3.56
(0.10)

Latino
Legislator

3.34
(0.09)

3.20
(0.09)

Difference

-0.22
(0.13)

-0.36***
(0.13)

Note: The dependent variable is support for bilingual education, and it starts at 1 (strongly opposed
to it) and ends at 5 (strongly in favor of it) with a midpoint of 3 (neither in favor nor in opposition).
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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The results, though at odds with the hypotheses, still present some interesting findings that
need to be further explored. Take the aforementioned difference between the baseline condition
and those respondents in the anti-bilingual education frame presented by a Latino legislator
condition. Why is it that respondents presented an anti-bilingual education frame by a Latino
legislator display a higher propensity to oppose bilingual education? The literature on intergroup
relationships would lead to the expectation that this framing condition would not necessarily affect
support as the information is coming from a member of an outgroup and that is further supported
by the fact that whites generally display a lower propensity to support bilingual education (Huddy
and Sears 1995; Sanchez 2006; Leal 2007). The only difference between the Latino legislator in
opposition and the white legislator in opposition conditions is the last name of each legislator (i.e.,
Hernandez versus Miller, respectively). This suggests that at least some segment of respondents
were able to pick up the source cue, but it was only salient in the Latino condition. The differences
(or their absence) in the other conditions (e.g., white legislator in favor and Latino legislator in
favor) relative to the baseline may be attributed to a weak or inefficient policy frame, but the
difference in the opposition conditions suggest that the source cue was something that respondents
should have picked up on.28 However, the theoretical foundations presented above make it difficult
to square away why only the MC Latino anti-bilingual education frame proved to be a determining
factor of support for bilingual education in the sampled population. I will return to this question
shortly, but first, I explore the robustness of these findings in a multivariate setting.

28

The fact that everything else in the treatments were identical except for the surnames suggests that respondents
each of the conditions (save for the baseline) were able to get the source cue, as it is difficult to explain the results in
the MC Latino in opposition condition.
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Multivariate Regression
To explore the robustness of the findings from the independent samples t-tests, I turn to
multivariate regression. The dependent variable – as measured in the survey – is ordinal, which is
why I use ordered logistic regression here. However, in an attempt to ensure that the findings are
robust, I also collapse that variable into a binary one where support takes the value of one and zero
otherwise; this means that I have to use logistic regression for modeling as well.29 Table 3.4 shows
the results of both dependent variables (i.e., binary and ordinal) across the different experimental
conditions with the baseline condition serving as the comparison in those different models.
The results do not look completely different from those of the t-tests , as both of the support
conditions (i.e., Latino and white legislators presenting a supportive position on bilingual
education) are statistically indistinguishable from the control condition (see Table 3.4).30 In
addition, the Latino in opposition frame is again the one where the difference between the
treatment and control group is clearly distinguishable, but more on this shortly (see the last two
columns in Table 3.4). Unlike the t-test results, the ordered logistic regression model suggests that
there is a statistically significant difference in support for bilingual education that is attributable to
the white legislator in opposition framing condition, as indicated by the negative coefficient (see
column 4 in Table 3.4). However, upon further exploration, it is that clear the effect of the
treatment on support for bilingual education is minimal and bordering on insignificance. This
assertion is backed by the p-value of 0.08 and the marginal effect of the treatment (i.e., the white

29

The original variable has five categories (i.e., strongly opposed, somewhat opposed, neither, somewhat in favor,
strongly in favor). Of those, the two favor categories take the value of 1 and the other three categories take the value
of 0.
30
The appendix houses a table that includes all of the different variables included in the models shown in Table 4 in
addition to a party identification variable. The results do not change fundamentally, but the size of respondents in
different experimental conditions does change significantly as a result of respondents that didn’t consider
themselves partisans. Therefore, in an attempt to address that issue, I show models both ways.
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Table 3.4: Multivariate Regression Models of Support for Bilingual Education
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
MC White
in Support
in Opposition
Logistic
Ordered
Logistic
Ordered Logistic
Logistic
Treatment
-0.347
-0.202
-0.392
-0.415*
(0.283)
(0.232)
(0.284)
(0.237)
Female
0.117
0.167
0.164
0.178
(0.356)
(0.292)
(0.343)
(0.286)
Education
0.237
0.159
0.242**
0.199**
(0.113)
(0.093)
(0.107)
(0.091)
Age
-0.021**
-0.030***
-0.026**
-0.030***
(0.010)
(0.008)
(0.010)
(0.009)
Family Income
0.005
-0.001
-0.003
-0.029
(0.046)
(0.037)
(0.044)
(0.036)
Conservative
-0.549***
-0.643***
-0.340**
-0.305**
(0.149)
(0.124)
(0.134)
(0.114)
Prejudice
-1.611
-0.932
-2.456**
-2.312**
Scale
(1.089)
(0.899)
(1.063)
(0.010)
White
-0.001
-0.008
0.006
-0.001
Thermometer
(0.008)
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.006)
Latino
0.021***
0.025***
0.009
0.012*
Thermometer
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.006)
Language
0.160
0.195
0.009
0.142
Threat
(0.199)
(0.166)
(0.007)
(0.149)

Model 5

Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
MC Latino
in Support
in Opposition
Logistic
Ordered
Logistic
Ordered
Logistic
Logistic
0.248
0.203
-0.633** -0.717***
(0.287)
(0.239)
(0.267)
(0.229)
0.170
0.415
-0.249
-0.151
0.350
(0.295)
(0.318)
(0.273)
0.085
0.077
0.078
0.066
(0.109)
(0.900)
(0.101)
(0.087)
-0.032*** -0.033***
-0.008
-0.015*
(0.011)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.273)
-0.061
-0.049
-0.004
-0.001
(0.047)
(0.038)
(0.043)
(0.036)
-0.425*** -0.475*** -0.304** -0.343***
(0.143)
(0.121)
(0.127)
(0.108)
-2.527** -1.949**
-1.967* -2.749***
(1.174)
(0.973)
(1.094)
(0.964)
0.005
-0.003
-0.008
-0.008
(0.008)
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.007)
0.012*
0.016**
0.015**
0.014**
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.006)
0.124
0.278*
0.102
0.133
(0.192)
(0.164)
(0.166)
(0.147)
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Table 3.4 Continued.
Model 1
Perceived Size
of Latino
Population
Political
Knowledge
Scale
Constant
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

0.014
(0.011)

0.006
(0.010)

0.004
(0.011)

-0.003
(0.009)

0.013
(0.011)

0.018*
(0.009)

0.006
(0.011)

0.001
(0.009)

0.583
(0.442)

0.454
(0.367)

0.579
(0.412)

0.420
(0.342)

0.652
(0.456)

0.451
(0.369)

0.733**
(0.417)

0.376
(0.348)

0.881
(1.109)

1.353
(1.060)

2.767**
(1.094)

1.831*
(0.977)

-4.841
(0.974)
-3.385
(0.937)
-1.817
(0.919)

-5.089
(0.965)
-3.641
(0.922)
-2.166
(0.901)

-5.279
(0.929)
-4.054
(0.893)
-2.675
(0.871)

-5.842
(0.913)
-4.427
(0.869)
-2.976
(0.848)

-0.144
(0.922)

-0.542
(0.899)

-1.137
(0.864)

-1.267
(0.843)

Adjusted or
0.154
0.1048
0.110
0.0630
0.129
0.0933
0.091
0.0629
Pseudo R2
N
262
262
258
258
253
253
271
271
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable in the logistic regression columns is coded as support for bilingual education equals 1 and 0 otherwise.
The dependent in the ordered logistic regression columns is coded from strongly in opposition to strongly in favor of bilingual education
with neither in the middle. Standard errors shown in parentheses.
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Figure 3.1: Marginal Effect of MC White in Opposition of Bilingual Education Condition on
Support for Bilingual Education
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legislator in opposition of bilingual education) on support for bilingual education. Figure 3.1 shows
that relationship across values of the dependent variable. While the treatment does seem to
decrease the likelihood of respondents choosing either of the support options (i.e., “Somewhat in
favor of it” or “Strongly in favor of it”) and increase the others, all of those estimates are very
close to zero. In addition, the effect on the predicted probability of a given respondent selecting
“Strongly opposed to it” is not statistically significant. Together, those different observations –
paired with the non-significant coefficient in the binary dependent variable model (see column 3
in Table 3.4) – lead me to dismiss those results as substantively insignificant.
As mentioned above, the results of the MC Latino in opposition condition hold up in the
multivariate regression setting. The results of the last two models – shown in the last two columns
of Table 3.4 – show that the effect of the treatment on support for bilingual education is positive
and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence (p=0.002). This means that respondents
exposed to the anti-bilingual education frame from a Latino legislator were more likely than their
counterparts in the baseline condition to oppose bilingual education. This can be more clearly seen
in the marginal effects plot. Indeed, Figure 3.2 shows that the treatment variable decreases the
likelihood that a given respondent will select either “Strongly in favor of [bilingual education]” or
“Somewhat in favor of [bilingual education] and inceases the likelihood that respondents in this
condition choose one of the latter categories. In addition, unlike the estimates from Figure 3.1 (the
non-Latino legislator in opposition condition) discussed above, the effects on the probability of
the treatment variable on support for bilingual education are clear and statistically significant at
the 99 percent confidence level.1

1

All of the marginal effects estimates meet this threshold.
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Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of MC Latino in Opposition of Bilingual Education Condition on
Support for Bilingual Education
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Though the effect of the MC Latino in opposition condition could be interpreted as
demonstrating support for the notion that Latino legislators can frame support for some issues on
the political agenda, the rest of the results from the survey experiment cast doubt on this possibility.
From the perspective of the theory advanced here, the idea that respondents would be more
receptive to an individual from an outgroup does not make much sense. However, the difference
in the findings between the two opposition conditions suggests that legislator ethnicity played a
role in the effect captured in the statistical analyses. It seems as if having a member of an outgroup take a position inconsistent with their own in-group (i.e., a Latino taking an anti-bilingual
education stance) sends a signal that resonates with Anglo respondents. 2 Though the underlying
mechanisms at play leading to the results captured cannot be explored here, the study provides an
interesting result that needs to be further explored. Indeed, it may be that the source cue paired
with a message that is inconsistent with a stereotype normally associated with that group gives
respondents the freedom to then display opposition to it that has been there latently all along. It
could also be that the Latino legislator is viewed as a more credible figure because it is an issue
that can be connected to the Latino population. The latter explanation, however, doesn’t seem as
plausible in the absence of the other framing condition (i.e., pro-bilingual education) by the same
fictional legislator. The experiment, though definitely different from what was expected, picked
up some interesting results that need to be squared away moving forward. In addition to the main
results discussed here, there was another interesting result captured by the experiment that merits
discussion; I turn to that now.

Though in a different context (i.e., immigration), Hainmueller and Hopkin’s (2015) work shows that individuals
perceived to be at odds with broader group stereotypes may be viewed in a more favorable manner than others of the
same outgroup.
2
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Political Knowledge
Irrespective of what is driving the results, the role of political knowledge is something that merits
attention. A long line of scholarship has concerned itself with the level of sophistication of the
electorate and its consequences (see Fowler and Margolis 2014 for a review). More to the subject
of this paper, scholars writing on framing have gone back and forth on what the role of political
knowledge in moderating receptiveness to policy frames (see Chong and Druckman 2007). 3 The
interaction between the treatment condition and political knowledge for the Latino legislator in
opposition condition is statistically significant (p=0.08). Figure 3.3 shows the marginal effect of
the treatment condition that comes from the interaction of the treatment variable and political
knowledge on both sides of the scale. What this figure communicates is that the combination of
the source cue and frame (i.e., MC Latino in opposition of bilingual education) only had an impact
on the politically sophisticated individuals.4 This finding is interesting because it suggests that
whatever the actual impact of the stimulus was on the preferences of respondents, it was
undoubtedly pronounced in the individuals at the highest end of the political knowledge scale (i.e.,
those that can be considered political sophisticates). Even more interesting, however, is the fact
that the effect manifests itself in the decreased probability that political sophisticates selected either
of the favor responses and increased the likelihood that respondents chose one of the other
opposition categories. This suggests that either the frame worked as it should have even though it
came from a source that is not of those respondents’ in-group or that the political sophisticates
were better at connecting the source cue to the policy area better than those on the opposite end of

3

Relatedly, the literature on voter sophistication has also debated on what individuals are more (or less) likely to be
receptive to new information (see Zaller 1992).
4
See the Figure B1 in the appendix; it shows the same relationship with the results from the ordered logistic
regression model.
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Figure 3.3: The Marginal Effect of MC Latino Opposition Frame on Bilingual Education Support
by Political Knowledge
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that knowledge scale.

Discussion
Though interesting, the results here fail to provide adequate support for the theory outlined
above. Neither of the pro-bilingual education conditions were able to influence support for
bilingual education at all. The pro-bilingual frame presented by a white legislator failed to increase
support for bilingual education in public schools and the same frame by a Latino legislator failed
to move public opinion in the other direction (i.e., decrease support), both of which were expected.
Similarly, though the anti-bilingual education frame presented by an Anglo legislator was
statistically significant and did seem to depress support in bilingual education, the effects were
quite weak. Though strong, the results from the last frame – especially in the absence of expected
results for the other conditions – fail to provide support for the role of source cue in framing
theorized above. Instead, it seems as if there is something else going on. Unquestioned, however,
is the notion that legislator ethnicity plays a role in influencing support for bilingual education,
even if it is only in the situation mentioned above.
It could be the case that the frames presented, especially in the pro-bilingual education
conditions, just weren’t strong or clear enough. While it is theoretically plausible that the wording
of the pro-bilingual education frame was just not adequate, the source cue alone should have
influenced support for bilingual education in some way; that is, being able to link Latinos to
bilingual education should have decreased support for it if my theory was correct. However, this
is clearly not what took place. Alternatively, it could be that the middle-of-the-road option for the
dependent variable allowed individuals to engage in satisficing and/or allowed those that had
positions on either side of that option to provide a socially desirable response to the question, the
182

latter of which masks true support for the policy. Whatever may be the case, there is still further
work to be done.
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Appendix B
Table B1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Dependent Variable
Bilingual
Education
Binary
Bilingual
Education
Independent
Variables
Respondent Demographics
Female
Education
Age
Family Income
Republican
Conservative
Threat & Prejudice

Minimum

Mean

Median

Maximum

St. Dev.

Skewness

Kurtosis

N

1

3.424

3

5

1.163

-0.399

2.437

750

0

0.493

0

1

0.500

0.011

1.000

750

0

.808

1

1

0.394

-1.564

3.446

750

1

4.561

4

7

1.462

0.030

2.095

750

18

40.725

38

82

15.066

0.382

2.150

750

1

6.247

6

14

3.472

0.284

1.998

750

0

0.544

1

1

0.499

-0.177

1.031

465

1

3.064

3

5

1.112

-0.080

2.415

652

0

60.213

60

100

22.708

-0.299

2.848

750

1

71.084

71.5

100

21.599

-0.473

2.785

750

Latino Thermometer
White Thermometer
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Table B1 Continued.
Variable
Language Threat
Anti-Latino Prejudice Scale
Perceived % of
Latino Population
Political Knowledge

Minimum

Mean

Median

Maximum

St. Dev.

Skewness

Kurtosis

N

0

0.356

0

3

0.825

2.299

7.039

750

0.2

0.638

0.6

1

0.133

0.299

3.577

750

0

13.645

10

100

13.275

2.053

9.551

750

0

0.509

0.5

1

0.352

0.022

1.667

750

Knowledge Scale
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Table B2: Ordered Logistic Regression of Support for Bilingual Education Across Opposition
Conditions
Opposition to Bilingual Education
Treatment
-0.411*
(1 = MC Latino in Opposition
(0.231)
0 = MC White in Opposition)
Female
0.234
(0.284)
Education
0.013
(0.089)
Age
-0.010
(0.008)
Family Income
-0.002
(0.035)
Conservative
-0.105
(0.106)
Prejudice Scale
-3.575***
(0.995)
White Thermometer
-0.004
(0.006)
Latino Thermometer
0.010*
(0.006
Language Threat
0.148
(0.125)
Perceived Size of Latino Population
-0.009
(0.009)
Political Knowledge Scale
0.147
(0.334)
Cut 1
-5.331
(0.995)
Cut 2
-3.944
(0.959)
Cut 3
-2.506
(0.942_
Cut 4
-0.736
(0.939)
Pseudo R2
0.0418
N
267
Note: The treatment variable takes the value of 1 for those respondents in the MC Latino in
opposition frame and the comparison group (i.e., 0) are those respondents from the MC White in
opposition frame.
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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Table B3: Ordered Logistic Regression Full Models with Party Identification
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
MC White
MC Latino
in Support
in Opposition
in Support
in Opposition
Treatment
-0.125
-0.236
0.207
-0.679**
(0.285)
(0.414)
(0.479)
(0.016)
Female
0.018
-0.121
0.182
-0.229
(0.365)
(0.746)
(0.627)
(0.489)
Education
0.159
0.160**
-0.007
0.019
(0.115)
(0.146)
(0.946)
(0.862)
Age
-0.227**
-0.027
-0.026**
-0.016*
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.016)
(0.089)
Family Income
-0.013
-0.037
-0.045
0.016
(0.045)
(0.103)
(0.346)
(0.715)
Republican
-0.014
-0.381
-0.439
-0.761**
(0.380)
(0.336)
(0.288)
(0.048)
Conservative
-0.662***
-0.195
-0.420**
-0.208
(0.168)
(0.241)
(0.019)
(0.192)
Prejudice Scale
-1.770
-2.867**
-1.868
-3.450***
(1.144)
(0.010)
(0.113)
(0.004)
White Thermometer
-0.005
-0.004
-0.005
-0.005
(0.008)
(0.645)
(0.487)
(0.491)
Latino Thermometer
0.020***
0.010
0.019**
0.012
(0.008)
(0.178)
(0.008)
(0.116)
Language Threat
0.056
-0.010
0.317
0.248
(0.206)
(0.954)
(0.102)
(0.184)
Perceived Size of
0.005
0.001
0.026**
0.007
Latino Population
(0.011)
(0.919)
(0.021)
(0.521)
Political Knowledge
-0.038
0.709*
0.113
0.459
Scale
(0.460)
(0.083)
(0.799)
(0.300)
Cut 1

-5.585
(1.261)
-4.070
(1.215)
-2.641
(1.887)
-1.135
(1.185)

-5.520
(1.204)
-4.178
(1.165)
-2.797
(1.136)
-1.278
(1.126)

-5.565
(1.185)
-4.312
(1.148)
-3.029
(1.119)
-1.550
(1.106)

-6.127
(1.159)
-4.819
(1.112)
-3.480
(1.085)
-1.845
(1.074)

Adjusted R2
0.1060
N
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*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

0.0704
183

0.1105
175

0.0929
180

Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
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Figure B1: Marginal Effect of MC Latino Opposition Frame on Bilingual Education Support by
Political Knowledge with Ordinal Dependent Variable
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Figure B2: Pro-Bilingual Education Frame with Latino MC
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Figure B3: Anti-Bilingual Education Frame with Anglo MC

203

Text B1: Survey Experiment Items
Q1 [Race]
What racial group best describes you?
[1] White
[2] Black or African American
[3] American Indian or Alaska Native
[4] Asian
[5] Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
[6] Middle Eastern
[7] Mixed
[8] Other
Q2 [Ethnicity]
Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic descent?
[1] Yes
[2] No
Q3 [Age]
In what year where you born?
Q4 [Education]
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
[1] Less than high school
[2] Some high school
[3] High school degree
[4] Some college
[5] 2-year college degree
[6] 4-year college degree
[7] Post-graduate degree
Q5 [Party identification]
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, and Independent, or
what?
[1] Republican
[2] Independent
[3] Democrat
[4] Other
[5] None
Q6 [Ideology]
When it comes to politics, how would you describe your viewpoint?
[1] Very conservative
[2] Conservative
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[3] Moderate
[4] Liberal
[5] Very liberal
[6] Not sure
Q7 [Zip code]
What is your current zip code?
Q8 [Family income]
Thinking back over the last year, what was your family’s annual income?
[1] Less than $10,000
[2] $10,000 - $19,999
[3] $20,000 - $29,999
[4] $30,000 - $39,999
[5] $40,000 - $49,999
[6] $50,000 - $59,999
[7] $60,000 - $69,999
[8] $70,000 - $79,999
[9] $80,000 - $89,999
[10] $90,000 - $99,999
[11] $100,000 - $149,999
[12] $150,000 - $199,999
[13] $200,000 - $249,000
[14] More than $250,000
Q9 [Political knowledge item 1]
What is the name of the current speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives?
Q10 [Political knowledge item 2]
What amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of speech?
Q11 [Political knowledge item 3]
How many justices normally serve on the U.S. Supreme Court?
Q12 [Political knowledge item 4]
What proportion of Congress is needed to override a presidential veto?
Q13 [Bilingual education]
How do you feel about bilingual education?
[1] Strongly in favor of it
[2] Somewhat in favor of it
[3] Neither in favor nor opposed to it
[4] Somewhat opposed to it
[5] Strongly opposed to it
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Q14 [U.S. population estimate]
Just your best guess – what percentage of the United States population is currently in each
group?
Whites
[ ## ] %
Blacks/African Americans
[ ## ] %
Hispanics or Latinos
[ ## ] %
Asian Americans
[ ## ] %
American Indians
[ ## ] %
Other
[ ## ] %
Q15 [Community population estimate]
Just your best guess – what percentage of the people who live in your local community is each
group?
Whites
[ ## ] %
Blacks/African Americans
[ ## ] %
Hispanics or Latinos
[ ## ] %
Asian Americans
[ ## ] %
American Indians
[ ## ] %
Other
Q16 [Language]
Can you speak a language other than English?
[1] Yes
[2] No
Q17 [Fluency]
How well do you speak that language?
[1] Very well
[2] Well
[3] Not well
[4] Hardly at all
Q18 [Anglo feeling thermometer]
I'd like to get your feelings toward groups that are in the news these days. You will be provided
the name of a group and I'd like you to rate that group using the feeling thermometer. Ratings
between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group.
Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group
and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50-degree mark
if you don't feel particularly warm or cold towards them. How would you rate Caucasians using
the thermometer? Note: If you rate the group at 0, then you have to move the pointer off of 0 and
return it in order for your response to be recorded.
Cold
Warm
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
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Q19 [Hispanic feeling thermometer]
I'd like to get your feelings toward groups that are in the news these days. You will be provided
the name of a group and I'd like you to rate that group using the feeling thermometer. Ratings
between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group.
Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group
and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50-degree mark
if you don't feel particularly warm or cold towards them. How would you rate Hispanics using
the thermometer? Note: If you rate the group at 0, then you have to move the pointer off of 0 and
return it in order for your response to be recorded.
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Next, I will provide you with some statements and I want you to tell me whether you agree or
disagree with them.
Q20 [Prejudice item 1]
Hispanics can get ahead if they work hard enough.
[1] Strongly disagree
[2] Somewhat disagree
[3] Neither agree nor disagree
[4] Somewhat agree
[5] Strongly agree
Q21 [Prejudice item 2]
A lot of Hispanics are not well off because there aren’t enough jobs to go around.
[1] Strongly disagree
[2] Somewhat disagree
[3] Neither agree nor disagree
[4] Somewhat agree
[5] Strongly agree
Q22 [Prejudice item 3]
The financial situation of Hispanics would improve if they had a chance to get a good education.
[1] Strongly disagree
[2] Somewhat disagree
[3] Neither agree nor disagree
[4] Somewhat agree
[5] Strongly agre
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation speaks to the various ways in which Latinos are represented in the
American political process. It also adds to our understanding of the relationship legislators have
with the Latino population and of the way in which they engage in the legislative process. All of
those things are important for understanding the representation of Latinos, especially when we
consider the current state of the study of Latinos in American politics. When compared to some
other groups in American society, Latinos are an understudied population within the discipline.
The paucity in the literature on the attitudinal, behavioral, and representational dimensions in the
study of the Latino population can partially be explained by the fact that only recently has this
segment of the population become the largest minority group in the country. Nevertheless, the
growth that this group has experienced, and the increasingly pivotal role that this population plays
in state, local, and federal elections, means that this group merits the same exploration and
methodological rigor applied in trying to understand other populations in the U.S. This work is an
attempt to add to that exploration. In the sections that follow I will summarize each of the core
parts of the study, discuss their limitations (and proposed work moving forward to address them),
and provide some ideas for broader future work.

Summary
The first substantive chapter looks at how Latino constituents fare on the representational
front relative to their Anglo counterparts in the electorate. While it isn’t the only way in which
Latinos – or any other group in society is represented – the dyadic connection between constituents
and their legislators is one that is supposed to be the closest citizens are to the core institutions of
the federal government. As a result, how responsive these representatives are to the people that put
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them in office has consequences for the way that those individuals view government and how they
interact with it. In addition, that relationship has consequences for the way in which the interests
of groups are advanced in government. Amongst other things, the first paper in this dissertation
shows – using a more precise measure of constituent preferences than earlier accounts and
accounting for contextual differences across geographies – that Latinos face a representational
deficit relative to their non-Latino Anglo co-citizens. However, the paper also adds to our
understanding of the underlying processes structuring the relative representation afforded to
Latinos. This is important because understanding the causes of the differences in representation
inform the potential avenues that can be taken in an attempt to ameliorate them. On this front, the
paper suggests that this disconnect in the preferences of Latinos and the behavior of their
legislators is rooted in both anti-Latino behavior (and attitudes) and the behavior (or lack thereof)
on the part of Latinos themselves. This suggests that any strategy to address the gap in the
preferences of Latinos and their legislators needs to account for both the intergroup dynamics at
play and also the underlying factors responsible for differences in participation between Latinos
and non-Latinos.
The second substantive chapter explores a different facet of the representation of Latinos:
via legislative communication. It looks at whether legislators speak to the interests of Latinos and
the factors that explain variation in their propensity to do so. Though this is different from roll call
voting or the advancement of Latino interests in other areas of the legislative process (e.g., in
agenda-setting and in committee work), what legislators are talking about, or failing to talk about,
speaks volumes about their priorities and their perceptions of their constituencies. However, the
paper also contributes to our understanding of the different ways in which minority legislators
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maneuver in the legislative process when compared to their non-minority colleagues. On the
former, the paper shows that Latino legislators and Democrats are more likely to speak to issues
important to Latinos in the electorate. On the latter, it shows that Latino legislators are more likely
to engage in making symbolic appeals, something I attribute to the majoritarian processes
influencing the behavior of Latinos in office and of minority legislators more broadly.
The third core part of this dissertation is also focused on communication, but not that
between Latinos and their legislators. Instead, the focus is on Latino legislators and their nonLatino white constituents as compared to white legislators and their white constituents. More
specifically, it explores – through a survey experiment – the role of ethnicity as a source cue on
framing. I look at how receiving a pro- or anti-bilingual education frame from a Latino legislator
influences support for bilingual education in comparison to that argument presented by a nonLatino white legislator. The results suggest that ethnicity does play a role in how receptive Anglo
respondents are to arguments regarding bilingual education.
Even with all of its contributions, there are plenty of other questions raised by this
dissertation and others that are beyond its scope. In closing, I will focus on some of the limitations
in each of the components of the dissertation and then discuss potential avenues for future research.
The papers taken collectively add to our understanding of Latino representation and legislative
behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives, but this dissertation is merely a starting point for
the work that is to come. I will address the limitations of this study and then describe how future
work can improve on the foundation set here.
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Limits and Coming Improvements
Representation as I define (and operationalize) it in the first paper only explores one of the
many ways in which Latinos can be represented by the individuals in office. Though the level of
representation afforded to Latinos as discussed here is likely connected to the other forms of
representation and activities that legislators engage in, there exists the possibility, if only
theoretically, that the interests of Latinos are advanced in other ways and in other areas of the
political process. Outside of that, there are other limitations in the work. For example, the data
used only has issues that the principal investigators decided to include, and the survey was only
fielded in English, both of which limit what a study like this can say about the representation of
Latino interests. Relatedly, even though the data set includes a nationally representative sample of
Latinos in the U.S., the sampling doesn’t account for the sub-ethnic diversity in the Latino
electorate, which is definitely important when trying to generalize about Latino interests. While I
am currently constrained on the data front – like many researchers before me – a smaller scale
survey (or group of surveys) can potentially capture the relationships explored in that paper while
also providing a clearer picture of Latino representation – one that accounts for the sub-ethnic
diversity and language differences that the CCES currently cannot.1
The research design for the second paper – while novel and ambitious – can benefit from
a more nuanced and qualitative supplement. Indeed, though undoubtedly capable of capturing
variation in the communication strategies chosen by legislators and being able to discriminate
amongst different issue areas, that method (i.e., machine learning) is not, at least at this point, able

1

Indeed, though the CCES is a great and valuable resource, there are clear limitations to it as I make clear in the
preceding paragraph, and, in the absence of getting the resources to get questions included in the survey, or having
the principal investigators to be sensitive to those limitations, I am forced to deal with those constraints.

211

to pick up the nuance in the messages posted by legislators. For one, the design in the paper is
unable to pick up on the visual cues presented by legislators in photographs. Indeed, something as
small as a pin, clothing, product, or even place have the potential to communicate things beyond
what is published in a newsletter, tweet, or anything of the sort. That subtlety is lost in the analysis
I conduct, but it is nonetheless part of the signaling that legislators are engaging in an attempt to
make and develop connections with their constituents. To address this, moving forward I plan to
take a subset of Latino and non-Latino legislators and qualitatively explore the content of their
Twitter profiles in a way that captures their communication with a sensitivity to those non-textual
cues. Relatedly, I also plan to look at press releases or other text messages released by legislators,
as they can bypass the visual cue limitation described before.
The framing paper looks only at one issue: bilingual education. This is one glaring
limitation in said work. Exploring other issues can provide more theoretical leverage, as the
findings of the study could be isolated to the issue chosen and possibly the nature of the frames
used. It could also be the case that economic (or other) angles (e.g., cultural) may be more effective
than those used. Relatedly, it may be that the newsletter, though one of the most common forms
of communication used by legislators, could be too lengthy for respondents and subsequently
stunting its effectiveness. Though the use of both pro and con policy framing conditions helps to
ease concerns about validity, the study only looks at one-way communication between legislators
and constituents, which may not always be applicable, especially in the midst of campaigns. To
address those issues, the next iteration of this study will not only include other issues but also
different frames and, most importantly, seeing how exposure to more than one frame and source
cue impacts support for the chosen issues.
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Future Work
Though I focus on the communication from legislators to constituents in this dissertation,
communication going in the opposite direction is also important because it can potentially provide
a way to better understand the responsiveness to Latinos on the policy front and in legislative
communication. A key assumption of the dyadic representation model is that legislators have an
idea of what their constituents want. However, if Latinos aren’t communicating with their
legislators at the same rate as their non-Latino counterparts in the electorate, then that can
potentially explain the deficit captured in this dissertation research. With those considerations in
mind, moving forward I’d like to explore the variation in Latinos’ efforts to contact legislators
across districts and the role that shared ethnicity plays in that propensity and decision-making on
the part of Latino constituents. In addition to exploring the situations where Latinos have Latino
representatives or white ones, I am interested in seeing how they communicate with other minority
legislators (e.g., African American, Asian, etc.). Relatedly, when exploring the situations in which
Latinos are represented by Latino legislators, I want to examine how sub-ethnic ties (or their
absence) influence propensity to contact legislators. Indeed, the country of origin to which a given
individual identifies (e.g., Cuba, Mexico, Argentina, etc.) could affect the willingness of
constituents to contact legislators.
In this dissertation, I focus on comparing how Latinos and Anglos in Congress differ in
their communication with the Latino population but that leaves out the rest of the members that
serve on the legislature.2 How other minorities communicate, and foster relationships, with the

2

Though this is defensible given that the majority of legislators in office are white, and prior work suggesting that
the descriptive connection between Latinos needs to be accounted, there is still a need to branch out and look at the
relationships other non-Latino legislators have with the Latino population.
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Latino population is also an interesting avenue that merits exploration.3 Though the literature on
cross-ethnic coalitions and competition between African Americans and Latinos clearly
demonstrates that the relationship between the two groups is multifaceted and complicated by
things such as feelings of commonality (Kaufmann 2003), contact (McClain et al. 2006), and
acculturation (Sanchez 2008), amongst others, shared experiences and similar positions in society
set the foundation for expectation that the two groups will, under certain conditions, come together
(see Kauffmann 2003 for a discussion; see also Cutia Wilkinson 2014). In addition, and more
important for the ongoing discussion, is the reality that all minority legislators have Latino
constituents in their districts, which means that there is likely an electoral incentive to develop
those relationships with, and amongst, constituents.
Though this is important from a political communication perspective, cross-ethnic
coalitions are also important to study with respect to their influence on the representational
prospects of these different minority groups. Indeed, intergroup dynamics are at the heart of
American politics. With the U.S. seemingly moving towards a majority-minority nation in the
decades that come (Frey 2018), there is much more to be explored about the interactions,
relationships, and political behavior of these different groups in American society. Exploring the
relative homogeneity in the preferences of different minority groups across different contexts is
something that I would like to explore moving forward.
We know that descriptive representation is important for the advancement of minority
interests, but, as the ongoing discussion makes clear, institutional and partisan realities can
sometimes get in the way of those interests being advanced. How constituents view legislators in

3

Relatedly, how Latino legislators appeal to non-Latino minorities also warrants exploration, especially as Latinos
continue to increase their presence and profile in Congress.
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those instances when their roll call voting is not in line with the interests of constituents is an
avenue that merits exploration. Though there is work looking at the attitudes (and behavior) of
constituents as impacted by the presence of descriptive representation (Bowen and Clark 2014;
Casellas and Wallace 2015; English et al. 2018), it may be fruitful to explore the relative leeway
afforded to Latinos in office by their co-ethnics as compared to their non-Latino constituents. That
is, how are Latino legislators viewed when they fail to behave in a way consistent with their coethnic constituents? Relatedly, how do non-Latino constituents view Latino legislators when the
same happens, are they more (or less) tolerant of such behavior? Future work might also benefit
from looking at communication between constituents and legislators with a special attention to
what Latino constituents are telling their (non-)Latino legislators. Recent work on communication
between constituents and legislators highlights the role of shared race and ethnicity (or their
absence) in affecting communication between the two (see Mendez and Grose 2018). In light of
those studies there is a need to look at what Latinos are actually saying to their constituents in the
situations that they do communicate with their legislators, co-ethnics or otherwise. This can add
to our understanding of the relationship between Latinos and their representatives, which
undoubtedly has representational implications and consequences.

Conclusion
In the three papers presented above, I explore different facets of the political representation
of Latinos in the U.S. House of Representatives. In doing so, I add to our understanding of the
relationship between constituents and their legislators, along with that of how different contexts
affect the behavior (and attitudes) of both constituents and legislators. The coming demographic
changes – in both the Latino population and outside of it – ensure that race and ethnicity will
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continue to play a role in the interactions and relationships between the different groups that make
up the U.S. population and the government that represents them. The papers here provide a
foundation for accounting how these changes affect the representation afforded to Latinos moving
forward. I will build on the insights provided here and will do so with a sensitivity to the different
ways in which representation takes place in American politics with respect to Latinos.
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